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Article 
Misunderstanding Judy Norman: Theory as Cause and 
Consequence 
MARTHA R. MAHONEY 
Judy Norman shot her abusive husband during a late afternoon nap while he 
rested before violently trafficking her that night.  The sharp contrast between the 
extreme violence and danger Judy faced and the denial of a self-defense instruction 
triggered extensive academic debates about justification and the use of deadly force.  
Norman became one of the most famous cases involving battered women, appearing 
in many casebooks and hundreds of law review articles.  Despite all this work, the 
facts of the case contradict much of what scholars have said about Norman.  
Misconceptions about expert evidence, “Battered Woman Syndrome,” and battered 
women drive academic errors that affect evaluation of her need to act immediately, 
including the timing of sleep and death and the idea that her perceptions of risk 
were distorted. Almost all legal scholars failed to grapple with the looming threat 
of violent, forcible sexual slavery and therefore did not explore the larger question 
of whether that threat may justify deadly force in self-defense.  
Battered woman syndrome and learned helplessness are terms of art.  In law, 
the term “battered woman syndrome” became a generic umbrella for expert 
evidence whether or not the expert applied Lenore Walker’s original theory. For 
decades, social scientists have applied other frameworks to understanding the 
impact of battering, especially “survivor theory” and “coercive control.”  From the 
mid-1990s, the term “intimate partner violence and its effects” replaced battered 
woman syndrome and learned helplessness, but syndrome terminology persisted in 
legal contexts, giving Walker’s theory disproportionate influence. Simplified 
concepts of the syndrome led some criminal law theorists to believe that critics of 
the Norman holding must be relying on expert testimony about passivity and 
helplessness to argue for change in the concepts of imminence and reasonableness.  
In fact, the forensic expert at Judy Norman’s trial had applied the “coercive 
control” framework that became more influential over time. 
This Article analyzes facts and confronts doctrinal questions in light of current 
social science. Replacing battered woman syndrome with “intimate partner 
violence” and replacing learned helplessness with “. . . the effects of intimate 
 partner violence,” we should reevaluate the literature on Norman and self-defense 
to identify the best arguments and address new questions.    
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Misunderstanding Judy Norman: Theory as Cause and 
Consequence 
MARTHA R. MAHONEY * 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Norman Case in Court and in Legal Scholarship 
Late in the afternoon of June 12, 1985, near Spindale, North Carolina, 
John Thomas Norman (J.T.) was taking a nap before transporting his wife 
Judy to a “truck stop” rest area where, every night, he forced her to sell sex.1 
For two days, J.T. had beaten Judy continuously and threatened to maim her 
and to kill Judy and her mother. His threats frightened Judy’s mother, 
Laverne Laws, so much that Laverne borrowed a gun and put it in her purse. 
Judy’s efforts to find help had failed. Afraid that a crying baby would wake 
J.T. from his nap, Judy took the baby to Laverne’s house thirty yards away. 
J.T. had not allowed Judy to eat for three days and she had a splitting 
headache. She asked her mother for something for the headache; Laverne 
said that there were pain pills in her purse in the next room. Judy opened the 
purse, saw the gun, took it, walked across the road, and shot J.T. while he 
slept.2 
                                                                                                                     
* Professor and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of Law. Portions of this 
Article were presented at faculty workshops at Fordham University School of Law and the University of 
Miami School of Law, and I am grateful to participants for their comments. Donna Coker and Ken 
Casebeer provided many rounds of insights and priceless suggestions. I am deeply grateful to Mary Ann 
Dutton, Mary Ann Franks, Madeleine Plasencia, and Stephanie Wildman for extended comments and 
discussion, to Richard McAdams for suggesting that the Judy Norman case merited an article of its own, 
to Holly Maguigan and Jessica Siegel for thoughtful comments and questions as the project got 
underway, and to Robert Wolf for his thoughts, his time, and the transcript. Elizabeth McIntosh, Nicole 
McLemore, Patrick McGee, Summer Galitz, and Mackenzie Garrity provided superb assistance with 
research. Thanks also to Robin Schard and the reference librarians at University of Miami School of 
Law. These generous helpers are not responsible for any mistakes that remain; all errors are my own.   
1 Transcript of Record at 17, State v. Norman, No. 85-CRS-3890 (N.C. Super. Ct., Rutherford 
County 1987) [hereinafter Transcript] (presenting testimony of Deputy Sheriff R.H. Epley that located 
the Norman residence a mile or two outside of Spindale city limits); id. at 48 (presenting testimony of 
Mark Navarra about trafficking Judy at the “truck stop”); id. at 128 (presenting testimony of Judy Norman 
referring to a “truck stop” and clarifying that it was a “rest area” on I-85 near Kings Mountain, North 
Carolina.). Judicial opinions used both terms. See State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 1011 
(N.C. 1989) (majority opinion) (using the term “rest area”); id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (using the 
term “rest[ ]stop”); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (using the 
terms “truck stop” and “rest stop”). 
2 For a description of the history of the marriage, see infra Part I.A.  
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At Judy’s murder trial in 1987, a detailed record of violence, degradation 
and threats emerged from thorough, intelligent work by her attorneys, 
Robert Wolf and Robert Harris; the court-appointed forensic psychologist, 
Dr. William Tyson; and the trial judge, John Gardner.3 Although Judge 
Gardner denied Judy’s request for a jury instruction on self-defense, he had 
appointed Dr. Tyson, admitted all evidence relevant to evaluating both 
provocation and self-defense, and given the issue serious consideration until 
the end of the trial.4 The jury convicted Judy of manslaughter.5 In 1988, an 
appellate court ordered a new trial, holding that a jury could find J.T.’s sleep 
to be only “a momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror” that might 
show imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.6 In 1989, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that Judy had “ample time” to 
find other ways to protect herself; they saw no evidence that could give rise 
to either actual or reasonable belief that she faced imminent threat or needed 
to use deadly force.7 Justice Harry Martin dissented, emphasizing not only 
Judy’s fear but her inability to escape, the failure of her efforts to get help, 
and the fears and perceptions of threat among the people closest to her.8  
The sharp contrast between the violence and danger facing Judy Norman 
and the denial of a self-defense instruction brought legal scholars into 
extensive debates about justification and the use of deadly force. Norman 
came to stand for a class of sympathetic defendants who killed in response 
to horrifying abuse, under circumstances in which most scholars could not 
see an imminent threat to justify self-defense.9 Hundreds of law review 
articles cite the case, many casebooks include it as a principal case or note, 
and scholarly debates on self-defense often focus on Norman.10  
                                                                                                                     
3 See infra note 26204 and accompanying text (highlighting that Judge Gardner chose both of the 
experts the defense called at trial and that, as a court-appointed expert, Dr. Tyson was available to testify 
for either party); see also infra note 282 and accompanying text (explaining that Dr. Rollins had 
performed Judy’s competency evaluation after the shooting).  
4 See, e.g., infra note 270 (overruling objection to allowing expert opinion on whether Judy 
reasonably believed it was necessary to kill her husband); see also Transcript, supra note 1, at 196–203 
(considering other battered women’s self-defense cases during conference on jury instructions).  
5 Transcript, supra note 1, at 22; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 9. 
6 Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 592 (holding that a jury “could find that decedent’s sleep was but a 
momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror by the decedent, [and] that defendant merely took 
advantage of her first opportunity to protect herself”). 
7 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (stating a conclusion that time was “ample” without referring to the 
facts or explaining its reasoning).  
8 Id. at 1718 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
9 See, e.g., Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman, 10 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 342, 346 (2007) (describing Norman II as “the most widely-cited example of a battered 
woman prevented from claiming self-defense solely by an application of the imminence rule” and citing 
discussion by other scholars). 
 10 Some articles focus on the Norman case in detail. See Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted 
in Reasonable Self-Defense: An Abused Woman and a Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 65, 6566 
(2008) (arguing that Judy Norman’s action was reasonable); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of 
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 89–93 (1991) (reviewing 
 
 2019] MISUNDERSTANDING JUDY NORMAN: THEORY AS CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE 677 
Norman is one of the best-known cases in criminal law, but the scholarly 
debates include serious errors explored in this Article. Many of these 
mistakes rest on legal misunderstandings about the social science on 
battering. Scholars often treat Norman as a case defined by “battered woman 
syndrome” as they understand that term.11 Many misunderstand “learned 
helplessness” as a literal term and assume that the legal argument for self-
defense rested on Lenore Walker’s application of “learned helplessness” to 
battered women.12 This allowed myths about passivity and lack of help-
seeking to confuse scholars about the content of expert testimony. “Battered 
woman syndrome” is a term of art with different meaning in psychology 
than in law. In law, many states made it a generic term for expert evidence, 
whether or not that expert applied Walker’s theories. To clarify these issues, 
encompass the breadth of knowledge in the field, and avoid 
misunderstandings, psychologists have for decades described the subject of 
expert knowledge as “battering and its effects” or “intimate partner violence 
and its effects.”13  
In the Norman trial, Dr. Tyson’s testimony applied a “coercive control” 
framework that, along with “survivor theory,” became more influential and 
better-supported than Walker’s “syndrome.” Subsequent work in social 
                                                                                                                     
Norman in detail and noting deadly threats, the threat of forced prostitution as “third-party rape,” and 
attacks on Judy’s ability to leave). A Westlaw search of law reviews and journals on February 15, 2018 
found 201 articles that cited Norman I, Norman II, or both decisions. For examples of scholarly 
discussion, see, e.g., Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman, in 
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 407 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 
eds., 2009) (featuring a debate between several authors regarding imminence in self-defense with 
substantial focus on Norman); Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters: 
Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW 
THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 26468 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters] (discussing Norman). For coverage 
of Norman in casebooks, see SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 903 (10th ed. 2017) (principal case); CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN ET AL., FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE: CASES & MATERIALS 236 (5th ed. 2018); JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 576 (8th ed. 2017) (note). 
11 See, e.g., Joshua Dressler & Holly Maguigan, Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 1, 11 (2011) (noting that this section of the exchange is based on the 
Judy Norman case); 15 (identifying Dressler’s concern as “the infusion of the Battered Woman Syndrome 
evidence as the way to prove imminence . . . .”); Jane Campbell Moriarty, “While Dangers Gather”: The 
Bush Preemption Doctrine, Battered Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 24 (2005) (stating that Norman did not allow expert testimony because that 
testimony would have made “[h]omicidal self-help . . . a lawful solution” (citing Norman II, 378 S.E.2d 
at 15)). 
12 For a discussion of concepts of “Battered Woman Syndrome” and “learned helplessness,” see 
infra Part III; see also infra note 254 and accompanying text (quoting Joshua Dressler, “learned to be 
helpless”); infra note 398 and accompanying text (“It is almost impossible to imagine that a human being, 
rather than a thing, could really be that passive when abused.” (quoting Anne Coughlin)); infra note 440 
and accompanying text (“addicted to abuse” (quoting George Fletcher)).  
13 See infra note 221 and accompanying text.  
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science would clarify some of the issues in Norman and illuminate the 
evaluation of danger. 14  
Cultural and social awareness also changed after Norman. In the 1980s, 
research and policy proposals on sexual slavery and forced prostitution were 
just emerging.15 After the late 1990s, states and the federal government gave 
greater recognition to the dangers of trafficking, provided special visas for 
victims, and took additional legal measures.16 It is not surprising that in the 
1980s, judges, lawyers, and commentators saw forced prostitution as part of 
a pattern of abuse rather than a harm that in itself might justify defensive 
force. Nonetheless, scholars should have been able to understand Judy 
Norman’s statements about the looming threat of violent prostitution, quoted 
in the published opinions.17 
The legal academy has spent a lot of time and ink on Norman, but much 
of our work ignored important statements by Judy Norman and Dr. Tyson. 
When legal scholars mine social science for nuggets to support what we 
already believe, we miss complexity and evolving knowledge. 
Misunderstandings about “battered woman syndrome” theory affected 
scholarly analysis of the Norman case—in the subtitle of this article, “theory 
as cause.” Significant misconceptions include the ideas that presenting 
expert evidence constitutes a separate and distinct “battered woman 
syndrome” defense, that “learned helplessness” is a literal term and not a 
psychological term of art, and that expert testimony focuses on abnormal 
perception. Professors also failed to grasp the urgency of the threat of 
trafficking Judy identified at trial.18 And those mistakes had consequences: 
debates that missed threats and relied on a vulgarized idea of “learned 
helplessness” generated flawed legal theory proposals.  
                                                                                                                     
14 See infra notes 222–74 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the subsequent social 
science work relevant to the Norman case). 
15 See, e.g., KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY xi (1979) (explaining that when she 
began writing her book, “the subject had been so effectively buried that there was hardly a trace of 
evidence that women were being forced into prostitution and trafficked from one country to another”; xi-
xiii (explaining the impact of the expansion of pornography and acknowledging the recency of work 
against sexual slavery at the time of writing); 5-9 (explaining work with the concept of “female sexual 
slavery,” and issues of research methodology). 
16 See, e.g., Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat. 1474 (2000) (delineating the various increased protections afforded by the U.S. government to 
victims of sex trafficking as part of this act); see also infra note 494 and accompanying text (highlighting 
other legislative changes relating to victims of sex trafficking). 
17 State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. 1989) (majority opinion); see also infra 
notes 189, 199202 and accompanying text (discussing the threat of violent prostitution that Judy 
Norman faced).  
18 These failures echo the judicial failure to see imminent threat when a man was on top of a woman 
with his hands around her throat. See V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1235, 1246–48 (2001) (discussing trial ruling in Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949 (1981)); id. at 
1286 (“[E]ven when the cases are confrontational—when the gun is pointed at her—they still are not 
seen as confrontational.”).  
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This Article reconstructs Judy Norman’s experience from published 
opinions and the trial transcript, supplemented by public records. Scholarly 
mistakes about Norman were avoidable because most of the important facts 
appear in the published opinions,19 but the transcript provides additional 
examples of coercive control, danger, and other details important to applying 
subsequent social science research. To help the reader distinguish the 
material we should all have understood without additional aid from the 
transcript, citations supporting facts will include references to the pages at 
which these facts appeared in the opinions as well as in the transcript.  
We will examine impending threat: the fear that J.T. was going to kill 
Judy—expressed by eyewitnesses as well as the defendant—and Judy’s fear 
of the forcible trafficking and torture that would commence when J.T. woke 
from his nap. We will ask how the possibility or impossibility of escape 
should be relevant to the time frame of threat. We will consider whether the 
brief and uncertain remainder of an afternoon nap should make deadly force 
unavailable to defend against either death or brutal trafficking. After 
clarifying the content of expert testimony, we will evaluate scholarly 
arguments about justification and self-defense in Norman, including the 
proposal for an alternative defense based on duress and excuse. To illustrate 
the ways in which preconceptions have overrun facts, we begin with a 
circumstance that all three opinions described differently: At what time of 
day did Judy Norman shoot J.T.? 
A. What Time Was It and Why Does It Matter? A “Midnight Shooting” 
During an Afternoon “Nap” 
The majority opinion in the Supreme Court of North Carolina said Judy 
had “ample time and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing 
further abuse by her husband.”20 “Ample time” is relevant to the question of 
                                                                                                                     
19 Among the points that appear throughout this Article that should have been apparent in the 
published opinions: J.T. Norman was napping before trafficking Judy, not asleep for the night; testimony 
from Dr. Tyson, the psychologist, emphasized coercive control rather than Lenore Walker’s theory of 
learned helplessness; Tyson’s testimony supported the reasonableness of Judy’s perception—his review 
of the record showed no options she had overlooked; Judy’s behavior was not passive—she engaged in 
urgent help-seeking; the most immediate threat Judy identified from the witness stand was forcible sex 
trafficking that night—death came second; and the family was so convinced of his dangerousness that 
they failed to intervene when they watched him burn her with a cigarette and when he trafficked her. See 
infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (discussing whether J.T. was napping); infra Part II.B 
(describing Dr. Tyson’s testimony about coercive control and help-seeking); infra note 199 and 
accompanying text (discussing Judy Norman’s immediate fear of prostitution); Transcript, supra note 1, 
at 48, 56, 66, 131 (showing various family members’ knowledge of cigarette burning and trafficking). In 
addition, basic legal research would have revealed that, when the police told Judy they could not arrest 
J.T. unless she “took out a warrant,” they were wrong—state law had changed years earlier to allow 
warrantless arrest for domestic violence. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
20 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (N.C. 1989) (majority opinion). 
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whether a threat was imminent.21 In addition, courts sometimes use the term 
“imminent” to assess the likely progress of an ambiguous threat,22 so Judy’s 
“opportunity to resort to other means” is directly relevant to whether deadly 
force was necessary but might also be relevant to imminence.23  
Each judicial opinion described the timeframe somewhat differently. 
The appellate court described a “late afternoon . . . nap” with police 
dispatched at 7:30 PM.24 In the North Carolina Supreme Court, the dissent 
stated that J.T. lay down “[e]arly in the evening” and the majority said 
simply, “evening.” But both the majority and dissent stated that the police 
arrived at “night.”25  
In fact, J.T. Norman napped and died by daylight, although the transcript 
does not state when he lay down or how long he slept. June 12th was close 
to the longest day of the year, and sunset was more than an hour away when 
police received the call about his death and when they arrived.26 “Late 
afternoon” and “early evening” are fair descriptions; some definitions of 
“evening” apply as well. But the police did not arrive at “night”—a term 
defined in relation to either sunset or darkness.27 The appellate court was 
                                                                                                                     
21 States use varying language to describe the temporal urgency required for justified self-defense: 
imminent, immediate, or necessary to act immediately. See 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 
DEFENSES § 131(c)(1) (1984) (noting variations of language for imminence); see also WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (2d ed. 2016 update) (discussing variations in 
terminology for imminence). 
22 See Nourse, supra note 18, at 1252–53 (2001) (“The vast majority of imminence-relevant cases 
in my survey look like the ‘standard’ self-defense case—a case, for example, in which the defendant 
alleged that he saw a weapon, the victim was advancing, or there was a fight.” (footnotes omitted)); id. 
at 1253 n.89 (citing a case in which one prisoner advanced toward another with his hand in his pocket).  
23 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (majority opinion). As explored in Section I.B below, when courts 
consider the availability of options in the evaluation of imminence, they concede that context matters to 
assessing temporal urgency. 
24 State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587–88 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
25 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting); id. at 11 (majority opinion). 
26 See Complete Sun and Moon Data for One Day, U.S. NAVAL OBSERVATORY, 
http://aa.usno.navy.mil/rstt/onedaytable?ID=AA&year=1985&month=6&day=12&state=NC&place=S
pindale (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (showing complete sun and moon data for Wednesday, June 12, 1985). 
The U.S. Naval Observatory calculator, Sun and Moon Data for One Day, found that in Spindale, North 
Carolina, on June 12, 1985, sunset came at 8:43 PM and twilight ended at 9:13 PM. Id. Captain Price of 
the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office was first on the scene, after receiving a call about J.T.’s death at 
7:20 PM. Transcript, supra note 1, at 79. Deputy Epley received a call at 7:37 PM. and arrived at the 
house at 7:49 PM. Id. at 17. The appellate opinion summarizes these times accurately as approximately 
7:30 PM. Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587. 
27 “Night” has more than one definition, but almost all are anchored in relation to sunset or to an 
identifiable level of darkness. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 485 
(William Sprague ed., 9th ed. 1915) (“As to what is reckoned night, and what day, for this purpose: 
anciently the day was accounted to begin only at sunrising, and to end immediately upon sunset[.]”); 
Black’s Law Dictionary has four separate definitions and the first three confirm the relationship to 
darkness or sunset: “1. The time from sunset to sunrise. 2. Darkness; the time when a person's face is not 
discernible . . . . 3. Thirty minutes after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise . . .” The fourth definition 
in Black’s Law Dictionary – “evening” – could lead to confusion between evening and night, and some 
of the references to police activity on June 11th and 12th. For additional clarification, the North Carolina 
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correct and both opinions in the state supreme court were wrong on that 
point.28  
“Night” appears frequently in work by legal scholars. One author quotes 
the appellate court on the “late afternoon . . . nap,” and only seven pages 
later refers to a “midnight shooting.”29 Another refers to the afternoon “nap,” 
then says that Judy Norman “had several hours to ‘cool off’ before she killed 
her sleeping husband” and discusses whether “she could have just fled into 
the night.”30 Authors who read in a long period of sleep cannot cite facts for 
that time frame, and “midnight shooting” is a fantasy or projection with no 
support in any account. These writers imagine a luxury of time that Judy did 
not possess. 
These subtle differences about time frame reveal questions important to 
the temporal urgency of danger that are lost in arguments based on “night”: 
How long could J.T. be expected to remain asleep? Did the judges 
understand that he was napping before trafficking activity that night? That 
the nap might last only minutes longer? Did the majority read in a longer 
period when they coupled “night” and “sleep,” or when they treated the 
Norman case as “somewhat similar” to a defendant who hid from a vengeful 
enemy for eight hours before taking a shotgun to his home and killing him 
while he slept?31 Should Judy’s proven inability to resist J.T.’s attacks matter 
in evaluating the urgency of the impending threat? What quantum of time 
would be ample for her to make yet another attempt to find help? How 
should we consider uncertainty—does a reasonable person measure the time 
remaining in a nap from the longest or the shortest possibility? And should 
that estimate consider patterns recognized among abusers?32 I will argue that 
                                                                                                                     
burglary statute, judges adopted a light-based standard: it is night when not enough light remains to see 
a person’s face without artificial lighting. State v. McKeithan, 537 S.E.2d 526, 533 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). 
On the day of the shooting, police would have been on the scene for some time; casual references in the 
transcript sometimes include either term, “evening” or “night.” See Transcript, supra note 1, 43–45, 85 
(using the terms “evening” and “night”). 
28 Compare Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (indicating that police arrived in the evening), with 
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 9 (stating that police arrived at night) (majority opinion), and Norman II, 378 
S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting that police arrived in the evening around 8:00 PM). 
29 Compare Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 457, 461 (2006) [hereinafter Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers] 
(“afternoon . . . nap”) (quoting Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587–89), with id. at 468 n.27 (“midnight 
shooting”). See also Joshua Dressler, Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some 
Critical Reflections, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1475, 1489 (2010) [hereinafter Dressler, Feminist (or 
“Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law] (“[D]eadly force was not immediately necessary in the middle 
of the night while J.T. slept.” (second emphasis added)). 
30 See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 
N.C. L. Rev. 371, 393 (1993) (“nap”); id. at 374–75 n.5 (“[O]f course, Ms. Norman had several hours to 
‘cool off’ . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 393–94 (treating escape as impractical or unavailable and 
discussing potential risk if she “just fled into the night”). 
31 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13–14 (majority opinion) (citing State v. Mize, 340 S.E.2d 439 (N.C. 
1986)). 
32 In a thoughtful essay, Professor Joan Krause evokes the experience of parents: 
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the mis-descriptions of time frame by judges and scholars reveal stereotypes 
about impaired perception in battered women and, simultaneously, reveal a 
problem in professorial attachment to our own interpretations: How else 
could “afternoon” turn into “midnight” without anyone noticing the change?  
Part I retells Judy Norman’s story chronologically. Part II reviews the 
range of theories of intimate partner violence from the 1980s to the present, 
unpacks the expert testimony at trial, and traces the way in which the 
Norman appellate opinions recast expert testimony on “coercive control” 
into a “syndrome” framework. Part III criticizes scholarly misreadings that 
sprang from oversimplified and mistaken concepts about the “syndrome” 
and battered women. 
Part IV explores ways to clarify these misunderstandings. Courts and 
scholars divide on whether sleep rules out imminent threat from the abuser. 
Part IV.A covers contradictions in theories about the legal ramifications of 
sleep, while Part IV.B explores questions about timing and threat that arise 
if resistance to violent, forcible sex trafficking may justify the use of deadly 
force in self-defense. Part IV.C addresses the relevance of witness 
perceptions of threat to the jury’s evaluation of reasonableness, and Part 
IV.D asks what interventions, if any, could have saved Judy Norman without 
killing her husband. Focusing on imminence and justification, Part IV.E 
addresses Joshua Dressler’s argument that justification must be unavailable 
and an excuse defense based on duress would be a more principled and 
effective way to address Judy Norman’s situation. 
I. JUDY NORMAN’S STORY 
A. History of the Marriage 
Judy Ann Laws married John Thomas Norman when she was fifteen-
years old and pregnant; he was five years older.33 Judy had two children by 
                                                                                                                     
Unless actually comatose, a sleeping abuser is merely seconds away from being an 
awakened abuser—and research demonstrates that abusers (particularly when 
intoxicated) tend to sleep lightly, demand that their partners be present when they 
awaken, and resume the abuse immediately. . . . By way of loose analogy, as parents 
of infants well know, a sleeping baby is merely seconds away from being a screaming 
baby. Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to describe my daughter’s afternoon nap as 
an “imminent meltdown”—one that my husband and I may be uniquely qualified to 
predict.  
Joan H. Krause, Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill: A Response to Professor 
Dressler, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 555, 563 n.35 (2007). 
33 Transcript, supra note 1, at 127. The majority opinion in the North Carolina Supreme Court 
recognized implicitly how young Judy was when they married. See Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (“At the 
time of the killing, the thirty-nine-year-old defendant and her husband had been married almost twenty-
five years and had several children.”). Most testimony at trial focused on the period around J.T.’s death, 
but prior abuse was of vital importance to understanding that period. Testimony from Judy herself, Dr. 
Tyson, and Mark Navarra fills in some of the history and context of the marriage. Id. at 47 (Mark 
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the year she turned eighteen.34 During the first five years of marriage, J.T. 
did not abuse her.35 Sometimes she worked as a waitress, but after J.T. 
started drinking and became abusive, she could no longer hold a job. J.T. 
said she did not make enough money as a waitress; he would come to her 
workplace and make her leave.36 He began forcing her into prostitution.37  
While they still lived in North Carolina, Judy had her third child.38 J.T. 
had family in Chicago, and they moved there in late 1968 or early 1969.39 
The family lived on welfare and the money from Judy’s prostitution.40 
Sometimes, J.T. threw her out of the house without a coat or shoes and 
forbade her to come back without enough money; sometimes, she had to 
sleep in the car.41 When he spent the money on alcohol, Judy shoplifted food 
for the children.42 
In Chicago, they had two more children.43 Judy gave birth to their fourth 
child prematurely in 1969 after J.T. beat her and kicked her down a flight of 
                                                                                                                     
Navarra); id. at 126 (Judy); id. at 152 (Dr. Tyson). Public records drawing from the Social Security Death 
Index show their dates of birth: J.T. Norman in 1940 and Judy Ann Laws in 1945. John Norman, SOCIAL 
SECURITY DEATH INDEX 1935–2014, https://www.ancestry.com (under “Search” and “Birth, Marriage 
& Death” search in the first name field for “John,” last name field “Norman,” birth year field “1940,” 
and “North Carolina” in the location field); Judy A. Norman, SOCIAL SECURITY DEATH INDEX 1935–
2014, https://www.ancestry.com (under “Search” and “Birth, Marriage & Death” search in the first name 
field for “Judy A.,” last name field “Norman,” birth year field “1945,” and “North Carolina” in the 
location field). 
34 See Jerry Dean Norman, NORTH CAROLINA BIRTH INDEXES, https://www.ancestry.com (citing 
Jerry Dean Norman as born in 1961); Robert Thomas Norman, NORTH CAROLINA BIRTH INDEXES, 
https://www.ancestry.com (citing Robert Thomas Norman as born in 1962 to John and Judy).  
35 See Transcript, supra note 1, at 134 (stating that abuse began after five years, when he began 
drinking); see also State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that 
“Norman was an alcoholic. He had begun to drink and to beat defendant five years after they were 
married.”). 
36 See id. at 136 (stating that when she worked as a waitress he would force her to quit, describing 
how he came to one of her jobs and forced her to walk out twice in one day, and concluding that “[h]e 
wouldn’t let [her] work like that” because she did not make enough money). 
37 See id. at 128 (describing how he would beat her if she did not prostitute); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d 
at 10 (stating that her husband “forced her to make money by prostitution . . . .”).  
38 See Phyllis Christine Norman, NORTH CAROLINA BIRTH INDEXES, https://www.ancestry.com 
(citing Phyllis as born to John and Judy in 1968). 
39 See Transcript, supra note 1, at 137 (quoting that Judy’s son was “shot in Chicago” and her 
husband had relatives in Chicago). 
40 See id. at 145 (referencing testimony of Judy Norman that family lived on welfare and she worked 
as a prostitute). 
41 See id. at 55–56 (recording testimony of Mark Navarr, who lived with J.T. and Judy in Chicago 
and North Carolina for about a year and a half and observed these conditions).  
42 Id. at 136. 
43 The move to Chicago took place between November 1968, when Phyllis was born in North 
Carolina, and August 1969, when John Wayne Norman was born prematurely in Chicago. See supra note 
38 (establishing that Phyllis Christine Norman was born in North Carolina in 1968); see also Transcript 
supra note 1, at 149 (stating that Judy’s “son was born in ’69 in Chicago.”). Loretta, the youngest child, 
was born in December 1978. See North Carolina Voter Registration, LEXISNEXIS, 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/gateway.page (follow “Public Records” to “Voter Registration” 
hyperlink; search First Name field for “Loretta” and Last Name field for “Hines” and select the State as 
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stairs.44 The appellate opinion described this attack during pregnancy and 
noted correctly that four of Judy’s five children were still living at the time 
she shot J.T.45 That led some scholars to infer that the premature baby had 
died,46 but the transcript reveals an even more extreme form of control over 
Judy. John Wayne Norman weighed only one and a half pounds at birth. 
During the six months he remained in the hospital, J.T. forbade Judy to visit 
him.47 When John Wayne finally left the hospital, J.T. gave the baby to his 
sister to raise. Judy did not see the boy until he was twelve years old when 
he found her and asked to live with her. She said yes.48 
Whatever Judy feared in that moment at the top of those stairs, she could 
not have imagined that if she and the baby both survived, they would have 
no contact for twelve years (even if they had argued about giving the baby 
to his sister, she would not have anticipated an attack that risked the baby’s 
life). The abuser enhances power and control when the target cannot prepare 
physically or emotionally against pain, fear, and loss.49 The most dangerous 
batterers use knowledge they gain through intimacy to inflict pain and fear 
with unique effectiveness for a particular victim.50 And Judy was vulnerable. 
She had no right to legal counsel in her effort to find safety with her children 
or regain custody of her son, and her criminal record for prostitution and 
                                                                                                                     
“North Carolina”); Judy Norman, Harrelson Funeral and Cremation Services, http://hosting-
9639.tributes.com/obituary/show/Judy-Norman-95106577 (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (stating in Judy’s 
obituary that Loretta Hines was her daughter). The family did not return to North Carolina until late 1983. 
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 190 (verifying through Lemuel Splawn’s testimony that J.T. had been 
away for almost twenty years).  
44 Transcript, supra note 1, at 151; State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1988). 
45 Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587. Cf. State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989) 
(stating that Judy had “several children”). 
46 See Jane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for 
the Criminal Law?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 757, 787 n.64 (1996) (“When Mrs. Norman was pregnant with 
her fifth child, her husband beat her and kicked her down a flight of steps, causing the premature birth, 
and death, of the baby the next day.”); Tania Tetlow, Criminalizing "Private" Torture, 58 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 183, 199 (2016) (“He knocked her down the stairs while she was pregnant, which resulted in the 
death of their child.”). 
47 See Transcript, supra note 1, at 151 (testimony of Judy Norman) (stating his birth weight, that 
“he stayed in the hospital for six months,” and that her “husband wouldn’t even let [her] go see him”).  
48 See id. (stating that “my husband’s sister kept him until he was twelve (12) years old” and 
indicating that John Wayne Norman was still living with Judy at the time of the trial). 
49 Cf. HARLAN K. ULLMAN & JAMES P. WADE, DEFENSE GROUP INC., SHOCK AND AWE: 
ACHIEVING RAPID DOMINANCE xxiv (1996) (explaining the goal of the experts who developed the 
military campaign strategy of “Shock and Awe” was “to affect the will, perception, and understanding 
of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and 
Awe”). 
50 EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 241 
(2007) (describing the “technology” of coercive control—the methods that make threats credible, 
punishments compelling, and escapes difficult). 
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shoplifting would have increased her fear of turning to courts for help.51 
Given the high risk of failure and the credibility of J.T.’s threats to kill, she 
probably did not consider legal action.  
Abuse was linked to J.T.’s drinking. He hit Judy “most every 
day . . . whenever he got drunk.”52 Judy said that they “got along very well 
when he was sober”53 and that he was “a good guy” when he was not drunk.54 
But the drinking—and abuse—continued. He beat her with his fists, with a 
baseball bat, and with household items turned into weapons, including 
bottles, glasses, an ashtray, a shoe, and a flyswatter.55 When he beat her, she 
cried but did not fight back.56 Beyond physical violence and unpredictable 
terror, he forced her to sleep on the floor, sometimes to eat pet food from the 
dog dish, and sometimes to bark like a dog.57 
Judy tried fleeing in search of help. In 1973, before Chicago had any 
hotlines or shelters,58 she was admitted for treatment at Chicago-Reid 
Mental Health Center.59 There, she described battering incidents and was 
diagnosed with injuries consistent with abuse. Two days later, she left after 
J.T. arrived at the hospital and made frightening threats.60 
At trial, Judy’s lawyer asked why she had not left her husband. She 
answered that she had left him many times: “I’ve . . . stayed all night in 
hotels to get away from him; he’d find me. I’ve walked to my son’s house 
with no coat on . . . in snow to get away from him.”61 Whenever she left, 
                                                                                                                     
51 See Transcript, supra note 1, at 136 (testimony of Judy Norman) (describing arrests in Chicago 
for shoplifting and prostitution).  
52 Id. at 57 (testimony of Mark Navarra); State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 
1989) (majority opinion); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
53 Transcript, supra note 1, at 181 (testimony of Dr. Rollins); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (majority 
opinion). 
54 Transcript, supra note 1, at 144 (testimony of Judy Norman); Norman II, 328 S.E.2d at 10. 
55 Norman II, 328 S.E.2d at 10 (stating that physical abuse included striking her with various 
objects); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587 (“He would beat defendant with whatever was handy-his fist, a fly 
swatter, a baseball bat, his shoe, or a bottle”); see Transcript, supra note 1, at 54 (“fly swatter”), 65 (“ball 
bats”), 66 (“shoe”), 129 (“ashtray”; “fist”), 130 (“broke bottles and glasses on her and hit her with 
shoes”). 
56 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 21 (Martin, J., dissenting). Subsequent research would reveal that 
resistance strategies work for some women but are much less effective than many other strategies. Lisa 
Goodman et al., Women’s Resources and Use of Strategies as Risk and Protective Factors for Reabuse 
Over Time, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 311, 327–32 (2005). In addition, resistance increases the 
risk of increased violence. Id. at 329–30. 
57 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587; Transcript, supra note 1, at 65. 
58 See History, CONNECTIONS FOR ABUSED WOMEN & THEIR CHILDREN, www.cawc.org/mission-
history/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (describing the development of domestic violence services provided 
by Connections for Abused Women and their Children (CAWC), including the first organizational 
meeting leading to a task force (1976), first hotline (1977), and first shelter (1979)).  
59 Transcript, supra note 1, at 162 (testimony of Dr. Tyson). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 135.  
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“[h]e’d come and find me and he’d beat me up.”62 J.T. controlled the money-
-Judy had no way to get another place to live. She had nowhere to go, and 
he had threatened to kill her if she left.63 
The record hints at extraordinary violence in J.T. Norman’s family but 
does not provide details. Judy testified in court about what happened to one 
of her sons who died in Chicago: 
A. [He] was shot . . . . 
Q. Was that while he was beating his wife? 
A. It was prior . . . to him beating on her, yes.64 
Then Judy’s attorney asked, “What happened to [J.T.’s] brother’s wife in 
Chicago?”65 Any harm that befell Judy’s sister-in-law would have made 
J.T.’s threats more credible,66 but the judge sustained that objection and 
another when Judy’s lawyer asked whether John Wayne, raised by her 
husband’s sister, was violent toward the other children.67 
Judy may have hoped that life would improve when they returned to 
North Carolina in November 1983.68 Her oldest son stayed in Chicago. The 
household included three of their children (Phyllis was seventeen at the time 
of her father’s death, John Wayne was fourteen, and Loretta was six) as well 
as Phyllis’s baby, Little Mark, and her boyfriend Mark Navarra.69 The new 
residence was in the heart of Judy’s family, in a community of small cinder 
block houses one or two miles outside Spindale.70 Her mother, sister, and 
grandmother lived in adjoining houses or just across a small country road.71  
In general, strong social support reduces the recurrence of violence, so 
hope for change would have been rational. For women who experience the 
most severe violence, however, social support networks make no difference 
to the frequency or intensity of violence; severe violence is equally likely to 
recur no matter how much social support she has.72 In his last days, J.T. 
                                                                                                                     
62 Id. (testimony of Judy Norman). Judy further testified that she “couldn't leave him. He threatened 
to kill me if I’d leave. I’ve left him, and he’d come and find me, and then beat me.” Id. (emphasis added). 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 137; see also Death Certificate, Robert Norman (Chicago 1982). 
65 Transcript, supra note 1, at 137. 
66 Batterers sometimes make threats by referring to other incidents of death and violence. STARK, 
supra note 50, at 2451. 
67 Transcript, supra note 1, at 137–38; id. at 151. 
68 Id. at 145. The family returned from Chicago in November and spent two Christmases in North 
Carolina. Id. 
69  Id. at 183 (stating that her son remained in Chicago); id. at 67, 70, 72, 151 (describing members 
of household). 
70 Id. at 17 (testimony of Deputy R.H. Epley). 
71 Id. at 83–84 (testimony of Laverne Laws). 
72 Goodman et al., Women’s Resources and Use of Strategies, supra note 56, at 330–31. In general, 
“social support [was] critical to victims.” Id. at 330. “[E]ven taking into account the severity of prior 
violence and other key predictors, participants’ social support networks protected them against future 
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spoke angrily of Judy’s family,73 which suggests that they tried to support 
her, but their presence did not protect her. Mark Navarra said of this physical 
abuse: “[H]e did it a lot when other people was around; he was showing off 
or something.”74 
Judy might also have hoped for improvement when J.T. participated in 
mental health counseling on a “sporadic” basis.75 Even after separation, 
battered women are more likely to attempt to work out relationships when 
their partners participate in counseling.76 J.T.’s counselor, Charlie Paige, 
testified at trial that he had seen Judy in the course of his work with J.T. and 
observed black eyes and bruises on her face and shoulder.77 
Her life in North Carolina was consistent with life in Chicago—
violence, forced prostitution, death threats, and humiliation. Judy’s 
daughter, Phyllis, testified, “She would beg him not to make her to go out 
. . . . He would just slap her and tell her to get on out there and do what a 
woman’s supposed to do.”78 Daily, J.T. took her to the truck stop more than 
forty-five minutes away.79 He demanded that she bring back at least one 
hundred dollars each day and beat her if she did not get enough money.80 
Sometimes Phyllis and Mark went with her to avoid the violent attacks J.T. 
made when he took Judy.81  
The majority said that J.T. made “humor” of her prostitution in front of 
family and friends,82 but that sanitized summary misses the lessons about 
                                                                                                                     
violence.” Id. However, for one-fourth of study participants who “had experienced the most severe 
violence, social support did not serve as a protective factor. Reabuse was equally likely at every level of 
social support. For these women, it may be that the violence was so severe that the support of family and 
friends was not sufficient to stop or prevent it.” Id. at 330–31. 
73 Transcript, supra note 1, at 82. 
74 Id. at 57, 87, 194; State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State 
v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989) (majority opinion). 
75 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; Transcript, supra note 1, at 92 (testimony of Charlie Paige). Early 
on the day of his death, Judy urged J.T. to accept help for alcoholism. Id. at 139; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d 
at 10 (majority opinion). The record does not show what moved J.T. to enter counseling, but there is no 
evidence in the record of events that would trigger mandatory participation, so it may have been 
voluntary.  
76 See, e.g., EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER: BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 4, 87–88 (1988) (identifying batterer participation 
in counseling as one of the strongest predictors that a woman would leave shelter and return to the 
batterer). 
77 Transcript, supra note 1, at 97. 
78 Id. at 63 (testimony of Phyllis Norman). 
79 Id. at 63–64, 128 (describing “truckstop” as a rest area near Kings Mountain). According to 
Google Maps, it takes about forty-five minutes to drive from Spindale to Kings Mountain; I-85 is a short 
distance past Kings Mountain—the rest stop would be farther. Directions from Spindale, NC to Kings 
Mountain, NC, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.maps.google.com (enter “Spindale, NC” into the search 
field, then follow the “Directions” hyperlink, and search the destination field for “Kings Mountain, NC”). 
80 Transcript, supra note 1, at 64; State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1988); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (majority opinion). 
81 Transcript, supra note 1, at 128. 
82 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (majority opinion). 
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power that J.T. built into Judy’s humiliation. When he had friends over to 
drink, J.T. would command their six-year-old daughter, Loretta, to tell his 
friends what her mother did for a living.83 Loretta had to answer, “Momma 
sucks dicks,” and if she failed to say it, he would “whup her.”84 The visitors 
would laugh, and Judy would hang her head.85 Phyllis said this happened all 
the time.86 With every performance by Loretta, J.T. proved again that Judy’s 
children could be used to hurt her, and that if they tried to protect her, they 
would suffer. 
Judy could drive, but driving did not mean freedom. When she left, J.T. 
would find her and force her to return.87 When they traveled, J.T. would 
make her take the wheel—a method often used by kidnappers—and beat her 
while she struggled to control the vehicle.88 Mark Navarra testified that two 
weeks before his death, as the family left to drive to Chicago for a visit, J.T. 
told Judy he would “beat her from the house to the State line.” 89 J.T. poured 
hot coffee on Judy and beat her while she drove, and “that went on for a 
while . . . . I couldn’t go to sleep because . . . when he got to hitting her; he’d 
reach over and hit her, and she’s swerv[ing] in and out of the road . . . it was 
going on quite a bit.”90 
There were additional indications that her children were in danger. J.T. 
tried to make his daughter Phyllis go into prostitution.91 Dr. Tyson testified 
that there was evidence J.T. had begun to make threats against the children.92 
Although the regime was much the same, it could not be described as 
stable. This was deliberate and studied instability—a pattern in which J.T.’s 
predictable ability to carry out threats and inflict pain combined with 
unpredictable attacks that used both violence and nonphysical methods to 
maintain control. The continuing patterns included reliance on Judy’s 
income, forcing her to sell sex against her will, turning her compliance into 
another weapon against her, and sometimes even horror (the denial of 
                                                                                                                     
83 Transcript, supra note 1, at 72–74. 
84 Id. at 73–78 (testimony of Phyllis Norman); id. at 193 (testimony of Lemuel Splawn). Phyllis 
told the judge that her father would “whup” her sister if she did not say it; when the jury returned, the 
judge admitted the testimony about what Loretta said but sustained the objection to what J.T. would do 
if she did not say it. Id. at 78. 
85 Id. at 76. When asked, “What did your momma do at that time?” Phyllis Norman answered, “She 
just drops her head; she can’t do nothing ‘cause if she’d say something, my dad would get up and beat 
her.” Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 135. 
88 Id. at 133–34. 
89 Id. at 58. 
90 Id. at 59; see also infra notes 155–97 and accompanying text (describing additional incidents of 
beating Judy while she was driving). 
91 See Transcript, supra note 1, at 67 (indicating that Phyllis answered “yes” to a question about 
this attempt by her father). The prosecutor’s objection was sustained and the transcript has no further 
details. Id.  
92 Id. at 170. 
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contact with one son, the death of another in an act of domestic violence, 
and the prospect of having her daughter pushed into prostitution).93 Another 
thread also ran through both Chicago and North Carolina: Judy’s efforts to 
find help met with frustration. 
On the night of June 10 and morning of June 11, Phyllis and Mark went 
with Judy to the truck stop.94 J.T. arrived later, already drunk.95 He said Judy 
did not have enough money and began hitting her in the face with his fist.96 
He poured hot coffee on her.97 When she tried to escape, he slammed the car 
door against her.98 This was brutal coercion, but the family did not describe 
it as different from other days at the truck stop. 
In the early morning hours of June 11, they were on the way home, 
driving two cars because J.T. had come separately.99 The police stopped J.T. 
and arrested him for drunk driving, and he spent the rest of the night in jail.100 
He called Judy, and her mother, Laverne, bailed him out; he was released in 
the morning.101 
B. Assessing Threat: Crisis and Death 
This Section follows the last day and a half of J.T.’s life. His threats 
became more grotesquely abusive and lethal. Judy was very frightened. 
After she tried to kill herself, the pace quickened further and she sought help 
urgently. Her mother, daughter, and social workers tried to help, but the 
violence and threats got worse. The dissent in the North Carolina Supreme 
Court would point to the actions and perceptions of eyewitnesses in 
assessing danger, the credibility of J.T.’s threats, and the reasonableness of 
Judy Norman’s fear. To understand the family’s fear of J.T., readers must 
face a hard question: If someone held your own mother in front of your eyes 
and put out a cigarette forcibly on her collar bone, what threat would be 
sufficient to make you stand still and take no action?  
                                                                                                                     
93 Id. at 67, 137, 151. 
94 Id. at 48; State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989); id. at 19 (Martin, J., 
dissenting); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
95 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588. 
96 Transcript, supra note 1, at 128–29 (testimony of Judy Norman, describing J.T. punching her in 
the face); id. at 49 (testimony of Mark Navarra, stating that J.T. punched Judy). See also Norman II, 378 
S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting that Phyllis testified that J.T. had beaten her mother after 
arriving); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (indicating that J.T. was “hitting defendant in the face with his 
fist”). 
97 Id. at 48–49 (testimony of Mark Navarra); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (noting that J.T. threw 
hot coffee on Judy at the truck stop). 
98 Transcript, supra note 1, at 129. 
99 See id. (indicating that J.T. drove a car borrowed from Judy’s sister). 
100 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588; 
Transcript, supra note 1, at 49, 57 (testimony of Mark Navarra); id. at 129 (testimony of Judy Norman).  
101 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting); Transcript, supra note 1, at 129.  
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1. June 11th 
J.T. reacted violently to the experience of arrest and jail. He returned 
home on June 11th in a state of unprecedented rage. 102 He began hitting Judy 
immediately and kept it up all day, slapping her and throwing “anything that 
was in his reach” at her, including glasses, ashtrays, and beer bottles.103 He 
asked her to make him a sandwich but then threw it on the floor and 
demanded that she make another.104 He threw the second sandwich on the 
floor as well and told Judy that he did not want her to touch it. She used a 
paper towel to handle the bread and luncheon meat for the third sandwich. 
He smeared it in her face.105 
Judy’s mother Laverne said that by late afternoon, Judy was unusually 
frightened: “She was real nervous, and she didn’t act like herself; she acted 
scared all the time.”106 This description implies that Judy did not usually 
manifest such extreme fear, another indication that even though violence 
was a daily event, the intensity of violence and indications of danger were 
increasing. The police received a call about a domestic quarrel, and Officer 
Price said that he arrived after dark.107 Judy’s face was bruised and she was 
crying.108 She said J.T. had been beating her all day and that she “could not 
take it any longer.”109 Officer Price advised her to go to the county jail to 
“take out a warrant on him.”110 She said if she did that, he would kill her.111 
                                                                                                                     
102 Transcript, supra note 1, at 49–50 (testimony of Mark Navarra) (discussing how J.T. returned 
from jail and “started with Judy”; id. at 57–58 (stating that J.T. “looked real mad,” angrier than Navarra 
had ever seen him); id. at 131 (testimony of Judy Norman) (discussing J.T.’s behavior after returning 
from jail); See also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (stating that “[t]he defendant's evidence also tended to 
show that her husband seemed angrier than ever after he was released from jail and that his abuse of the 
defendant was more frequent); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (stating that when J.T. “was released from 
jail the next morning, on 11 June 1985, he was extremely angry and beat defendant”). 
103 Transcript, supra note 1, at 129 (testimony of Judy Norman); see also Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 
588 (describing J.T.’s anger and violence upon release from jail).  
104 Transcript, supra note 1, at 50 (testimony of Mark Navarra). 
105 Id. at 131 (testimony of Judy Norman); see also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (discussing the 
sandwich incident); id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (discussing the sandwich incident); Norman I, 366 
S.E.2d at 588 (discussing the sandwich incident). 
106 Transcript, supra note 1, at 81 (testimony of Laverne Laws); see also Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 
588 (“Defendant’s mother said defendant acted nervous and scared.”).  
107 Transcript, supra note 1, at 35 (testimony of Donald Price) (describing time of this June 11th 
incident as after 8:00 or 8:30 PM and noting that it was already dark; but cf. Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 19 
(Martin, J., dissenting) (stating time as 8:00 PM but not mentioning the testimony about darkness). 
108 Transcript, supra note 1, at 36 (testimony of Donald Price). 
109 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588; 
Transcript, supra note 1, at 36 (testimony of Donald Price).  
110 Transcript, supra note 1, at 39 (testimony of Donald Price). 
111 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (stating that the sheriff’s deputies advised Judy Norman to file a 
complaint, but “she was afraid her husband would kill her if she had him arrested”); id. at 19 (Martin, J., 
dissenting) (discussing that the police officer told Judy Norman “he could do nothing for her unless she 
took out a warrant on her husband,” but if she did, she said he “would kill her”); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d 
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Officer Price told her he could not do anything for her until she got “a 
warrant in my hand where I could place him under arrest.”112 
Some years before the events in Norman in 1985, the Norman case, 
which occurred in 1985, a warrant would have been necessary. As in most 
states, police could make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors only if they 
witnessed the violent act or saw threats involving property or physical 
injury.113 In 1979, however, North Carolina had passed an act permitting 
warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases.114 Officer Price’s statement 
reflected a gap between law and practice that the Violence Against Women 
Act of 1994 (VAWA) addressed by funding law enforcement training 
programs.115 
When Officer Price left without arresting J.T., Judy went into the 
bathroom with a cup of coffee and took seventeen or eighteen “nerve 
pills.”116 Judy had never brought coffee to the bathroom before, and Phyllis 
wondered why she had done it. Phyllis went into the bathroom and found 
the empty pill bottle.117 Laverne was at the house and heard Phyllis tell her 
father that Judy had taken some pills. J.T. shouted that they should let her 
die; he threatened to cut Judy’s heart out and cut off her breast.118 He cursed 
                                                                                                                     
at 588 (“The officer advised [Judy Norman] to take out a warrant on her husband, but [she] responded 
that if she did so, he would kill her.”); Transcript, supra note 1, at 39 (testimony of Donald Price). 
112 Transcript, supra note 1, at 39 (testimony of Donald Price); see Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 19 
(Martin, J., dissenting) (“The officer told her that he could do nothing for her unless she took out a warrant 
on her husband.”). Laverne also believed J.T. would kill Judy if she “took a warrant out.” Transcript, 
supra note 1, at 90 (testimony of Laverne Laws). 
113 See Lisa G. Lerman, Expansion of Arrest Power: A Key to Effective Intervention, 7 VT. L. REV. 
59, 64–67 (1982) (explaining the technical aspects of warrantless arrests); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law 
of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 61–63 (1992) 
(explaining the national movement to push for warrantless arrest). 
114 See Act of Jan. 10, 1979, ch. 561, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 592–93 (providing remedies for 
domestic violence); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-5 (Supp. 1979) (“Local law enforcement officer . . . is 
authorized to take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect the complainant from harm.”). This 
act authorized warrantless arrests for violations of protective orders. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-4 
(Supp. 1979); Lerman, supra note 113, at 67 (citing the North Carolina statute section 50B-4 as requiring 
police to make arrests when there is probable cause of spousal assault). 
115 See, e.g., Factsheet: The Violence Against Women Act, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/vawa_factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 
2018) (“VAWA funds train over 500,000 law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and other 
personnel every year.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NJC152159, GRANTS TO COMBAT VIOLENT CRIME 
AGAINST WOMEN: PROPOSED REGULATIONS 2–3 (1994) (discussing the national impact of Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994). 
116 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588; Transcript, supra note 1, at 67–68 
(stating that Judy Norman took coffee to the bathroom); id. at 132 (referring to “nerve pills”). 
117  Transcript, supra note 1, at 67–68 (testimony of Phyllis Norman). 
118 Id. at 81–82 (testimony of Laverne Laws). 
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and said, “Call your brothers . . . I’m not scared of your whole family . . .  
I’ll kill you, your mother and your grandmother.”119  
Laverne called for an ambulance. When it arrived, Judy at first refused 
to go to the hospital. She was beginning to lose consciousness; Laverne 
thought Judy might die before she agreed to go.120 J.T. fought the paramedics 
and refused to let them help Judy.121 
In the sole example of outright defiance in this story, seventeen-year-old 
Phyllis said to her father, J.T., “I ain’t letting my mother die because of 
nobody.”122 She told Judy, “Momma, you’re going.”123 With Laverne’s 
assistance,124 Phyllis walked her mother out past her raging father and put 
Judy in the ambulance.125 J.T. continued to disrupt the paramedics; they 
complained that it was hard to treat Judy and called for backup.126 
Officer Price had not driven far when he received the call to return to 
the Norman residence to help with J.T.127 He found a chaotic scene. J.T. 
shouted that they should “[l]et the bitch die.”128 Price said they were there to 
save a life, showed J.T. a club or flashlight, and threatened to arrest him: “I 
started to grab him and he ran into his house . . . .”129  
The paramedics worked on Judy, who appeared to be unconscious, and 
took her to the hospital.130 J.T. reacted with fury, telling Phyllis to take her 
“bastard” baby and get out.131 The Norman children fled and stayed the night 
at Laverne’s mother’s house.132 
Meanwhile, Laverne obtained a gun. J.T.’s death threats frightened her: 
“He might have killed the whole family, and [I was] especially scared that 
                                                                                                                     
119 Id. at 82 (testimony of Laverne Laws); see Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) 
(quoting J.T. as saying “I’ll kill you, your mother and your grandmother”); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 
(“Norman also threatened to kill defendant, defendant’s mother, and defendant’s grandmother.”). 
120 Transcript, supra note 1, at 82–83. 
121 Id. at 36–37 (testimony of Donald Price); see Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (“[J.T.] told 
[paramedics] to let [Judy Norman] die.”); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (“[J.T.] Norman was interfering 
with emergency personnel who were trying to treat [Judy Norman].”). 
122 Transcript, supra note 1, at 68 (testimony of Phyllis Norman). 
123 Id. at 83 (testimony of Laverne Laws). 
124 Id. at 55, 83 (testimony of Mark Navarra and Laverne Laws). 
125 Id. at 68, 83 (testimony of Phyllis Norman and Laverne Laws). 
126 Id. at 37, 39–40 (testimony of Donald Price). 
127 Id. at 39. 
128 State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Norman 
(Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989) (stating that J.T. said they should let Judy die); (Martin, J., 
dissenting) (quoting the statement that they should let “the bitch die;” Transcript, supra note 1, at 37 
(testimony of Donald Price). 
129 Transcript, supra note 1, at 37, 40 (testimony of Donald Price); see also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d 
at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“[T]he officer was compelled to chase [J.T.] into the house.”); Norman I, 
366 S.E.2d at 588 (“The law enforcement officer reached for his flashlight or blackjack and chased 
Norman into the house.”).  
130 Transcript, supra note 1, at 37 (testimony of Donald Price). 
131 Id. at 83 (testimony of Laverne Laws). 
132 Id. 
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he would kill [Judy].”133 Two years earlier, Judy’s sister Janice had been the 
victim of a violent home invasion.134 Janice carried a gun in her purse.135 
After Laverne called the paramedics, she placed Janice’s gun in her own 
purse and took it away.136 
At the hospital, the emergency medical staff pumped Judy’s stomach.137 
Charlie Paige, a psychologist from the mental health center, was on call that 
night. He had seen J.T. occasionally for mental health counseling and had 
seen Judy when she accompanied J.T.138 Paige interviewed Judy when she 
woke up, sometime after 1:00 AM, and found her anxious and depressed.139 
Laverne had joined Judy at the hospital.140 Charlie Paige encouraged 
Judy to accept help and suggested prosecuting her husband for abuse.141 
Initially, Judy was angry, but she and Laverne agreed to go to the mental 
health center in the morning to consider prosecution.142 During the interview 
with Paige, Judy said that she should kill her husband for what he had done 
to her.143 Paige urged her to enter the Prevention of Abuse in the Home 
(PATH) domestic violence shelter, but Judy was worried about her children 
and wanted to stay with them.144 Paige gave Laverne a card for the shelter.145 
The hospital released Judy at about 2:30 AM.146 Paige had advised Laverne 
                                                                                                                     
133 Id. at 82. 
134 See id. at 116 (testimony of Janice Dyer) (testifying that, on September 4, 1983, Bobby Shepherd 
broke into her house, stabbed her, attempted to rape her, and killed her niece). 
135 Id. at 82 (testimony of Laverne Laws). 
136 Id. Laverne took the gun to her own mother’s house nearby. Id. Later, Judy found the gun in 
Laverne’s purse at Laverne’s house. Id. at 141 (testimony of Judy Norman). See also State v. Norman 
(Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 19–20 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (describing Laverne's acquisition 
and Judy's discovery of the gun). 
137 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (majority opinion); see also Transcript, supra note 1, at 97 
(testimony of Charlie Paige) (testifying that Judy had her stomach pumped). 
138 Transcript, supra note 1, at 92, 97 (testimony of Charlie Paige).  
139 Id. at 92–93 (explaining further that “anxiety” meant feeling “nervous” and “depressed” meant 
feeling “hopeless [and] helpless.”). The majority opinion in Norman II omits the testimony about anxiety 
and nervousness, reporting only her depression and anger. Norman II, 378 S.E.2d. at 10. 
140 See Transcript, supra note 1, at 93 (testimony of Charlie Paige) (testifying that he discussed 
possibilities with Judy and Laverne). 
141 Id.; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10. 
142 Transcript, supra note 1, at 93 (testimony of Charlie Paige); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 
S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that Judy was “angry and depressed”); Norman II, 378 
S.E.2d at 10 (stating that Judy “agreed to go to the mental health center the next day to discuss” 
prosecution or commitment, but she “seemed depressed” and “expressed considerable anger toward her 
husband”). 
143 Transcript, supra note 1, at 95 (testimony of Charlie Paige); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10–11. 
144 Transcript, supra note 1, at 96–97 (testimony of Charlie Paige). 
145 Id. at 87 (testimony of Laverne Laws). 
146 Id. at 88. 
 
 694 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:3 
that Judy should not return home that night, so Judy spent the rest of the 
night at her grandmother’s house.147 
2. June 12th 
J.T. reacted to Judy’s suicide attempt with more rage.148 Judy went to 
the mental health center where the staff advised her to sign papers to have 
J.T. committed for his alcoholism. Judy went back and told him “J.T., 
straighten up. Quit drinking. I’m going to have you committed to help 
you.”149 He answered, “If you do . . . I’ll see them coming and before they 
get here, I’ll cut your throat.”150 
Stories from that last day illustrate J.T.’s methods of control and the 
inability of the people around them to stop his violence. Judy went to an 
appointment at the food stamp office.151 At home, J.T. asked Mark Navarra 
to go with him to bring her back, and Mark agreed.152 A clerk interrupted 
Judy’s food stamp interview to say that J.T. was there demanding that she 
go home.153 Judy became very upset and began to cry. The eligibility worker 
locked the door “for safety sake” to give Judy time to calm down before she 
left.154 J.T forced Judy, still groggy from the pills, to drive home, and he hit 
her as they went.155 The car swerved.156 Mark told J.T. that “if he was going 
to hit her, let me drive or wait until we get home . . . .”157 It is not clear 
whether this request to delay a beating would have functioned as a 
confrontation with J.T., and the record does not show how J.T. responded. 
A little while later, they were in the car again, and J.T. was using the 
same tactics. His friend, Lemuel Splawn, had invited J.T. to drive with him 
to Spartanburg to pick up Splawn’s paycheck.158 Splawn was not expecting 
                                                                                                                     
147 Id. at 88–89; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting) (stating that Judy spent the rest 
of the night at her grandmother’s house); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (“On the advice of the therapist, 
defendant did not return home that night, but spent the night at her grandmother's house.”). 
148 See Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (“The next day, 12 June 1985, the day of Norman’s death, 
Norman was angrier and more violent with defendant than usual.”). 
149 Transcript, supra note 1, at 139 (testimony of Judy Norman); see also id. at 94 (Paige observed 
her presence at the center); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
150 Transcript, supra note 1, at 139; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (majority opinion); id. at 20 
(Martin, J., dissenting). 
151 Transcript, supra note 1, at 101–02 (testimony of Revonda Hipps, eligibility specialist); cf. 
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (majority opinion) (stating that Judy went to “the social services office that 
day to seek welfare benefits”).  
152 Transcript, supra note 1, at 59–60 (testimony of Mark Navarra). 
153 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11; Transcript, supra note 1, at 101 (testimony of Revonda Hipps). 
154 Transcript, supra note 1, at 101–102. 
155 Id. at 133–34 (testimony of Judy Norman). 
156 Transcript, supra note 1, at 84 (testimony of Laverne Laws) (“He made her drive the car back 
home from the food stamp office and she was from one side of the road to the other.”). 
157 Id. at 60 (testimony of Mark Navarra). 
158 Id. at 191 (testimony of Lemuel Splawn); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting); 
State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
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Judy, but she was with J.T. when he arrived159—which had the effect of 
preventing her from engaging in more help-seeking. J.T. drove at first, but 
then he pulled over and told Judy to drive. Still affected by the overdose, 
Judy struggled to control the car.160 J.T. said she was following a truck too 
closely and began slapping her, then poured beer over her head.161 Splawn 
said, “[t]here’s no use in that. If you’re going to act like that, just take me 
back home.”162 J.T. said he was going to go to sleep. “[H]e laid his head on 
the arm rest, put his feet over towards her and then took his foot and kicked 
her up the side of the head.”163 Splawn also testified that as they arrived to 
pick up the check, J.T. threatened to “cut her breast off and shove it up her 
rear end.”164  
Judy had not eaten in three days.165 There was no food in the house on 
June 12th.166 The young people had to go out if they wanted anything to 
eat.167 Laverne sent some groceries, but J.T. made Judy put the food back in 
the bag.168 He said she was not going to eat.169 Phyllis brought her a 
doughnut from Laverne, but J.T. smashed it into Judy’s face.170 
Laverne had been trying to help. In addition to sending food, she went 
with Judy to the hospital and the food stamp office, and she had called the 
paramedics on the 11th.171 On the afternoon of the 12th, when six-year-old 
Loretta told her that J.T. was beating Judy again, Laverne called the police, 
but they said they could do nothing without a warrant.172 She stated that she 
did not try to get a warrant because “they wouldn’t accept a warrant from 
me and he told her if she ever took a warrant out for him he would kill 
her.”173 The police did not arrive.174 
                                                                                                                     
159 Transcript, supra note 1, at 191. 
160 Id. at 133–34 (testimony of Judy Norman). 
161 See id. at 133–34, 191–92 (testimony of Judy Norman and Lemuel Splawn); Norman II, 378 
S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting) (describing J.T.’s assaults on Judy); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 
(same). 
162 Transcript, supra note 1, at 192 (testimony of Lemuel Splawn). 
163 Id. 
164 Id.; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588. 
165 Transcript, supra note 1, at 66 (testimony of Phyllis Norman); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20. 
166 Transcript, supra note 1, at 66 (testimony of Phyllis Norman); id. at 137 (testimony of Judy 
Norman). 
167 Id. (testimony of Judy Norman); see also id. at 51 (testimony of Mark Navarra) (stating that 
Phyllis had some money from babysitting, so they went to McDonald’s). 
168 Id. at 70 (testimony of Phyllis Norman). 
169 Id.; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
170 Transcript, supra note 1, at 131–32 (testimony of Judy Norman); State v. Norman (Norman I), 
366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).  
171 Transcript, supra note 1, at 82, 85 (testimony of Laverne Laws). 
172 Id. at 90. 
173 Id. 
174 Id.; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588. 
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The advocates at PATH were trying to help. They called Laverne to 
arrange for Judy to come meet with them to discuss shelter, talked with both 
Laverne and Judy’s grandmother, and tried unsuccessfully to have Judy 
brought to the phone.175 When Laverne’s call to police did not bring help, 
she called PATH.176 PATH called the police,177 which apparently resulted in 
Officer Price being dispatched to the Norman house. While Price was on the 
way, he received a second call that a man had been shot.178 
Meanwhile, that afternoon, the family had watched without interfering 
while J.T. put out a cigarette on Judy’s collarbone.179 Testimony about this 
incident came from two witnesses as well as from Judy herself.180 When 
asked about Judy’s reaction, Mark Navarra said, “It hurt her . . . . [S]he was 
scared.”181 When Judy’s lawyer asked Phyllis what she had done to try to 
stop her father from treating her mother like this, she answered, “I was 
scared to do anything. I begged him not to hit her.”182 The cigarette burn was 
more than a method of inflicting pain. It showed Judy again that no one—
not even the daughter who stood up to J.T. the previous day and saved her 
life—would act to stop him. 
After the cigarette burn, J.T. sat cursing for a while and then told Judy, 
“[l]et’s go lay down.”183 She started to lie on the smaller bed, but he said, 
“[n]o, bitch . . . [d]ogs don’t sleep on beds, they sleep [on] the floor.”184 A 
little while later, Phyllis came in—not to ask her mother to watch her baby, 
but to get J.T.’s permission.185 In the following quotes from the transcript, 
phrases important to time span or perceptions of danger are italicized. Judy 
described what happened after she lay down on the floor: 
A. [I]t wasn’t but a little bit till my daughter came in there and 
she says, “Daddy,” says, “Let momma watch the baby while I 
go to the store.” And, he says, “All right.” So I got the baby 
                                                                                                                     
175 Transcript, supra note 1, at 98–99 (testimony of Ann Lancaster). 
176 Transcript, supra note 1, at 87 (testimony of Laverne Laws). In response to a question, Laverne 
answered that she had called PATH, but the prosecutor’s objection was sustained, and she did not 
describe the call. Id.  
177 Id. at 99–100 (testimony of Anne Lancaster). 
178 Id. at 42 (testimony of Donald Price) (describing two calls; first about a quarrel then about a 
shooting). 
179 Id. at 131 (testimony of Judy Norman); State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 
1989); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588. 
180 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
181 Transcript, supra note 1, at 53 (testimony of Mark Navarra). 
182 Id. at 67 (testimony of Phyllis Norman). 
183 Id. at 140–41 (testimony of Judy Norman); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin J., dissenting). 
184 Transcript, supra note 1, at 140–41 (testimony of Judy Norman); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 
(Martin, J., dissenting); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588. 
185 Transcript, supra note 1, at 141 (testimony of Judy Norman); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 
(Martin, J., dissenting) (stating that “Phyllis came in and asked her father if defendant could take care of 
her baby”); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (stating that J.T. Norman “assented” to having Judy watch the 
baby).  
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and I had him on the bed. I was sitting in the floor watching 
him so he wouldn’t fall off and J.T. just finally went to sleep. 
Q. What happened then? 
A. The baby started crying and I snuck up and took him out 
there to my mother’s. I said, “Momma, watch him. I’m scared 
he’ll wake J.T. up, and he’ll start fussing again.” And, I give 
her the baby. I said, “Give me something for the headache; my 
head is busting.” [Laverne] says, “I’ve got some pain pills in 
my purse.” So I went in there to get the pain pills and the gun 
was in there, and I don’t know, I just seen the gun, and I took 
it out, and I went back out there and shot him.186 
Judy shot three times into the back of J.T.’s head while he lay 
sleeping.187 
Phyllis testified that after the shots, she ran into the bedroom and saw 
her mother with a gun: 
A. I grabbed the gun, and I hollered, “No,” and she turned it 
loose to me . . . . I looked at my dad’s head. I seen the blood 
and I dropped the gun, and I ran out of the room and hollered 
that he killed her. I kept on hollering, “He killed her.” 
. . . . 
Q. Why did you think he’d killed her? 
A. Because I would always think that he would kill her.  
. . . .  
He would always said that he would kill her. He kept on telling 
her and everybody else he would kill her. 
. . . .  
[He said it] the day he got shot. He would say it every day. It 
was constantly . . . .188 
At trial, Judy’s lawyer asked her why she had killed him. She wept while 
she answered: 
A. Why? Because I was scared of him and I knowed when he 
woke up, it was going to be the same thing, and I was scared 
when he took me to the truck stop that night it was going to be 
worse than he had ever been. I just couldn’t take it no more. 
                                                                                                                     
186 Transcript, supra note 1, at 141 (testimony of Judy Norman) (emphasis added); Norman II, 378 
S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
187 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 9; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589. 
188 Transcript, supra note 1, at 61–62 (emphasis added) (testimony of Phyllis Norman).  
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There ain’t no way . . . even if means going to prison. It’s better 
than living in that. That’s worse hell than anything . . . . 
Q. On that day, when he threatened to kill you, did you believe 
him? 
A. Yes. I believed him; he would, he would kill me if he got a 
chance. If he thought he wouldn’t a had to went to jail, he 
would a done it . . . .189 
On this fear, let us take Judy Norman at her word. On the night of the 
shooting, she told a deputy sheriff that she shot J.T. because she had taken 
“all she was going to take from him”190—but that statement does not 
contradict her terror at the prospect of even more violent trafficking that 
night. Defense witnesses corroborated J.T.’s threats of death and Judy’s 
inability to escape violent trafficking.191 The crisis had brought intense fear 
and urgent help-seeking, but the help she sought and others tried to give had 
not protected her. She believed terrible things were going to happen—the 
threat of death and the certainty of imminent, vicious, violent sexual 
trafficking—and she could neither defend against them nor escape. 
She feared that he was going to kill her. So did her family.192 J.T.’s 
repetitive threats did not undermine his credibility: the testimony showed 
that Judy, Laverne, and Phyllis all feared his lethal threats. Judy was certain 
that she could not get away, and so was everyone around her.193 Judy and 
Laverne both believed that J.T. would kill her instantaneously if she took out 
a warrant or signed papers to have him committed.194  
Even while Judy pursued a variety of strategies to find help, she 
responded to specific deadly threats with strategies that studies would later 
                                                                                                                     
189 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11, 14; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589; Transcript, supra note 1, at 142 
(emphasis added). 
190 Transcript, supra note 1, at 27 (testimony of Deputy Sheriff R.H. Epley). 
191 In a slightly different argument, Whitley Kaufman points to the anger in Judy’s statement at the 
hospital that she should kill J.T. for what he had done to her. Kaufman, supra note 9, at 366. Kaufman 
treats this as evidence that Judy killed J.T. over past wrongs rather than fear about future danger—
basically, acting for revenge rather than from fear. But anger over past wrongs does not contradict terror 
in the present. The debate with regard to Norman turns on whether the judge should have allowed the 
jury to consider self-defense. The jury would have weighed evidence of both anger and terror in 
determining whether Judy had acted based on actual and reasonable fear. 
192 Transcript, supra note 1, at 61–62 (testimony of Phyllis Norman); id. at 82 (testimony of Laverne 
Laws). Part IV.C infra explores the relationship between eyewitness perception and reasonableness and 
discusses the treatment of that issue in the dissent.  
193 See Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 18 (Martin, J., dissenting) (analyzing imminence in light of 
captivity). 
194 Transcript, supra note 1, at 90, 139; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (recounting Judy’s statements 
that J.T. threatened to kill her if she tried to have him committed and that he would kill her if she took 
out a warrant). 
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call “placating.”195 She complied—she did not defy him on those points. 
Compliance with those threats did not mean that she was behaving passively 
but rather that she found his death threats credible.196 
Judy would not leave her children.197 Therefore, for safety, J.T. would 
have to be removed effectively. But he had made a credible threat that she 
would die before law enforcement could remove him.198 And as long as she 
avoided the steps that would bring immediate death, she would not be able 
to predict any particular instant at which a lethal attack would happen. 
From the witness stand, Judy described her immediate fear that the 
forced prostitution looming before her would be unendurable. She said, “it 
was going to be the same thing”—beatings and forced sex with strangers.199 
But she did not say that her experience would be the same as the beatings 
and hot coffee two nights earlier. “[W]hen he took me to the truck stop that 
night it was going to be worse than he had ever been.”200 That fear was 
consistent with her suicide attempt the previous night. Both her attempt to 
kill herself and her action in shooting J.T. followed incidents that proved she 
could not get help and preceded the time at which he would force her to the 
truck stop. 
Threats of trafficking and death do not contradict each other. J.T. had 
convinced the family that he would kill her.201 The threat of trafficking was 
so clear, so about-to-happen-that-night, that the opinions do not treat it as a 
threat but as a fact. It happened every day. If he wanted another $100, he 
could kill her later. 
For trafficking, the meaningful acts would not have to wait until night. 
The record does not state the time at which J.T. planned to leave. Because 
driving to the truck stop would take more than forty-five minutes, they could 
leave during daylight and arrive after dark.202 
                                                                                                                     
195 See Lisa Goodman et al., The Intimate Partner Violence Strategies Index: Development and 
Application, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163, 169 (2003) [hereinafter Goodman et al., Strategies 
Index] (explaining that placating strategies are “intended to change batterer behavior without challenging, 
and possibly even supporting, his sense of control”). 
196 Stereotypes can make avoidance of a credible threat of death seem like passivity instead of active 
self-preservation.  
197 Transcript, supra note 1, at 96-97 (testimony of Charlie Paige) (testifying repeatedly that Judy 
would not go to the PATH shelter because she was concerned about her children and wanted to be with 
them). Cf. id. at 170 (testimony of Dr. Tyson) (stating that after her suicide attempt Judy began to fear 
that if she were gone J.T. would transfer the abuse he had heaped on her to her children and her family). 
198 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).  
199 Id. at 11 (majority opinion). 
200 Id. (emphasis added). 
201 See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 1, at 61–62 (testimony of Phyllis Norman) (testifying that J.T. 
said “constantly” that he would kill Judy Norman).  
202 See Directions from Springdale, NC to Kings Mountain, NC, supra note 79 and accompanying 
text (“[I]t takes about 45 minutes to drive from Springdale to King’s Mountain.”); for a discussion of 
daylight and nightfall, see supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining that there was still daylight 
remaining when J.T. Norman was killed). 
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From the moment J.T. opened his eyes, events would move rapidly 
toward torture and prostitution. The trafficking event would begin when he 
started transporting her, or even sooner, when he began beating her to force 
submission and move her toward the car. Judy could not escape while she 
drove.  
On their previous trip to the truck stop, J.T. had punched her in the face 
while forcing her to sell oral sex. It is difficult to imagine the peculiar 
humiliations and forms of pain she would face on a night when he was 
angrier than ever. “[W]orse than he had ever been” as not mere conjecture 
from Judy—it had abundant support in the witnesses’ descriptions of 
spiraling, escalating rage and danger.  
3. A Summary of Judy’s Strategies 
Eighteen years after Judy shot J.T., a major study created an index of 
thirty-nine strategies women use to deal with abuse and evaluated the 
effectiveness of those strategies.203  
Within the twenty-four hours before J.T.’s death, Judy used at least nine 
strategies from the index. She used at least three of nine formal network 
strategies: talking to a doctor or nurse about abuse, consulting a mental 
health counselor and trying to get J.T. help for alcohol or substance abuse. 
Of four strategies classified as “informal network,” Judy tried two: talking 
to family or friends about protecting herself and staying with family the 
night she left the hospital.204 Judy also tried one of four “legal” strategies: 
talking to the police.205 The officer told her incorrectly that he could not 
arrest J.T. without a warrant; indirectly, the officer acted as if no crime 
occurred when J.T. fought paramedics and shouted they should let her die 
after her suicide attempt. As Victoria Nourse points out, the police conveyed 
a message that legal help was not available.206  
During those twenty-four hours, Judy had sought help from several 
sources: the police (who did not arrest J.T.), the food stamp office (where 
                                                                                                                     
203 Goodman et al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 168. 
204 See State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that Judy 
talked to family about protecting herself and stayed with family the night she left the hospital); Goodman 
et. al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 184 (listing the four informal network strategies). 
205 See Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (noting that Judy told a police officer that “her husband had 
been beating her all day and she could not take it any longer”); Goodman et. al., Strategies Index, supra 
note 195, at 184 (listing the four legal strategies). 
206 Nourse focuses on the failure of police to arrest J.T. for attempting to prevent the paramedics 
from rescuing Judy after her suicide attempt and shouting that they should let her die. Victoria Nourse, 
After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 
33, 46 (2008) (“Norman’s best claim . . . is . . . that she suffered from an ongoing course of felony conduct 
to which the authorities not only did nothing when done in their presence (let her die), but acted in ways 
suggesting that there was no violation of law.”). Nourse argues that “the question is whether Norman can 
be analogized to one who, quite literally, has been remitted to a state of nature where the government has 
abandoned her to the government of her murderous husband, with no legal recourse.” Id.  
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J.T. interrupted her visit to get her back), and the mental health center (where 
she began efforts to have him committed, which halted when she believed 
his threat to kill her). She also sought help at the hospital—though she was 
unconscious when transported there, she talked with staff voluntarily when 
she woke up. Laverne also used some of the strategies from the index, 
including calling the police (a legal strategy) and obtaining a weapon (safety 
planning).207  
In addition, Judy used two of the five “placating” strategies in the index: 
she tried to keep things quiet for him and did whatever he wanted to stop the 
violence. In the abstract, placating and resisting may seem contradictory. In 
fact, these are two of the strategies most frequently chosen by battered 
women and, at times, by the same woman  in trying to deal with violence.208 
A follow-up study found that direct resistance was the strategy most 
associated with the recurrence of abuse.209 Therefore, if Judy could not get 
away, she was probably wise not to fight back directly. 
Evaluating resistance is a more complicated issue. Judy used either one 
or two resistance strategies in that twenty-four-hour period. The question is 
whether to classify suicide as resistance, and authorities differ on that point. 
Although suicide does not appear in the Strategies Index, some social 
scientists treat it as a form of resistance.210 Captivity and impossibility of 
escape would seem to be the predicates for treating suicide as resistance, as 
in the historic example of captured Africans who refused to become slaves 
by jumping off slave ships;211 otherwise, suicide has a very different quality. 
Captivity and the possibility of escape are at the core of much of the debate 
on the Norman case. Judy definitely adopted a “resistance” strategy when 
she used a weapon against J.T. 
She did not try to leave for the shelter. Separation is a resistance strategy 
that Judy had tried in the past without success, and for which J.T. had 
threatened death. (At trial, Dr. Tyson would summarize the failed efforts that 
                                                                                                                     
207 See Goodman et al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 183–84 (listing legal strategies and 
safety planning strategies). 
208 Id. at 178. 
209 Goodman et al., Women’s Resources and Use of Strategies, supra note 56, at 328. 
210 Compare Goodman et al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 178 (omitting suicide from a list 
of resistance strategies), with Brittany E. Hayes, Women’s Resistance Strategies in Abusive 
Relationships: An Alternative Framework, 3 SAGE Open, July–Sept. 2013, at 1, 4 (classifying suicide 
as a form of resistance) (citing Margaret Abraham, Fighting Back: Abused South Asian Women’s 
Strategies of Resistance, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, 
GENDER, AND CULTURE 253 (Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina Pratt eds., 2005)). 
211 Telephone interview with Sherrilynn Bevel, Ph.D. (July 18, 2016). At the time of the interview, 
Dr. Bevel was a doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago. Her 
degree was conferred in December 2018, and currently she is the Director of Training and Special 
Projects, The Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence, I am grateful to Sherri Bevel for this 
insight. 
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convinced her she could not try again.)212 If Judy could not have J.T. 
removed, she had to bring her family with her, but it is not clear whether she 
could have taken the household. Phyllis had a baby and a boyfriend, Phyllis 
and Mark could not stand up to J.T., and there was no hint that either had 
steady work on which to survive. Some shelters have age limits on male 
children,213 and the record does not reveal whether the shelter would have 
accepted John Wayne Norman, the teenager who had come back to Judy 
only recently, or Mark Navarra, who was not related to Judy by blood or 
marriage. The threats against family members that Laverne found credible 
and J.T.’s interest in prostituting Phyllis would have kept Judy from leaving 
her family behind.  
II. UNDERSTANDING THE EXPERTS 
A. Analytical Frameworks and Research on Intimate Partner Violence 
In the late 1970s, researchers developed more than one theory to explain 
dangerous and sometimes lethal patterns of violence by men against women. 
In books published in 1979 and 1984, psychologist Lenore Walker linked 
two of her theories in a pattern she called “Battered Woman Syndrome”214: 
a “cycle of violence” that moved through stages of tension building, violent 
explosion, and remorseful loving behavior, which Walker had found in two-
thirds of the battering relationships she studied; and her application of 
Martin Seligman’s “learned helplessness” theory of depression to battered 
women who could not control or escape the violence against them.215 (Later, 
Seligman found problems with this application of his theory and pointed out 
that passivity can be an appropriate instrumental response to danger.)216 
                                                                                                                     
212 See Transcript, supra note 1, at 163 (testimony from Dr. Tyson explaining her effort to get help 
in Chicago in 1973); infra text accompanying notes 271–72 (summarizing Dr. Tyson’s account of Judy’s 
efforts to find help); infra text accompanying notes 331–38 (same). 
213 See Escaping with Older Kids, DOMESTICSHELTERS.ORG (Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://www.domesticshelters.org/domestic-violence-articles-information/escaping-with-older-kids 
(“Depending on how they’re staffed, some shelters may only take male children under a certain age—
usually the limit is somewhere between 12 and 18 . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
214 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 45–70 (1979); see generally LENORE E. WALKER, 
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) (analyzing and discussing issues related to the battered 
woman syndrome and linking the “cycle of violence” and “learned helplessness” in her theory).  
215 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 214, at 45–70 (discussing and applying 
Seligman’s theory). 
216 CHRISTOPHER PETERSON ET AL., LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: A THEORY FOR THE AGE OF 
PERSONAL CONTROL 239 (1993) (criticizing Walker’s application of Seligman’s learned helplessness 
theory to battered women, and noting tension in Walker’s work between learned helplessness and the 
idea that battered women’s fears are appropriate responses to real dangers, and pointing out that passivity 
can be instrumental). 
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Other approaches emerging in this period that went on to greater influence 
in social science included “survivor theory” and “coercive control.”217  
“Battered woman syndrome” became a term of art with distinct 
meanings in different fields.218 In psychology, the term identifies Walker’s 
psychological theory. In legal contexts, the term “battered woman 
syndrome” is often generic—an umbrella term for expert evidence on 
intimate partner violence and its effects, whether the expert will or will not 
apply Walker’s theories.219  
Battered women’s self-defense cases do not always use expert 
testimony, but experts can be critically important.220 Although some states 
                                                                                                                     
217 See LEE H. BOWKER, BEATING WIFE BEATING (1983) (studying women who solved the problem 
of violence without leaving the relationship, an approach that is part of survivor theory); R. EMERSON 
DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 15 
(1979) (“We propose that the correct interpretation of violence between husbands and wives 
conceptualizes such violence as the extension of the domination and control of husbands over their 
wives.”); GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 76, at 11 (naming and describing survivor theory); LEWIS 
OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 78–139 (1985) (including literature review and a 
chapter on coercive control).  
218 See Martha R. Mahoney, Why Didn’t WE Leave? Confronting the Failure of Legal Scholars to 
Move On from a “Syndrome” Framework for Intimate Partner Violence (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Why Didn’t WE Leave?], at 1 (defining “term of art” and explaining that 
“battered woman syndrome” became a term of art with different meanings in different fields); 11–14 
describing analytical frameworks for expert knowledge on intimate partner violence, including Lenore 
Walker’s “Battered Woman Syndrome”); 15 (describing 1996 report from National Academy of Science 
that described “battered woman syndrome” in passing as a framework applied to testimony in legal 
cases); 17–20 (describing the development of “battered woman syndrome” as a “term of art” and 
explaining how legal research methods perpetuated that term as a description of expert evidence). 
Elizabeth Schneider explains that in law the phrase “battered woman syndrome” applies even more 
broadly to include additional phenomena, in contrast to its specific use in psychology (“[Walker 
originally used the term] as a clinical description of certain psychological effects that the trauma of 
battering produces in women. Paradoxically, “battered woman syndrome” is now used as a catch-all 
phrase by the media and in courtrooms to describe a great range of issues: a woman’s prior responses to 
violence and the context in which those responses occurred; the dynamics of the abusive relationship; a 
subcategory of post-traumatic stress disorder; or woman abuse as a larger social problem.”) ELIZABETH 
M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 23–24 (2000). 
219 SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 23–24.  
220 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE VALIDITY 
AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT 
RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT vi-xiv (1996), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/batter.pdf [hereinafter VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE] (summarizing 
findings from three reports assessing validity of expert evidence, its admissibility, the legal role of this 
evidence). For some of the earliest, path-breaking descriptions of considerations in using expert evidence 
in women’s self-defense cases, see generally WOMEN’S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(ELIZABETH BOCHNAK, ed.1981). See Susie Macpherson et al., Expert Testimony, in WOMEN’S SELF-
DEFENSE CASES, supra, at 87–97 (discussing the risks and benefits of “expert testimony on the 
phenomenon of battering,” id. at 88, a variety of potential experts including mental health professionals 
and law experts who have worked with battered women, id. at 90–91, and describing two types of expert 
evidence—general testimony on domestic violence, its patterns, and its effects, id. at 93, and individual 
evidence with expert testimony, id. at 94–97). See also Betty Levinson, Using Expert Testimony in the 
Grand Jury to Avoid a Homicide Indictment for a Battered Woman: Practical Considerations for Defense 
Counsel, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 239, 242–44 (1986). 
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refer to evidence in general terms such as the effects of “intimate partner 
violence,” many use the term “Battered Woman Syndrome” to describe the 
subject of expert testimony.221 Lenore Walker’s “syndrome” theories never 
defined or limited the theories other experts could apply. Experts provide 
general information on intimate partner violence and may provide clinical 
evaluations; law professors should not assume that clinical testimony on 
“learned helplessness” defines the field.222 Some scholars who began within 
a “syndrome” framework came to emphasize help-seeking and social 
context by the 1990s.223 The persistence of “syndrome” terminology made 
Walker’s early framework seem more durable in law than in other fields.224 
Ultimately, Walker’s theory has had more influence in law than it had 
in social science, but legal actors understood it differently than did social 
                                                                                                                     
221 As of the mid-1990s, about half the states had statutes on admissibility that referred specifically 
to expert testimony on “battered woman syndrome” or “battered spouse syndrome.” VALIDITY AND USE 
OF EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at 16. The other half referred more generally to “the nature and effects of 
‘domestic violence,’ ‘family violence’ or ‘physical, sexual or psychological abuse’ on the beliefs, 
behavior and perceptions of the person being abused.” Id. The California statute originally referred to 
“Battered Woman Syndrome” evidence, but the legislature amended it, effective 2005, to refer to 
“Intimate partner battering and its effects.” S. 1386, 2003–2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (codified 
as amended at CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2018)). 
222 For example, in People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996), Lee Bowker, a sociologist, was 
the expert admitted under the “battered woman syndrome” evidence statute. Id. at 3. Bowker was an 
expert on help-seeking; he had studied strategies women used to end violence in their relationships 
without leaving. Id. He emphasized the efforts battered women made and the constraints they faced. 
Battered women employed “strategies to stop the beatings, including hiding, running away, counter-
violence, seeking the help of friends and family, going to a shelter, and contacting police.” Id. His 
discussion of remaining in a relationship emphasized social circumstances and constraints including 
“lack of money, social isolation, lack of self-confidence, inadequate police response, and a fear (often 
justified) of reprisals by the batterer.” Id.; cf. BOWKER, supra note 217, at 68–70 (listing several strategies 
that battered women employ to protect themselves from their abusers, most of which are non-violent). 
Expert testimony on battering and its effects (without dependence on syndrome terminology) had been 
admitted since the 1970s, often without judicial resistance. See WOMEN’S SELF-DEFENSE CASES., supra 
note 220, at 289–300 (providing chart of fifty of the first one-hundred cases coordinated by the Women’s 
Self-Defense Project). 
223 See, e.g., MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN: A MODEL 
FOR ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 41–42 (1992) (naming formal and informal help-seeking 
strategies used by battered women to escape, avoid, and protect themselves against abuse); Mary Ann 
Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 39, 43 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987) (“It is essential to 
remember that learned helplessness is often based on the realistic belief that it is not safe to engage in 
help-seeking behaviors.”); see also Kathleen J. Ferraro, The Words Change, but the Melody Lingers: The 
Persistence of the Battered Woman Syndrome in Criminal Cases Involving Battered Women, 9 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 110, 113 (2003) [hereinafter Words Change but Melody Lingers] (discussing active 
help-seeking strategies and how social constructs of femininity “define[] working women, lesbians, and 
women of color as ‘less feminine.’”). 
224 See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton et al., Update of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” Critique 
VAWNET 3 (2009), http://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/AR_BWSCritique.pdf 
(“It is in the legal (rather than clinical) arena that BWS continues to be most firmly embedded and to 
receive the most attention.”). See infra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing explanation by 
sociologist Kathleen Ferraro of changes in the field and the persistence of “syndrome” concepts). 
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scientists. Legal actors who treated “learned helplessness” as a literal term 
distorted Walker’s theory. That approach ignored both her repeated criticism 
of the idea that battered women were in fact helpless and her 
acknowledgment of both the genuine possibility of lethal danger and the 
increased danger of lethality at the time of separation.225  
The belief that Walker meant literal helplessness led some legal scholars 
to assume that experts would describe a battered woman’s sense of 
entrapment as a belief that a reasonable person would not share, usually 
described as only a subjective belief. For example, Joshua Dressler 
supported the relevance of expert evidence to the defendant’s subjective 
belief but not to reasonable belief: “Although some subjectivization of the 
‘reasonable person’ standard is appropriate . . . it is a contradiction in terms 
to describe the ‘reasonable person’ as one who suffers from emotional 
paralysis or whose fear causes her to misperceive reality.”226 To be fair, 
Walker’s work created some ambiguity on this point because she believed 
women could perceive options to escape more clearly when they overcame 
learned helplessness.227 Nonetheless, her rejection of absolute helplessness 
was clear and consistent.  
As sociologists and psychologists studied coercive control, they 
examined the patterns and effectiveness of physical and nonphysical 
                                                                                                                     
225 See, e.g., LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 42 (2d ed. 2000) 
[hereinafter BWS 2d 2000]. Walker stated that: 
[T]he issue of the woman’s response to violent attacks . . . has been further clouded 
by the mythology that she behaves in a manner that is either extremely passive or 
mutually aggressive. Rather, . . . battered women develop survival or coping skills 
that keep them alive with minimal injuries. 
Id. at 40. “Learned helplessness was confused with being helpless, and not its original intended 
meaning of having lost the ability to predict that what you do will make a particular outcome occur.” Id. 
at 116. Reflecting the better-known aspect of her theory, Walker stated in the same work that, “There is 
also some evidence that [survival or coping] skills are developed at the expense of escape skills.” Id. at 
40. 
226 See Dressler, supra note 10, at 269 (“Even if syndrome evidence is properly introduced to 
support a battered woman's subjective belief that the sleeping abuser is an imminent threat to her life, 
there is no basis for claiming that such a belief is reasonable unless the ‘reasonable person’ is 
characterized as a ‘reasonable battered woman suffering from BWS.’”); see also Dressler, supra note 29, 
at 464 (“How can we say that a belief is reasonable when we are judging the reasonableness from the 
perspective of someone who, by definition, [because of Battered Woman Syndrome] is experiencing a 
set of symptoms that renders her state of mind abnormal?”); cf. Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman 
Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 
45, 95–96 (1994) (treating learned helplessness as “a form of psychological impairment” and battered 
woman syndrome as a mental disorder or mental illness). 
227 Walker makes similar statements about overcoming learned helplessness repeatedly. See, e.g., 
BWS 2d 2000, supra note 225, at 118 (“If a woman is to escape such a relationship, she must overcome 
the tendency to learned helplessness survival techniques . . . . She must learn to use escape skills 
compatible to the survival behaviors already adopted.”). 
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measures men used to entrap and control women.228 Batterers chose coercive 
methods based on intimate knowledge of their partners, using approaches 
that would cause the most humiliation or fear or that would best demonstrate 
the futility of resistance.229 Details of abusive behavior varied in different 
relationships because coercive control was an evolving experiment 
performed on a living target.230 Personal threats may have vastly different 
power over different women. For example, a threat to tell an employer that 
a woman had not completed the college degree on her resume might threaten 
job loss and inability to support a family for one person, but the same threat 
might be less important to someone in a job based more on performance than 
credentials. 
In 1988, Edward Gondolf and Ellen Fisher proposed survivor theory as 
an alternative to learned helplessness.231 From their own data and Lee 
Bowker’s study of women who ended the violence without ending their 
relationships,232 Gondolf and Fisher found that “the majority of women 
made extremely assertive efforts to stop the abuse.”233 In 2008, sociologist 
Michael Johnson summarized these developments: “[S]urvivor theory has 
been the mainstream feminist analysis of battered women for at least twenty 
                                                                                                                     
228 See, e.g., DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 217, at 15 (treating violence as “the extension of the 
domination and control of husbands over their wives”); OKUN, supra note 217, at 113–19 (comparing 
coerecive control in Chinese communist thought control with woman abuse).; R. Emerson Dobash & 
Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The ‘Appropriate’ Victims of Marital Violence, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 426, 434 
(1978) (emphasizing uses of violence by men to control wives and maintain hierarchy). See also STARK, 
supra note 50, at 113–14 (describing “entrapment enigma”). 
229 See STARK, supra note 50 at 206 (explaining the personal quality of coercive control). 
230 See id. at 112–32 (detailing the different dimensions of coercive control). 
231 GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 76, at 11. Goodman et al. summarize Walker’s use of learned 
helplessness, criticism by scholars—including Walker—of the idea that battered women were passive in 
response to violence, and discuss the development of survivor theory: 
Based on [Gondolf & Fisher’s] survey of 6,612 victims of IPV [intimate partner 
violence] in Texas shelters and Bowker’s . . . survey of 1,000 community women, [the 
survivor] theory held that battered women actually become increasingly active in their 
attempts to stop violence as it grew more frequent or severe. Not only were 
participants in these studies more likely to seek help as the violence worsened, but 
they also were also likely to seek a wider variety of forms of help. A number of other 
studies—both qualitative and quantitative—have since demonstrated support for the 
finding that IPV victims are tremendously active and persistent in their attempts to 
stop the violence.  
Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 165–66 (internal citations omitted).  
232 See BOWKER, supra note 217, 63–73 (1983) (noting that women used a variety of informal 
strategies in their attempts to stop the abuse themselves, from within their relationships, with varying 
levels of success).  
233 See id. 21–29 (describing the statistical demographics and testimonials of the couples involved 
in the study); GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 76, at 28–37 (detailing analytical models of help-seeking).  
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years. Feminists long ago debunked the idea that battered women were 
helpless victims.”234 
Survivor theory “now dominates our understanding of the reactions of 
women to intimate terrorism. The core idea is that battered women respond 
to severe abuse with innovative coping strategies and active 
help-seeking.”235 Survivor theory was consistent with coercive control, but 
not with Lenore Walker’s “syndrome.”236 Gondolf and Fisher did not find 
learned helplessness in battered women; rather, they said that 
professionals—such as social workers—developed learned helplessness 
because their efforts to help battered women were frustrated by the 
extraordinary obstacles the women faced.237 Scholars also began to identify 
different types of domestic violence—for example, distinguishing “common 
couple violence” or “situational couple violence” from coercive control, 
intimate terrorism, or “patriarchal terrorism.”238 
In a 1993 law review article, psychologist Mary Ann Dutton criticized 
problems with “syndrome” terminology and adopted the term “battered 
women’s experiences” to describe the subject of expert evidence.239 Dutton 
rejected Walker’s treatment of “Battered Woman Syndrome” as a subset of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),240 pointing out that battered 
women’s reactions to abuse either might not be explained by PTSD or might 
                                                                                                                     
234 MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, VIOLENT 
RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 133 (2008) [hereinafter TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE]. 
235 Id. at 49 (footnote omitted). 
236 See id. at 133 (offering an analysis of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies as support). 
237 GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 76, at 22–23. 
238 See MICHAEL S. DAVIS ET AL., NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP, CUSTODY 
EVALUATIONS WHEN THERE ARE ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PRACTICES, BELIEFS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL EVALUATORS 16 (2010) (discussing typologies proposed by 
Johnson); TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 234, at 6–7 (describing typologies of 
violence); Evan Stark, Coercive Control, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 166, 170 (Nicky 
Ali Jackson ed., 2007) (discussing Johnson’s typology and Stark’s distinction between ordinary “fights” 
and “partner assaults” where violence “was used to hurt or control a partner rather than to resolve a 
conflict”); Claire Dalton et al., High Conflict Divorce, Violence, and Abuse: Implications for Custody 
and Visitation Decisions, 54 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 11, 14 (2003) (distinguishing “conflict-initiated” and 
“control-initiated” violence); Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 181 (“[I]ncreasing evidence points to 
the need to distinguish between what Johnson called ‘patriarchal terrorism’ (ongoing violence in the 
context of coercion and control) and ‘common couple violence’ (discrete acts of violence that exist 
outside a context of coercion and control).” (citation omitted)). 
239 Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of 
Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1993) [hereinafter Understanding 
Women’s Responses: A Redefinition]. As of May 2019, a Westlaw search showed that this article had 
been cited 160 times in law reviews and journals.  
240 See, e.g., Lenore E. Walker, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Women: Diagnosis and 
Treatment of Battered Woman Syndrome, 28 PSYCHOTHERAPY 21, 21 (1991) (“Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) comes closest to describing battered woman syndrome, the group of psychological 
symptoms often observed after a woman has repeatedly experienced physical, sexual and/or serious 
psychological abuse.” (citation omitted)). 
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not meet the specific criteria for PTSD.241 Emphasizing the variety of 
women’s responses to violence, Dutton reframed expert analysis through 
four questions: 
(1) The cumulative history of violence and abuse experienced 
by the victim in the relationship at issue, including, where 
relevant, the nature and extent of violence or abuse in a 
specific episode; 
(2) The psychological reactions of the battered woman to the 
batterer’s violence; 
(3) The strategies used (or not used) by the battered woman in 
response to prior violence and abuse, and the consequences of 
(or the expectations that arise from) those strategies; and 
(4) The contextual factors that influenced both the battered 
woman’s strategies for responding to prior violence, and her 
psychological reactions to that violence.242 
 A 1996 report to Congress mandated by the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA) recommended the terms “battering and its effects” or “battered 
women’s experiences” and criticized the term “battered woman syndrome” 
for its susceptibility to misunderstanding and stereotyping.243 Some forensic 
experts already used the recommended approach; others adopted it.244  
                                                                                                                     
241 See Understanding Women’s Responses: A Redefinition, supra note 239, at 1198–1200 
(comparing battered women’s reactions with specified PTSD criteria). A woman’s psychological 
response may not meet PTSD criteria for one or more reasons: (1) Her reactions are not considered 
“clinical” phenomena, and thus do not appear within diagnostic nomenclature; (2) her reactions are either 
more circumscribed than the full spectrum PTSD diagnosis or are not characteristic of PTSD per se; 
and/or (3) her reactions are indicative of an even more complex clinical picture than that suggested by 
PTSD. Id. 
242 Id. at 1202 (footnote omitted). 
243 See VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at xii–xiii (summarizing the benefits of 
using the terms “battering and its effects” or “battered women’s experiences”). The working group for 
the report included representatives from agencies and organizations including the Office of Policy 
Development, the Office of Justice Programs, the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics of the Department of Justice; the National Institute of Mental Health, the Administration for 
Children and Families, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, as well as the National Association of Women Judges. Id. at 
v. 
244 See, e.g., KATHLEEN J. FERRARO, NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS: WOMEN, CRIME, AND 
VICTIMIZATION 166 (2006) [hereinafter NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS] (“The use of expert testimony 
on the effects of battering in criminal trials has changed since it was first introduced in the early 1980s.” 
(footnote omitted)); Words Change but Melody Lingers, supra note 223, at 111 (describing Ferraro as a 
sociologist with extensive experience as an expert at trial beginning in 1983 and having conducted 
training on the effects of battering for law enforcement officers, attorneys, and other groups). Ferraro 
described her own experience with changing knowledge and terminology: “Although I originally used 
the language of syndrome . . . in accordance with the literature of the time, since 1995 I have described 
my testimony and expertise as being about ‘the effects of battering,’ as suggested in the literature and by 
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After the mid-1990s, research on violence against women increased 
exponentially. VAWA poured tens of millions of dollars into research, 
allowed pilot programs, and required evaluations of the pilots.245 The 
ensuing expansion in knowledge did not rest on the terminology of 
“syndrome” or “helplessness.” Some cases and codes did not use syndrome 
terminology, and some courts and some legal scholars began to recognize 
the change.246  
By 2005, Dutton and other psychologists had produced a model of 
coercive control that illustrated the patterns and dynamics that linked 
                                                                                                                     
the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women.” Id. (footnote omitted). Ferraro 
attributes the persistence of syndrome terminology and framework to its consistency “with dominant 
paradigms for viewing violence against women as individualistic pathology.” Id. at 110. 
Also, in 1996, a report by the National Academies of Science did not mention “learned 
helplessness.” See generally PANEL ON RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ET AL., 
UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN v–vi (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996) 
(explaining the background of the report). “Battered woman syndrome” appeared only fleetingly as a 
term used in some legal cases that was not a “recognized psychiatric syndrome.” Id. at 84. 
245 See, e.g., Carol E. Jordan, Advancing the Study of Violence Against Women: Evolving Research 
Agendas Into Science, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 393, 398 (2009) (“An examination of the annual 
reports issued by [the National Institute of Justice] reveals that between 1995 and 2005, more than $50 
million was awarded in [violence against women]-related research grants.”) (citations omitted)). 
246 For judicial recognition of rejection of the “syndrome” framework, see, e.g., People v. 
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 n.3 (Cal. 1996). The Humphrey court used the term “battered woman 
syndrome” only because the Evidence Code section and cases considered in the opinion used that term. 
Id. 
We note . . . that according to amici curiae California Alliance Against Domestic Violence et al., “. 
. . the preferred term among many experts today is ‘expert testimony on battering and its effects’ 
or ‘expert testimony on battered woman’s experiences.’ Domestic violence experts have critiqued 
the phrase ‘battered woman’s syndrome’ because (1) it implies that there is one syndrome which 
all battered women develop, (2) it has pathological connotations which suggest that battered women 
suffer from some sort of sickness, (3) expert testimony on domestic violence refers to more than 
women’s psychological reactions to violence, (4) it focuses attention on the battered woman rather 
than on the batterer’s coercive and controlling behavior and (5) it creates an image of battered 
women as suffering victims rather than as active survivors.” 
 
Id. (quoting Brief for California Alliance Against Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellant, People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996) (No. S045985)). After Humphrey, the California 
legislature changed the statutory terminology to “battering and its effects” in 2001 and then to “intimate 
partner battering and its effects” in 2004. S. 1386, 2003–2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (codified as 
amended at CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2018)). 
For other examples of courts and commentators recognizing the changed framework in the 1990s, 
see Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048 n.3 (Fla. 1999) (noting that amicus curiae criticized use of 
the term “battered woman’s syndrome” but continued to use the term because Lenore Walker had used 
it at trial); Diane R. Follingstad, Battered Woman Syndrome in the Courts, in 11 HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 485, 485–486 (Alan M. Goldstein & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2003) (criticizing the syndrome 
framework); Joan S. Meier, Notes From the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal 
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1314–17 (1993) 
(explaining revisions to syndrome framework); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From 
Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 976–82 (detailing the changes to 
the legal response to partner violence). 
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controlling behavior with intimate partner violence.247 This is an example of 
expert analysis that does not apply a “syndrome” formula or predict any 
particular response by the woman. Rather, experts organize common 
phenomena into cognizable and well-established patterns in battering.  
If learned helplessness had in fact been the cornerstone of expert 
evidence, then these changes in terminology and the recognition of a variety 
of responses to violence might have undermined its effectiveness in court—
but research and experience showed that was not the case. The earliest 
litigation on battered women’s self-defense often used expert testimony on 
battering that was admitted without reliance on “syndrome” terminology.248 
In 1996, a study of three alternative trial strategies—the Walker approach, 
the Dutton approach, and no expert at all—found that experts helped jurors 
reach more lenient conclusions, but excluding the terms “battered woman 
syndrome,” PTSD, and “learned helplessness” did not change the way jurors 
utilized the testimony.249  
The use of expert knowledge in law raised questions of evidence and 
substantive law.250 To the extent that some work in criminal law theory relied 
heavily on Walker’s syndrome or “learned helplessness” as predicates for 
analysis of battering and legal testimony, the shift in framework challenged 
that analysis and its relevance in scholarly debates. But even as 
psychologists and sociologists discarded the term “syndrome” with its 
prescriptive implications, criminal law theorists embarked on a new round 
of extensive debates in which “syndrome” terminology and its implications 
had profound importance.251 Law professors used a research style created 
for work with judicial precedent. When they saw the words “battered woman 
syndrome” and read judicial summaries of Walker’s work in the early cases, 
they looked back at Walker’s definitions and treated those early theories as 
predictors of what experts on intimate partner violence would say—largely 
                                                                                                                     
247 Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward a New 
Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 746 (2005) (illustrating coercive control); see infra Appendix 
(same); see also MARY ANN DUTTON ET AL., DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A COERCIVE 
CONTROL MEASURE FOR INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT 4 (2005), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214438.pdf (same). 
248 See discussion of expert testimony, Macpherson et al., supra note 220, at 87–104 (discussing 
expert testimony at length without referring to a “syndrome.”).  
249 Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact of 
Alternative Forms of Expert Evidence, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 168 n.3, 171, 182–83 (1996); see also 
NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS, supra note 244, at 166–68 (describing the effects of various types of 
expert witness testimony); Words Change but Melody Lingers, supra note 223, at 111 (describing 
experience of a forensic expert). 
250 For a magisterial analysis of the law of self-defense including comprehensive discussion of 
evidence issues, see Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in 
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 409–31 (1991) 
251 See infra Section III.B (describing ways in which legal scholars misunderstood and misapplied 
the concept of “battered woman syndrome”). 
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ignoring the cases, articles, books, and reports that had moved past the 
syndrome framework.252 
In addition to misunderstanding theories applied in expert testimony, 
legal scholars often over-simplified Walker’s theories. Some authors 
confused the psychological theory of learned helplessness with literal 
helplessness.253 Learned helplessness had several definitions, but none of 
them meant the woman had “learned to be helpless.”254 Even though 
virtually all courts admitted expert evidence as relevant to reasonableness, 
several scholars treated that testimony as if it must concern only abnormal 
psychology and, therefore, could be relevant only to a defendant’s 
“subjective” state of mind.255 
                                                                                                                     
252 For examples of statutes, articles, and reports applying other theories or criticizing “syndrome” 
theory, see supra notes 221–65, 239–88 and accompanying text. See also SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, 
at 23 (“The use of the term ‘battered woman syndrome’ has intensified the general confusion about 
domestic violence and battered women, and has increased the likelihood that the law will be misapplied 
to battered women when they seek protection in the courts or appear as defendants.”); VALIDITY AND 
USE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at i–ii (“Among the most notable findings was the strong consensus 
. . . that the term ‘battered woman syndrome’ does not adequately reflect the breadth or nature of the 
scientific knowledge now available concerning battering and its effects.”); Sue Osthoff & Holly 
Maguigan, Explaining Without Pathologizing: Testimony on Battering and Its Effects, in CURRENT 
CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 226 (Donileen R. Loseke et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) 
(“Unfortunately, it did not take long for some scholars and practitioners to mischaracterize this BWS 
testimony . . . .”); Marina Angel, The Myth of Battered Woman Syndrome, 24 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 
301, 302 (2015) (noting that a “bad result” of Walker’s invention of the term “Battered Woman’s 
Syndrome” is “that the term ‘syndrome’ is associated with mental illness, which created the perception 
that battered women are mentally defective”); Angel, supra note 10, at 65 (“Discredited theories that 
label abused women who kill their abusers as suffering from insanity, a syndrome, or learned-
helplessness, must be rejected.”); Holly Maguigan, It’s Time to Move Beyond “Battered Woman 
Syndrome,” 17 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 50, 50 (1998) (reviewing DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, MORE 
THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND THE LAW) (explaining the challenge 
of explaining “the impact of intimate partner violence without appearing to pathologize battered women 
and deny their reason and capacity”; noting that for some years before her 1998 essay, many experts had 
“offered instead testimony described more generally as relating to “battering and its effects” because 
Walker’s “cycle of violence” and “learned helplessness” fail to “capture the full experience of battered 
women, and it risks subjecting them to stereotypes which deny their great diversity and which portray 
them as helpless and incapacitated.”). 
253 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 80 (“Lawyers . . . have primarily focused on the passive, 
victimized aspects of battered women’s experiences—their ‘learned helplessness’ . . . .”). 
254 Cf. Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 470 (“Thus, we would 
test the abused woman . . . against the standard of reasonable firmness, not one who has learned to be 
helpless.”); see Dutton, supra note 239, at 1197 (“Originally, battered woman syndrome was defined as 
the psychological sequelae to domestic violence. The definition emphasized ‘learned helplessness,’ a 
theory originally developed to explain why some animals fail to protect themselves in certain situations. 
The theory was reformulated in terms of human depression, and was eventually applied to victimization.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
255 See infra Part III (“Stereotypical ideas about expert evidence persisted.”); see also Nourse, supra 
note 22, at 1279 (“Jurisdictions flirted with or adopted ‘reasonable woman’ standards; indeed, a majority 
have, by legislative fiat if not judicial decision, permitted the admission of expert syndrome testimony 
based on the defendant’s ‘subjective state,’ known as battered woman syndrome.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Among professors, jurors, and the public, one of the sticking points in 
understanding battered women’s experiences is the conflict between each 
person’s own perceived autonomy and the impact of violence and control 
that Evan Stark calls the “entrapment enigma.”256 Many people find it 
difficult to imagine how anyone can force another person to do something 
against their will—especially when they do not see forcible constraints on 
kidnap victims or visible chains holding a prisoner.257 Research on coercive 
control addressed that question by studying nonphysical methods of control 
and their interaction with intimate partner violence.258 Common threads in 
expert testimony include the interaction of help-seeking and constraint with 
the circumstances that create a lack of options, controlling tactics and 
strategies of survival and resistance, and the reasons why well-established 
patterns of abuse and control are effective.259  
B. What Experts Really Said at Trial: Dr. William Tyson (Forensic 
Reconstruction and Coercive Control) and Dr. Robert Rollins 
(Psychiatric Evaluation and Competency) 
 
“It worked in Korea and it worked in J. T. Norman’s home.”260 
 
Judge Gardner appointed forensic psychologist Dr. William Tyson as an 
expert.261 Court-appointed experts do not represent either side.262 Either 
party can depose these experts, either party or the court can call them; either 
party—including the party that called the witness—can cross-examine them; 
their compensation comes from funds provided in criminal cases.263 Dr. 
Tyson retained an investigator and made an exhaustive independent 
                                                                                                                     
256 See STARK, supra note 50, at 113–14 (“And yet, the same question, ‘Why doesn’t she leave 
him?’ or its obverse, ‘Why does she stay?’ continues to gnaw at the moorings of the domestic violence 
revolution. . . . This chapter deals with the entrapment enigma: why women who are no different from 
any of us to start, who are statistically normal become ensconced in relationships where ongoing violence 
is virtually inevitable, and are prone to develop a unique problem profile when they do so.”). 
257 Id. at 113.  
258 See, e.g., infra Appendix (containing Dutton and Goodman’s Model of Coercion in Intimate 
Partner Violence). 
259 See NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS, supra note 244, at 167 (listing “many factors” that 
“influence women’s perceptions of their safety and alternatives in a violent relationship”).  
260 Transcript, supra note 1, at 165 (emphasis added) (testimony of Dr. William Tyson). 
261 Id. at 107, 155 (statement by Mr. Robert W. Wolf and testimony of Dr. William Tyson). 
262 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 706(a) (2018) (“The court may appoint any expert witnesses 
agreed upon by the parties . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
263 See id. at Rule 706(a)–(b) (“The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the 
parties . . . . A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be 
taken by any party; and he may be called to testify by the court or any party. He shall be subject to cross-
examination by each party, including a party calling him as a witness . . . . The compensation thus fixed 
is payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases . . . .”).  
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investigation of the facts so that he could base his analysis on empirical 
findings rather than the memory or opinion of any one person.264 
His testimony applied a coercive control framework. He emphasized the 
importance of degradation and humiliation as strategies to break the spirit of 
a human being and make that person more vulnerable to abuse.265 Through 
coercive control, Tyson linked the details of humiliation, such as forcing 
Judy to eat from pet dishes and bark like a dog, with the physical violence.266  
Dr. Tyson compared Judy’s experience to the experience of prisoners of 
war. Invoking the reactions of soldiers to violence and degradation, the 
military model is generally male or at least not distinctively female. Unlike 
Walker’s “learned helplessness,” Tyson’s approach did not emphasize 
unique feminine vulnerability or compare human beings to Seligman’s lab 
animals:  
It was part of the process that whenever you want to brainwash 
somebody, dehumanize them, degrade them, bring them 
completely under your power and remove whatever humanity 
they have; those are the kinds of things that you do. It’s 
consistent with the kind of behavior that was observed in 
prisoner of war camps during the Second World War as 
practiced by the Nazis; it’s consistent with the type of 
behavior, deprivation of information; deprivation of normal 
human functioning that was consistent in the brainwashing 
techniques of the Korean War. Anything that will reduce and 
degrade an individual’s concept of themselves as human and 
                                                                                                                     
264 Transcript, supra note 1, at 156–58 (testimony of Dr. William Tyson). Dr. Tyson defined 
“empirical facts” as those determined to be reliable, with agreement that they had happened, and not 
dependent on the memory or impressions of any one witness. Id. at 158. He interviewed Judy Norman 
and Laverne Laws twice, first in a meeting partially attended by her lawyers and then after he had 
obtained all the materials. Id. at 156–57. He obtained background materials and information on sources 
from her lawyers. Id. at 156. He got records on the Norman family from the Rutherford County 
Department of Social Services. Id. He obtained Dr. Rollins’s forensic report from Dorothea Dix Hospital 
and reanalyzed and interpreted the raw test data. Id. He obtained records from Judy’s hospitalization at 
the Chicago-Reid Mental Health Center from July 21 through July 23, 1973, and records from the Illinois 
Department of Mental Health and Disabilities. Id. at 156–57. He retained an investigator, and together 
they obtained interviews and/or records for both Judy and J.T. from several agencies: the Rutherford-
Polk Area Mental Health Program; the Prevention of Child Abuse in the Home, Inc.; the PATH Program 
of Forest City; Rutherford County Emergency Medical Services; Rutherford County Sheriff’s 
Department employees who had contact with Judy as responders; investigative officers; jailers; 
employees of the county Emergency Medical Services who had contact with Judy or J.T. around the time 
of his death; and employees of PATH who had contact with Judy or family members around that time. 
Id. at 157–58. 
265 Id. at 161–65 (testimony of Dr. William Tyson). 
266 Id. at 164. 
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make them totally dependent on the oppressor. It worked in 
Korea and it worked in J. T. Norman’s home.267 
Dr. Tyson linked Judy’s belief that death was inevitable to the fear that 
if she left the children behind, the violent abuse would transfer to them.268 
The prosecutor argued that the defense could not ask Dr. Tyson whether 
Judy reasonably believed it was necessary to shoot her husband because the 
defendant could not have been defending herself from someone who was 
asleep.269 Because the standard for self-defense was not whether there was 
actual danger, but whether it reasonably appeared to the defendant that 
danger existed, the judge allowed the question.270 Dr. Tyson’s answer 
addressed both Judy’s actual belief and the rational factors supporting that 
belief: 
Yes . . . . [I]n examining the facts of this case and examining 
the psychological data . . . Mrs. Norman believed herself to be 
doomed . . . to a life of the worst kind of torture and abuse, 
degradation that she had experienced over the years in a 
progressive way; that it would only get worse, and that death 
was inevitable . . . . I believe she also came to the point of 
beginning to fear for family members and her children, that 
were she to commit suicide that the abuse and the treatment 
that was heaped on her would be transferred onto them. There 
is evidence that Mr. Norman had begun to make threats . . . . 
. . . . 
The answer very simply is, yes, I think Judy Norman felt that 
she had no choice, both in the protection of herself and her 
family, but to engage, exhibit deadly force against Mr. 
Norman, and that in so doing, she was sacrificing herself, both 
for herself and for her family.271 
 Dr. Tyson gave further support to the reasonableness of Judy’s belief 
when he summarized the evidence from his independent review of the 
record: 
Mrs. Norman didn’t leave because she believed, fully believed 
that escape was totally impossible. There was no place to go 
                                                                                                                     
267 Id. at 164–65 (emphasis added); see also State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 17–18 
(N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (discussing portions of this part of Dr. Tyson’s testimony); State v. 
Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 589 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (same). 
268 Transcript, supra note 1, at 170. 
269 Id. at 168. 
270 Id. at 166–69. 
271 Id. at 170–71; see also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (discussing the same quotation from Dr. 
Tyson’s testimony); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589 (same). 
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. . . . [S]he had left before; he had come and gotten her . . . . 
She had gone to the Department of Social Services. He had 
come and gotten her. The law, she believed the law could not 
protect her; no one could protect her, and I must admit, looking 
over the records, that there was nothing done that would 
contradict that belief. She fully believed that he was 
invulnerable to the law and to all social agencies that were 
available; that nobody could withstand his power. As a result, 
there was no such thing as escape.272 
Dr. Tyson’s evaluation followed a full investigation. His review validated 
Judy’s perception that help was not available and the law could not protect 
her. But over the years that followed, only the dissent and one law review 
article quoted the statement that the record did not contradict her.273  
 The lawyers asked both experts whether Judy fit the “profile” of an 
abused spouse, and both agreed that she did.274 Dr. Tyson said she “fit[] and 
exceed[ed] the profile.”275 He described different types and levels of 
battering in terms notably different from the central focus on psychological 
“learned helplessness” in Walker’s “syndrome.”276 His description was 
closer to, though not identical with, the typology of intimate partner violence 
that sociologist Michael Johnson would develop ten to twenty years later.277 
Dr. Tyson distinguished terroristic abuse and degradation (the pattern that 
Johnson calls “intimate terrorism”) from ongoing marital violence (similar 
to Johnson’s situational couple violence).278 
                                                                                                                     
272 Transcript, supra note 1, at 163 (emphasis added); see also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 17 (Martin, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the same quotation from Dr. Tyson’s testimony); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589 
(same). 
273 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting); Mahoney,, supra note 10, at 92. 
274 See Transcript, supra note 1, at 159, 175–76 (concluding Judy Norman fit the profile of an 
abused spouse); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (majority opinion) (same); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589 
(same). 
275 Transcript, supra note 1, at 159; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting); Norman I, 
366 S.E.2d at 589. 
276 Compare Transcript, supra note 1, at 159–61, with THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra 
note 225, at 118 (discussing learned helplessness as the resultant depression and helplessness of a period 
of violence that diminishes a “woman’s motivation to respond.”).  
277 See TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 234, at 5 (identifying four types of domestic 
violence that “constitute a typology of individual violence that is rooted in information about the couple 
and defined by the control context within which the violence is embedded . . . .”). 
278 Id. at 5–12. For Tyson, the “simplest” level of violence involved occasional fights without severe 
violence; the “second stage” involved sustained fighting and violence, a prolonged vendetta “punctuated 
by the wife getting slapped or in some cases, the husband; or beaten [] in some way that ends that current 
round of the fight.” Transcript, supra note 1, at 159–60. Implicitly, this analysis emphasizes some control 
(ending the argument by violence), but does not include terrorism and lethality. Both of these stages have 
some similarity to Michael Johnson’s common couple violence. See TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, supra note 234, at 11–12, 115 (“What makes it situational couple violence is that it is rooted 
in the events of a particular situation rather than in a relationshipwide [sic] attempt to control.”). 
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Dr. Tyson testified that J.T.’s abuse had characteristics different from 
ordinary abuse. The abuse of Judy Norman had progressed “far beyond what 
would be called ‘[w]ife battering or family violence,’ and into a realm which 
could be only considered as torture, degradation and reduction to an animal 
level of existence, where all behavior was marked purely by survival . . . 
.”279 Dr. Tyson distinguished J.T.’s violence from “disagreements or fighting 
between a husband and wife” and described “a deliberate, studied, and 
effective attempt to completely subordinate another human being[,] 
humiliating them and degrading them to the point where they became less 
than human.”280 For Tyson, Judy’s belief that escape was impossible was her 
conclusion after previous efforts. 
Dr. Robert Rollins, clinical director of the forensic unit at the state 
mental hospital, did use the term “syndrome” in testimony.281 Rollins had 
evaluated Judy’s competency to stand trial and administered several 
psychiatric tests, but he had not hired an investigator or reviewed the 
evidence.282 He testified that Judy fit the profile of an abused spouse.283 He 
diagnosed her with “marital problems” followed by “abused spouse 
syndrome” in parentheses.284 To Rollins, the “syndrome” involved a 
situation in which one spouse achieved control over the other through “both 
psychological and physical domination.”285 He emphasized individual 
psychological vulnerability to abuse saying that abused women usually 
lacked “a strong sense of their own adequacy . . . [or] a lot of personal or 
occupational resources.”286 In contrast, Walker had addressed the impact of 
abuse on women with professional careers and resources.287 He came closer 
to Walker in describing the effects of a long period of physical abuse 
emphasizing control and the belief in the inability to escape.288  
                                                                                                                     
279 Transcript, supra note 1, at 160–61. See also Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589 (quoting substantial 
portions of Dr. Tyson’s testimony). 
280 Transcript, supra note 1, at 161. 
281 Id. at 176. 
282 See id. at 172–74 (discussing Dr. Rollins’s credentials); id. at 175 (explaining psychiatric 
evaluation and testing). 
283 Id. at 175–76. 
284 See id. at 174–78 (discussing abused spouse syndrome and “marital problems” diagnosis); State 
v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989) (discussing Dr. Rollins’ testimony); Norman I, 
366 S.E.2d at 589 (same). 
285 Transcript, supra note 1, at 177. 
286 Id.; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589. 
287 See THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 214, at 21–23 (discussing the myths that middle-class, 
well educated women are abused less frequently than poorer, less educated women); BWS 2d 2000, 
supra note 225, at 7–8 (discussing the impact that abuse has on women and the factors that make it 
difficult for them to leave). 
288 “[T]he abused spouse comes to believe that the other person is in complete control; that they 
themselves are worthless and they cannot get away; that there’s no rescue from the other person.” 
Transcript, supra note 1, at 177; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589. 
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Rollins left open a question that the terminology of “syndrome” and 
“learned helplessness” sometimes muddled: Would a reasonable person in 
these circumstances form the same set of beliefs? He said “Mrs. Norman had 
the ability to make decisions, and understand herself to the extent of the 
average person.”289 When Judy’s lawyer asked whether she reasonably 
believed it was necessary to use deadly force, Rollins replied that Judy 
believed it was necessary.290 Much of his testimony tended to support Judy’s 
perceptions, but he did not discuss Judy’s efforts to escape or her lack of 
options.  
Regarding Tyson’s coercive control approach, some readers may 
question his analogy between prisoner of war camps in Korea291 and a small 
house in Spindale, North Carolina. They may not see the Norman home as 
duplicating the conditions of captivity in a prison camp. Lenore Walker tried 
to address that gap when she treated “learned helplessness” as an answer to 
the question of why a woman had not left a violent relationship.292 But her 
approach makes an implicit concession to the false premise underlying that 
question—the idea that leaving had been possible and that it would have 
brought safety.293 Tyson did not share Walker’s approach to this question. 
On the issue of entrapment, Dr. Tyson emphasized Judy’s escape attempts, 
the reasons for the failure of those attempts, her concern about danger for 
the children, and her lack of material resources. He could find no 
possibilities that Judy had overlooked.294  
Judges and scholars who read meekness and paralysis into this story 
misunderstand both “learned helplessness” and Dr. Tyson’s testimony. To 
Martin Seligman, who coined the term, and in much of Lenore Walker’s 
work, “learned helplessness” meant giving up low-probability strategies that 
                                                                                                                     
289 Transcript, supra note 1, at 181. Dr. Rollins had also used the term “syndrome” in a portion of 
his report that did not reach the jury. See id. at 185–87 (including a query by Judge Gardner, a conference 
with Judy Norman, and the defense decision not to introduce it). 
290 Id. at 178; State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989); id. at 18 (Martin, J., 
dissenting); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589. In addition, the judge and attorneys used the phrase “battered 
spouse syndrome” a few times outside the presence of the jury in general reference to evidence on the 
effects of battering—for example, in a discussion of the admissibility of the history of violence by Judy 
Norman’s father against Judy’s mother. Transcript, supra note 1, at 148–50. This context fits the common 
legal usage of “battered woman syndrome” as a term referring generally to use of expert testimony in 
battering cases. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (“In legal contexts, the term ‘battered 
woman syndrome’ is often generic, an umbrella term for expert evidence on intimate partner violence 
and its effects . . . .”). 
291 Transcript, supra note 1, at 164 (containing Dr. Tyson’s testimony that compared the 
dehumanization process that J.T. inflicted on Judy to Nazi deprivation tactics and the brainwashing 
techniques utilized during the Korean War).  
292  THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 214, at 43 (introducing Learned Helplessness as a social-
learning theory that helps to describe why women stay in violent relationships).  
293 See Why Didn’t WE Leave?, supra note 218, at 22–25 (explaining that “why didn’t she leave?” 
is a classic example of a “loaded question” or complex fallacy). 
294 See supra note 272 and accompanying text (quoting testimony of Dr. Tyson).  
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failed and choosing high-probability strategies.295 Walker stated that women 
took that approach because they had lost the ability to predict successful 
outcomes for low-probability strategies.296 Seligman notes that people may 
appear to be passive while they plan the next attempt at a solution.297 
But the very term “helplessness” is misleading. Consider a military 
commander confronted by an overwhelming enemy force. There are no 
reinforcements that can reach him. In a direct battle, victory would be 
impossible. Scholars would not describe the decision to retreat or reorganize 
into a guerrilla-style force as “learned helplessness.” We would recognize 
this as common sense and tactics. 
When the experts said Judy had come to believe she could not get away, 
and the law would not help her, they described her assessment of the 
situation. That assessment did not, in itself, imply incorrect or impaired 
perception. Dr. Tyson’s statement that he saw nothing in the record to 
contradict her provided direct support for the rationality of her perception.298 
After Judy’s conviction, the defense brought Dr. Tyson back at 
sentencing. He described Judy’s diagnosis as “Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder-Chronic Type.”300 Tyson described PTSD as symptoms that follow 
a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside the range of 
normal human experience.299 Judy’s PTSD was “chronic-type” because the 
                                                                                                                     
295 See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 216, at 8 (describing how helplessness studies measure a 
person’s passivity versus activity in certain situations and whether they take certain actions with varying 
probability of success); see also Lenore E.A. Walker, Psychology and Violence Against Women, 44 
American Psychologist 695, 698 (1989) (comparing her findings regarding battered women to Martin 
Seligman’s studies and stating that battered women “increasingly choose actions that have the highest 
probability of success in minimizing pain and enhancing survival rather than taking a chance that they 
might be hurt more seriously or killed if they tried to escape.”). 
296 See Walker, supra note 240, at 24–25 (citing Seligman and Walker’s earlier works explaining 
that learned helplessness does not mean that a woman is helpless; it means that because she cannot predict 
successful outcomes for low-level probability behaviors, she will only resort to behaviors that have a 
high probability of success); Lenore E. A. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome is a Psychological 
Consequence, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 133–35 (Richard J. Gelles & 
Donileen R. Loseke eds. 1993). Walker acknowledges that “the name Seligman gave to his theory is 
unfortunately confusing . . . .” Id. She says the term “does not mean they learn to behave in a helpless 
way . . . . Even if learned helplessness were another way of labeling the [“Battered Woman Syndrome,”] 
which it is not, the process does not suggest the alleged helplessness or inherent weakness of battered 
women.” Id. at 135. 
297 See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 216, at 239  (criticizing the application of learned helplessness 
theory to battered women and pointing out that passivity can be instrumental). This framework seems to 
concede something to the appearance of passivity and behaviors that the Strategies Index would classify 
as placating—a less “passive” term. Goodman et al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 169. 
298 Transcript, supra note 1, at 163. 
300 Id. at 235. 
299 Id. 
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symptoms had “been in existence for more than six months following the 
initiation of the stresses.”300 
The term “helplessness” does not appear until sentencing, where it is not 
used as a term of art, but rather grouped with anxiety and depression.301 Dr. 
Tyson testified that Judy could be rehabilitated and overcome the aftermath 
of abuse: “her anxiety and depression could be relieved; . . . her feelings of 
helplessness and despair and uselessness and worthlessness that have been, 
just to be frank, beaten into her over the last twenty years . . . .”302 He 
suggested vocational training, working, getting a GED, volunteering, and 
“doing what normal members of the community do to contribute to society; 
something she’s been deprived of doing.”303 
Almost immediately, judges and scholars retelling Tyson’s testimony 
changed its emphasis and coverage.304 Most noticed only the statements 
about Judy’s sincere beliefs, not the support for those beliefs that emerged 
from his independent investigation and review of the record. The retold story 
framed false dichotomies between entrapment and the struggle for self-
preservation, between help-seeking and the experience of frustration and 
despair. This version of the story would frame legal scholarship for decades, 
and law school classrooms would structure discussion of Norman and 
imminence around stereotypes of “battered woman syndrome.” Part III.D 
analyzes the process through which testimony on coercive control turned 
into Walker’s “syndrome” in the opinions.  
C. Judy Norman Through Differing Forensic Lenses 
Despite differences in emphasis and overarching frameworks among 
various experts and theories, common threads emerge in expert testimony, 
which is “usually much more comprehensive” than many critics suggest: 
most experts “testify both about the social and practical experiences of 
battered women, and about the psychological impact of being battered.”305 
Even in the early cases describing expert testimony on “battered woman 
syndrome,” “expert testimony rarely focused solely on the psychological 
consequences of being battered. . . . Rather, . . . [it] included discussion of 
                                                                                                                     
300 Id. at 235–36. The prosecutor asked Dr. Tyson whether his diagnosis differed from that of Dr. 
Rollins, who recorded a diagnosis of “marital problems” followed by “abused spouse syndrome.” Id. at 
182. Tyson said that Rollins’s diagnosis was more “conservative,” that Tyson had more facts on which 
to base his diagnosis, and that the doctors had discussed and agreed on the issue. Id. at 239–40. 
301 In the text of the transcript, the only other use of “helpless” appears in the mental health 
counselor’s definition of depression. See id. at 92–93 (describing Mrs. Norman’s state of depression as 
feeling “hopeless” and “helpless”).  
302 Id. at 238.  
303 Id. 
304 See legal scholarship addressed infra Part III (detailing assumptions and errors of scholars on 
Battered Woman Syndrome). 
305 Osthoff & Maguigan, supra note 252, at 231. 
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the practical realities of having an abusive partner and what is today called 
testimony about battering and its effects.”306 This Section applies two 
distinct frameworks to the Norman case to illustrate similarities, differences, 
and the relative susceptibility to misunderstanding. 
1. “Battered Woman Syndrome”–Lenore Walker 
If Lenore Walker had testified at Judy Norman’s trial, she would—like 
other experts—have provided general information on domestic violence, the 
social and practical experiences of battered women, and the psychological 
impact of battering. In self-defense cases, that information would be relevant 
both to whether the defendant actually believed a threat was imminent, and 
to whether a reasonable person would have shared that perception.307 The 
balance of social context and psychological factors in her testimony varied, 
though law professors generally noted only her psychological theories.  
The comparison of two other judicial opinions that summarized 
Walker’s testimony shows the various threads in her work.308 One example 
included both social context (emphasizing actual danger and obstacles to 
leaving) and psychological reactions to violence (framed largely within the 
“syndrome” and “learned helplessness”):309 
Terminating the relationship usually has adverse economic 
consequences. Separating from a battering partner may be 
very dangerous, and the battered woman is aware of the 
danger. The batterer may have threatened to kill the battered 
woman or to abscond with the children if she leaves. Many 
battered women have tried to leave and been unsuccessful. In 
a battering relationship, the woman loses self-esteem, is 
terrified, and does not have the psychological energy to leave, 
resulting in “learned helplessness” and “a kind of 
psychological paralysis.” . . . “Learned helplessness” is 
another aspect of BWS. The battered woman often does not 
know why she is beaten on any particular occasion. The 
                                                                                                                     
306 Id. 
307 See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“[S]elf-defense may be 
analyzed as having two requirements: (1) the defendant’s acts causing the victim’s death were motivated 
by an actual (also referred to as ‘genuine’ or ‘honest’) belief or perception that (a) the defendant was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury from an unlawful attack or threat by the victim and (b) 
the defendant's acts were necessary to prevent the injury; and (2) a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances would have had the same perception and done the same acts.”), overruled by People v. 
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996). 
308 See id. at 177–78 (describing Dr. Walker’s expert testimony); Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 
1048 (Fla. 1999) (discussing the analysis Dr. Walker gave in the field of Battered Woman Syndrome), 
superseded by statute, Chapter 2005-27, 2005 Fla. Laws 199 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 
776.012–013, 031–032 (2018)).  
309 See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (discussing the dangers of leaving and the psychological reactions 
in Battered Woman Syndrome).  
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violence is perceived by the woman as “random and aversive 
stimulation.” Because of its randomness, she believes she is 
incapable of doing anything to prevent the abuse and, as a 
result, feels helpless.310 
In the other case, the judicial summary of Walker’s testimony did not 
emphasize “learned helplessness” even though Walker had testified at trial. 
That opinion listed four reasons that Walker identified to explain why that 
defendant did not retreat from a confrontation—only one of which was 
psychological: “[S]he felt that she was unable to leave because she had just 
given birth seven weeks earlier; she had been choked unconscious; she was 
paralyzed with terror; and experience had taught her that threats of leaving 
only made her husband more violent.”311  
 In general, Walker’s testimony emphasized the “cycle of violence” and 
“learned helplessness” theories that formed the lens through which she 
interpreted a defendant’s actions and perceptions.312 In Norman, there was 
no evidence of a cycle of tension building, violence, and remorseful 
romance. The absence of that cycle would have posed no problems for 
Walker’s theory, however, because she never claimed that the cycle would 
be found in all abusive relationships.313 
Walker treated the “syndrome” as a subcategory of PTSD.314 She 
believed the advantage of a PTSD diagnosis was its emphasis on traumatic 
stress rather than on unique violence among intimate partners. To Walker, 
PTSD implied the possibility of healing after violence ended; she believed 
that diagnosis would help avoid stereotypes about battered women.315 
Walker acknowledged that some battered women did not have symptoms of 
PTSD,316 but she would have agreed with Dr. Tyson’s testimony at 
sentencing about PTSD in Norman and of course with Dr. Rollins’s addition 
of battered spouse syndrome to the diagnosis of marital problems.  
                                                                                                                     
310 Id. In Aris, the appellate court found Walker’s testimony relevant only to Aris’s actual belief, 
not to reasonableness. Id. at 179–80. The California Supreme Court soon overruled Aris, explicitly 
recognizing relevance to reasonableness. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1996). 
311 See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1048 (summarizing from Walker’s expert testimony at trial). The 
Florida Supreme Court recognized that battered women face danger when separation from violent 
relationships and did not discuss learned helplessness. Id. at 1052–55. 
312 See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (discussing the theory of “learned helplessness” and how victims 
of domestic violence perceive violent situations). 
313 See BWS 2d 2000, supra note 225, at 127–28 (“In 65% of all cases . . . there was evidence of a 
tension-building phase prior to the battering. In 58% of all cases there was evidence of loving contrition 
afterward.”). 
314 Id. at 117. 
315 See id. at 104 (explaining that individuals with PTSD may “respond to therapy” when they are 
in a safe environment). 
316 See id. at 28–29 (indicating that PTSD “frequently develops after direct experience of trauma,” 
suggesting that it is not always present after trauma). 
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Most law professors missed a crucial aspect of Walker’s theory: in 
describing psychological reactions to the inability to stop violence, Walker 
was not concerned with the accuracy or reasonableness of the woman’s 
perceptions that she could not escape or stop the attacks.317 When law 
professors assumed that “learned helplessness” meant an unusual inability 
to see solutions, they misconstrued her point about psychological responses: 
Walker applied the term even when a woman’s perceptions were accurate 
and would have been shared by anyone in her position. Walker herself 
contributed to these misunderstandings: she usually stated clearly that 
“learned helplessness” did not mean a woman was literally helpless, but at 
times her testimony conveyed passivity or dysfunction.318  
Walker recognized that help-seeking increased as violence increased, 
which could have allowed her framework to describe Judy Norman’s urgent 
help-seeking as “learned helplessness.” The Norman case evinced no 
absence of help-seeking. Walker would also have explained that battered 
women develop keen insight into the circumstances and cues that predict 
violence, that they understand when situations become more dangerous and 
that often they have no realistic options. 319 
If Walker had testified in Norman, her evidence would have been more 
complex than the usual treatment in law reviews, but her terminology and 
approach would have remained susceptible to oversimplification. The jurors 
might have taken “learned helplessness” literally (as the appellate courts did 
later): that term might have displaced the detailed explanation of the defeat 
of Judy’s help-seeking that Walker would also have provided. When courts 
and commentators formed that misunderstanding of the term, they 
transformed defeated help-seeking and brutally-coerced submission into 
imagined descriptions of passivity or impairment in battered women.320  
2. Intimate Partner Violence and Its Effects – Mary Ann Dutton and 
Others 
Mary Ann Dutton focuses on the variety and complexity of responses 
that women have to violence and on the context within which violence takes 
place and women seek solutions.321 Her work, like that of many experts, 
                                                                                                                     
317 Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 525, 528–32 
(1978). 
318 See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 638 F. Supp. 1120, 1138 (W.D. La. 1986) (“Dr. Walker 
testified that this learned helplessness theory explains why women stay in an abusive relationship. She 
described this learned helplessness as ‘a woman’s loss of her voluntary will.’ These women ‘go into a 
survival mode to learn to cope . . . . They can do that quite well but they can’t really escape.’ ” (citations 
omitted)). 
319 See BWS 2d 2000, supra note 225, at 116–25 (discussing learned helplessness in battered 
women).  
320 See infra Part III.B (providing examples of scholarly discussion of helplessness or passivity).  
321 See Dutton, supra note 239, at 1215–26 (discussing the various psychological responses women 
have to domestic violence, as supported by academic literature).  
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began in the 1980s within the framework of “battered woman syndrome.”322 
Dutton became one of the leading scholars who transformed the dialogue by 
the early 1990s.323  
Dutton goes beyond approaches that focus on victim characteristics such 
as trauma history and reactivity to explain the variety of women’s responses 
to violence. Dutton emphasizes the importance of cognitive threat appraisal, 
which involves, firstly, the level of risk or threat posed by the abuser but also 
includes potentially additional factors that can contribute to threat appraisal, 
such as her exposure to the abuser’s violence over time and her physical and 
emotional state.324 “The reality of continuing risk—sometimes for years 
following termination of the relationship—makes the phenomenon of 
[Intimate Partner Violence] vastly different . . . from stranger rape, combat, 
and most other forms of interpersonal violence.”325  
For many law professors, the concept of expert testimony has been so 
completely defined by Lenore Walker’s theory and particularly by “learned 
helplessness” that it is not easy to envision expert testimony that would take 
a different approach. In the Appendix to this Article, the Model of Coercion 
in Intimate Partner Violence326 provides a sophisticated illustration of 
threats and actions as well as the impact of those threats and actions and 
responses to them. The expert can explain these dynamics and apply them 
to the particular case.  
Applying Dutton’s framework, the expert would provide information on 
intimate partner abuse and its context and address the history of violence and 
abuse in this relationship and the woman’s psychological responses to 
                                                                                                                     
322 See, e.g., Douglas (later Dutton-Douglas or Dutton), The Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 
223, at 39–53 (applying battered woman syndrome terminology and discussing battered woman 
syndome); Ferraro, supra note 223, at 111 (“Although I originally used the language of syndrome in my 
own testimony in accordance with the literature of the time, since 1995 I have described my testimony 
and expertise as being about ‘the effects of battering,’ as suggested in the literature and by the National 
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women.”). 
323 For examples of representative leading scholarship of the period, see Ferraro, supra note 223. at 
110 (describing persistence of the term “battered woman syndrome” among judges and attorneys 
“[d]espite the clarity of arguments rejecting the use of the term [] in favor of testimony describing the 
full range of social, institutional, relational, and psychological impacts of battering” and describing legal 
actors as relying on “a mythical stereotype that constricts perceptions of what ‘real’ battered women look 
like”), 111 (explaining change in terminology of expert witness); Follingstad, supra note 246 (discussing 
battered woman syndrome in the courts and the major legal issues in the use of battered woman 
syndrome); Osthoff & Maguigan, supra note 252 (reviewing developments in social science and the law 
and discussing the current use of social science testimony in battered women’s homicide trials); Dutton, 
supra note 239, at 1196 (“Referring simply to testimony concerning battered women’s experiences, 
rather than to ‘battered woman syndrome,’ more accurately captures the range of information typically 
covered in expert testimony.”). 
324 Mary Ann Dutton, Complexity of Women’s Response to Violence: Response to Briere and 
Jordan, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1277, 1278–80 (2004). 
325 Id. at 1277.  
326 See Dutton & Goodman, supra note 247, at 746 fig.1 (providing schemata illustrating the 
dynamics of coercive control in intimate partner violence); see infra Appendix (same). 
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abuse.327 The expert would also describe the strategies with which women 
respond to abuse and the strategies this woman used (or did not use). 
Strategies have consequences—the expert would explain the effects, 
successes, and failures of the woman’s strategies; the expectations she 
formed as a result; and the contextual factors that affected the woman’s 
choice of strategies in response to violence and her psychological reactions 
to that violence.328 In Judy Norman’s case, expert explanation would help 
jurors understand both the strategies Judy adopted and the reasons that she 
did not pursue others. 
For Dutton, PTSD illustrates the methodological problem when experts 
rely only on the effects of past violence. She points out that a flashback from 
prior violence caused by PTSD “might explain why a particular woman 
(unrealistically, but understandably) perceives her partner’s behavior as 
threatening . . . ; however, it provides little clarity in explaining why she 
might perceive realistic danger from an intimate partner.”329 Dutton’s 
approach would apply clinical forensic analysis to each issue separately, 
including the danger of leaving children with the abusive partner.330 The 
assessment of the level of risk—risk of death, looming certainty of 
trafficking worse than she had ever known—was a core issue in Judy 
Norman’s trial. 
At trial, Dr. Tyson’s testimony addressed many of the issues that 
Dutton’s work later brought together.331 He described J.T.’s violence against 
Judy and the extreme degradation and dehumanization that accompanied 
that violence.332 He summarized the strategies Judy had adopted and the 
outcome of those strategies.333 He emphasized contextual factors, including 
her desire to protect the children, the threats and violence that had forced her 
to return whenever she tried to leave, her conviction from past experiences 
that outright defiance of J.T. would bring worse violence or death, and the 
failures that convinced her “the law could not protect her.”334 Dr. Tyson also 
testified about her psychological responses when help-seeking failed. He 
                                                                                                                     
327 See Dutton, supra note 239, at 1193–1203 (offering a framework for examining, in the context 
of the legal system, the diversity of women’s responses to violence; criticizing and redefining battered 
woman syndrome). 
328 See id. at 1202 (explaining that these four components allow the expert witness “to within the 
overall social context, the various legal issues to be considered by the factfinder”); 1226–31 (reviewing 
the academic literature and discussing the array of strategies that battered women use in attempting to 
stop the violence). 
329 Dutton, supra note 324, at 1278. 
330 Id. at 1279. 
331 Compare testimony of Dr. Tyson, supra notes 264–80 and accompanying text (quoting and 
summarizing Dr. Tyson’s testimony), with the questions formulated by Dr. Dutton, supra note 242 and 
accompanying text (quoting and discussing the four questions posed by Dr. Dutton). 
332 Transcript, supra note 1, at 164. 
333 Id. at 171. 
334 Id. at 163.  
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said that she could find no way to escape worsening torture and degradation 
and he explained that she shot J.T. in an attempt to save herself and her 
family.335 
That account contains no formula like the cycle of violence. It does not 
imply inaccuracy or distortion in Judy’s judgment—Dr. Tyson’s testimony 
supported her perceptions. Feeling unable to escape was not learned 
helplessness in that she had not stopped trying—even on that last morning, 
Judy was still trying to find help. Her continuing inability to find help was 
part of her appraisal of her risk.  
A well-founded belief cannot be reduced to the psychological response 
that it may elicit. Focusing solely on psychological responses—and 
misunderstanding those responses—leads law professors to lose track of 
what experts actually say in these cases. Confusion about the content of 
expert testimony leads in turn to bad policy recommendations by scholars, 
explored further in Parts III and IV below.  
These self-defense cases need experts because the questions are 
difficult. Most jurors do not know enough about intimate partner violence to 
formulate Dutton’s queries or answer them without expert help. Expert 
analysis could help jurors who struggle to understand the woman’s 
experience and evaluate her credibility. Experts may also help avoid the 
impediments created by myths and stereotypes while jurors evaluate the 
woman’s story, the sincerity of her belief in the need to use deadly force, 
and the reasonableness of that belief. 
D. After Conviction: The Appellate Path from Coercive Control to 
“Battered Woman Syndrome”  
1. Post-Conviction—Dignity, Personhood, and Community at 
Sentencing and in Petitioning for Clemency 
Judge Gardner denied the self-defense instruction,336 but his instruction 
on manslaughter clarified that provocation could include terror as well as 
rage.337 The jury convicted Judy of manslaughter.338 At sentencing, the 
defense emphasized her good character and other factors in arguing for 
mitigation.339  
                                                                                                                     
335 See supra notes 265–280 (summarizing testimony of Dr. Tyson; his emphasis on degradation, 
dehumanization, and the defeat of Judy’s help-seeking efforts; and Judy’s belief that she had to use deadly 
force to defend herself and her family).  
336 Transcript, supra note 1, at 224. 
337 Id. at 218–19; see also Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-
of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1685–86 (1986) 
(discussing terror and provocation). 
338 Transcript, supra note 1, at 226.  
339 Her landlord, neighbor, and work supervisor spoke to her good character. Id. at 229–34. Judy’s 
attorney also emphasized that she had cooperated with law enforcement after the shooting and 
 
 726 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:3 
Attorney Robert Wolf argued for rehabilitation, rebutting justifications 
for criminal punishment. He emphasized that Judy posed no danger to the 
public because the person who threatened her was gone and she had no 
record of serious criminal acts (no need for incapacitation). Because of the 
violence to which Judy had been subjected, she had already been punished 
(no need for retribution).340 Furthermore, the community did not think that 
Judy deserved punishment; people agreed that she should go home (no 
support for retribution or deterrence). “Everyone is sympathetic to her, [and] 
empathizes with what she went through.”341 In support of rehabilitation, 
Wolf focused on her character as a mother and an employee with a good 
chance of promotion to supervisor, and on her willingness to undertake 
programs such as the GED.342 
In conclusion, he spoke about Judy’s dignity and personhood.343 Some 
legal scholars assume that arguments for battered women emphasize 
passivity and victimhood.344 In contrast, Wolf’s argument emphasized 
economic and social disadvantage: 
So the final thing you have to look at is whether or not she can 
be rehabilitated, and I would submit to Your Honor, that she 
can. This lady has never had a break. She wasn’t born into the 
high station in life that some of the rest of us have been 
privileged to have. She has only an eighth-grade education. 
She was married at fifteen. She’s got four children. She hasn’t 
had the kind of breaks that allow you to move up socially, 
economically, whatever. But, this is a lady that Bob Harris and 
I both have come to realize has a lot going for her. She’s got 
dignity. She is a kind compassionate lady. She’s got a sense of 
humor. And, it’s been a privilege for us to represent her, and I 
hope we’ve done a good job, but I’m afraid maybe we didn’t 
do enough. But, I honestly submit to Your Honor, that she does 
not deserve nor need to go to prison. And, rehabilitation would 
be the most appropriate thing.345 
                                                                                                                     
acknowledged her actions, acted under duress or compulsion (even if insufficient to constitute a complete 
defense), and acted under strong provocation. Id. at 243. He urged the court to consider Dr. Tyson’s 
diagnosis of PTSD as a severe “mental/physical condition.” Id. at 243; see also id. at 237–38 (testimony 
of Dr. Tyson).  
340 Id. at 243–45. 
341 Id. at 244. 
342 Id.  
343 Id. at 245–46. 
344 See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 67 (1994) (arguing that a 
“battered woman syndrome defense” “transforms the woman into a pet or thing that is brutally misused 
by its owner”).  
345 Transcript, supra note 1, at 245–46; see also id. at 244 (“[Y]ou could take your . . . robe and 
walk through this courthouse and walk down any main street in this county, and no one in this community 
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After the North Carolina Supreme Court reinstated Judy’s conviction,346 
her attorneys turned to the community for support and executive clemency 
for relief. Wolf and Harris distributed petitions for clemency in accessible 
locations around Rutherford County, including convenience stores and gas 
stations.347 The community responded, and the attorneys collected several 
thousand signatures.348 Wolf and Harris submitted those petitions, with the 
case record and additional files, in the petition for clemency.349 Two months 
after Judy went to prison, “Governor James T. Martin commuted her 
sentence to time already served.”350 
In the world of justice, executive clemency is not law but relief from 
law.351 Clemency for Judy Norman came shortly before some other 
governors began systematic clemency reviews for battered women.352 The 
extraordinary support from her attorneys and the community must have been 
critically important. Clemency is not a “safety valve” on which battered 
women can depend.353 Legal debates focused on Norman because the case 
illustrated continuing issues of inequality and injustice in self-defense law.   
2. Intimate Partner Violence—“Syndrome” Emerges in the Opinions 
The appellate court held that sleep should not make self-defense 
unavailable “as a matter of law.”354 The opinion by Judge (later Chief 
                                                                                                                     
is calling for you to, the Court, to put this lady in prison. Everyone is sympathetic to her, empathizes with 
what she went through.”). 
346 State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989). 
347 E-mail from Robert W. Wolf, Attorney for Judy Norman, to author (July 4, 2016, 11:16 AM) 
(on file with author). 
348 Id.  
349 Id. 
350 Rosen, supra note 30, at 391 n.56 (citing Mark Barrett, Norman Set Free, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-
TIMES, July 8, 1989, at 1). 
351 See id. at 391 (describing executive clemency as a “safety valve” to correct injustice which arises 
from application of the law). 
352 See, e.g., Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor’s 
Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (1994) 
(describing Ohio clemencies); Virginia Ellis, Two Women Given Clemency in Killings: Prison: Wilson 
Considers Battered Spouse Syndrome as Mitigating Factor, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 1993), 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1993-05-29/news/mn-41281_1_battered-spouse-syndrome (describing 
California clemencies); Al Schoch, Clemency Granted for Battered Woman, UNITED PRESS INT’L 
(Mar. 10, 1993), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/03/10/Clemency-granted-for-battered-
woman/9255731739600/ (describing Florida clemencies). 
353 See Carol Jacobsen & Lynn D’Orio, Defending Survivors: Case Studies of the Michigan 
Women's Justice & Clemency Project, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (2015) (“[T]he notion that 
clemency functions properly as a safety valve for justice creates the erroneous impression that those who 
do not receive relief deserve their punishment while legitimating the current oppressive criminal legal 
system.” (footnote omitted)); Rosen, supra note 30, at 391 (discussing clemency and concluding that 
focusing on necessity over imminence in domestic violence cases will help battered women more than 
executive clemency). 
354 State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (“The State contends 
that since decedent was asleep at the time of the shooting, defendant’s belief in the necessity to kill 
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Justice) Parker set forth the facts in detail, including Judy’s efforts to get 
help, the lethal threats from J.T. that stymied her efforts, and the ongoing 
threat to her life.355 A jury could find “that decedent’s sleep was but a 
momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror by the decedent, that 
defendant merely took advantage of her first opportunity to protect 
herself.”356 Taken together, the evidence “would permit reasonable minds to 
infer that defendant did not use more force than reasonably appeared 
necessary to her under the circumstances to protect herself from death or 
great bodily harm.”357 
The appellate opinion alternated between an approach based on a 
reasonable person in Judy’s circumstances and an approach based on 
characteristics of “battered spouse syndrome,” which the court defined by 
“cycles of violence,” paralysis under attack, and “learned helplessness.”358 
Toward reasonableness: “[T]he record is replete with sufficient evidence to 
permit but not compel a juror, representing the person of ordinary firmness, 
to infer that defendant’s belief was reasonable under the circumstances in 
which she found herself.”359 In evaluating the reasonableness of Judy’s fear 
of death or serious injury, the opinion considered J.T.’s rage, the evidence 
that his battering on June 12th was constant and more violent than usual, her 
previous efforts to get away, her fear that the beatings would resume, and 
her belief that he would carry out the threat to kill her if she swore out a 
warrant.360 “The inability of a defendant to withdraw from the hostile 
situation and the vulnerability of a defendant to the victim are factors 
considered by our Supreme Court in determining the reasonableness of a 
defendant’s belief in the necessity to kill the victim.”361 
Intertwined with that discussion of circumstances, lethal threat, and 
crisis, the appellate court also treated “battered spouse syndrome” as a 
crucial element in its own right. The opinion cited Walker’s “cycle of 
violence” to explain a battered woman’s inability to fight back during “the 
                                                                                                                     
decedent was, as a matter of law, unreasonable.”).  The court explained further that “a jury, in our view, 
could find that decedent’s sleep was but a momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror by the 
decedent, that defendant merely took advantage of her first opportunity to protect herself, and that 
defendant’s act was not without the provocation required for perfect self-defense.” Id. at 592. 
355 Id. at 587–89. 
356 Id. at 592. 
357 Id. 
358 See id. at 591 (citing Loraine Patricia Eber, The Battered Wife’s Dilemma: To Kill or To Be 
Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 927 (1981); Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a 
Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 38–39 (1986)) 
(“Through this repeated, sometimes constant, abuse, the battered spouse acquires what the psychologists 
denote as a state of ‘learned helplessness,’ defendant’s state of mind as described by Drs. Tyson and 
Rollins.”).  
359 Id.  
360 Id. at 588, 591. 
361 Id. at 591. In addition, the court commented that the “existence of battered spouse syndrome . . 
. distinguishes this case from the usual situation” Id. 
 
 2019] MISUNDERSTANDING JUDY NORMAN: THEORY AS CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE 729 
violent phase, the time when the traditional concept of self-defense would 
mandate that defendant protect herself, i.e., at the moment the abusing 
spouse attacks” and said that in this violent phase the battered spouse is 
“immobilized by fear, if not actually physically restrained.”362  
The conclusion wavered again between the circumstances generating 
reasonable fear and “syndrome” phenomena. The penultimate paragraphs 
treated “the realities of the condition” as the reason not to wait until the 
beginning of an actual deadly attack.363 In conclusion, the court returned 
again to the reasonable person in Judy’s circumstances, emphasizing the 
“reign of terror” and the idea that deadly force “reasonably appeared 
necessary.”364 That final review of her circumstances and danger did not 
depend on whether Judy had a “condition.”365 
The dual reasoning of the appellate opinion showed the pathologizing 
effect of Walker’s approach. The court did not make the mistake of treating 
the “syndrome” as a separate defense; it concluded that the jury should 
weigh syndrome testimony “merely as some evidence to be considered along 
with all other evidence in making its determination whether there is a 
reasonable doubt as to the unlawfulness of defendant’s conduct.”366 But the 
appellate opinion created the linkage to Walker’s framework that became 
the basis for part of the majority opinion and for much of the commentary, 
even though the case had been litigated as coercive control. 
Justice Mitchell’s majority opinion in the state supreme court said the 
appellate court had relied on evidence of worsening violence, “learned 
helplessness,” and “meekness” in battered women.367 (The appellate court 
had not used the term “meekness.”) The majority saw the core of the 
appellate reasoning as dependent on the admission of “syndrome” 
                                                                                                                     
362 Id.; see also THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 214, at 55–70 (introducing Walker’s theory of 
the cycle of violence and explaining why a woman could perceive it as futile to resist her attacker during 
the violent phase of the cycle). This move toward Walker’s theory relied on opinions from other 
jurisdictions and law review notes and articles citing Walker, as well as on Walker’s own work. See State 
v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d at 591–92 (first citing Eber, supra note 358, at 927; then citing Rosen, 
supra note 358, at 38–39; and then citing State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 821 (N.D. 1983)) (applying 
a subjective standard to the beliefs of a defendant in a self-defense situation, rather than “[what] a jury 
might determine to be objectively reasonable”). 
363 Id. at 592 (“Given the characteristics of battered spouse syndrome, we do not believe that a 
battered person must wait until a deadly attack occurs or that the victim must in all cases be actually 
attacking or threatening to attack at the very moment defendant commits the unlawful act for the battered 
person to act in self-defense. Such a standard, in our view, would ignore the realities of the condition.” 
(emphasis added)). 
364 Id. at 592. 
365 See id. (instructing the jury to consider the condition only as a portion of the evidence). 
366 Id  
367 State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 15 (N.C. 1989). The appellate court had not used 
the term “meekness.” See generally Norman I, 366 S.E.2d 586. 
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testimony.368 This opinion summarized the testimony of Doctors Tyson and 
Rollins in relation to “battered wife syndrome,” a “condition” characterized 
by “such abuse and degradation that the battered wife comes to believe she 
is unable to help herself and cannot expect help from anyone else. She 
believes that she cannot escape the complete control of her husband and that 
he is invulnerable to law enforcement and other sources of help.”369 The 
opinion did quote testimony that Judy believed escape was impossible and 
law would not protect her but did not quote the testimony on coercive 
control.370 
The justices saw no evidence that Judy had “any belief . . .—reasonable 
or otherwise—that she faced a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm 
from the drunk and sleeping victim.”371 The opinion was emphatic: the 
phrase “reasonable or otherwise” appears three times on that page in addition 
to another statement that there was no evidence of any “imminent threat nor 
of any fear by the defendant of death or great bodily harm, imminent or 
otherwise.”372 The majority ignored the aspects of the expert testimony that 
supported the reasonableness of Judy’s belief. 
By linking her perception to the “syndrome,” the opinion implied a 
distinction from reasonable perception.373 The majority considered a 
“battered woman’s defense” as a separate strategy that “could be extended 
in principle to any type of case in which a defendant testified that he or she 
subjectively believed that killing was necessary and proportionate to any 
perceived threat.”374 This approach treats reasonableness and “syndrome” 
testimony as if they were in tension with each other and appears to treat Judy 
Norman’s perceptions as relevant only under a “subjective” standard. 
However, the admission of expert testimony could not change the 
requirements of imminent threat and reasonableness in self-defense, even if 
Dr. Tyson had actually testified about Walker’s “battered woman syndrome” 
and “learned helplessness.” The court erred in treating these ideas as a 
change in self-defense.375  
                                                                                                                     
368 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 9 (referencing the appellate opinion’s statement that “the defendant’s 
evidence that she exhibited what has come to be called ‘the battered wife syndrome’ entitled her to have 
the jury consider whether the homicide was an act of perfect self-defense and, thus, not a legal wrong”). 
369 Id. at 11. 
370 Id. at 17. 
371 Id. at 14.  
372 Id. 
373 Id. (“We are not persuaded by the reasoning . . . that when there is evidence of battered wife 
syndrome, neither an actual attack nor threat of attack by the husband at the moment the wife uses deadly 
force is required to justify the wife’s killing of him in perfect self-defense.”).  
374 Id. at 16 (citing Rosen, supra note 405, at 44). 
375 See id. (declining to “expand” the “law of self-defense beyond the limits of immediacy and 
necessity”). Feminists have not advocated for the creation of a separate defense. See, e.g., Maguigan, 
supra note 250, at 426–27 (“By the offer of battered-woman-syndrome expert testimony, a defendant 
does not assert her entitlement to a completely new defense. Rather, she asserts her right to explain to 
 
 2019] MISUNDERSTANDING JUDY NORMAN: THEORY AS CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE 731 
Although the majority recognized that J.T. was “angrier than ever” and 
his abuse had become more frequent, they found no qualitative shift, no 
lethal threat, and no possibility of mortal danger in his escalation.376 They 
found predictions of lethal force against Judy “entirely speculative” because 
J.T. had never “inflicted any harm . . . that approached life-threatening 
injury, even during the ‘reign of terror.’”377 The discussion of previous life-
threatening injury probably responded to the fact that the judges saw no 
imminent threat. However, relying on past violence makes it difficult to 
address questions important in many battered women’s self-defense cases—
the increasing credibility of lethal threats and the need to respond to changes 
in behavior from prior abuse.  
As to the timing of threat and death, the majority stated that J.T. had 
been asleep for “some time” when Judy got the gun.378 If taken literally, that 
statement must be accurate, because “some time” could mean anything from 
two minutes to twenty hours. But Judy’s testimony shows that the time was 
actually very brief.379 Preoccupation with the appellate discussion of 
“syndrome” theory and psychological response may have discouraged the 
majority from grappling with the contrast between the idea that Judy had 
“ample time and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing abuse”380 
and the opposing view of the people around Judy who did not see a way for 
her to escape or find help.  
Inability to see threat interacted with reliance on the “syndrome.” The 
failure to see any imminent threat supported the idea that the appellate court 
had intended to justify a taking of a human life on a “purely subjective 
speculation that the decedent probably would present a threat to life at a 
future time and that the defendant would not be able to avoid the predicted 
threat.”381 The majority saw a parade of horribles in these relaxed 
requirements that could categorically legalize the opportune killing of 
abusive husbands by their wives solely on the basis of the wives’ testimony 
                                                                                                                     
the jury the effects of intimate violence and the relationship of its effects to her self-defense claim under 
existing self-defense law.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 427 n.169 (“No state has adopted a separate 
defense based solely on the admission of expert testimony.”); Brief for California Alliance Against 
Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae at 4 n.3, People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996) (stating 
that in 1993, the California Senate considered a bill that would have created a special self-defense law 
for battered women, and the California Alliance Against Domestic Violence opposed that legislation).  
376 Id. at 10. 
377 Id. at 15. Richard Rosen criticized this holding in light of North Carolina precedent. See Rosen, 
supra note 30, at 374 n.5 (“It is hard to take this contention seriously, since Mr. Norman, among his other 
actions, actually threatened to kill his wife. In any event, . . . the amount of bodily harm Mr. Norman 
actually inflicted on his wife, as well as that threatened, easily meets [the standard for use of deadly force 
in self-defense] under prevailing North Carolina law.” (citation omitted)).  
378 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13. 
379 See supra text accompanying note 186 (Judy Norman’s testimony). 
380 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13. 
381 Id. at 15. 
 
 732 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:3 
concerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of future 
felonious assaults by their husbands. “Homicidal self-help would then 
become a lawful solution, and perhaps the easiest and most effective 
solution, to this problem.”382 The majority concluded: “[W]e decline to 
expand our law of self-defense beyond the limits of immediacy and necessity 
which have heretofore provided an appropriately narrow but firm basis upon 
which homicide may be justified and, thus, lawful by reason of perfect self-
defense.”383 
Despite the discussion of “reasonable perception” in the appellate court, 
both the appellate and majority opinions linked expert testimony with 
Walker’s syndrome and struggled with its relationship with reasonableness. 
In contrast, the dissent discussed battered women and fear but did not rely 
on the syndrome framework. The arguments in the dissent relied on both the 
evidence of Judy’s actual perception of threat and the evidence that her 
perception was reasonable. 
3. “And Its Effects”—Reasonableness in the Dissent 
The majority and dissent agreed on the legal standard for reasonableness 
in self-defense: “[The defendant’s] belief must be reasonable . . . in that the 
circumstances as they appeared to the defendant would create such a belief 
in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.”384 But they disagreed on the 
application of that law to the Norman facts. 
Justice Martin’s dissent began with precedent, stating that the duty of 
the court was to instruct the jury on all defenses arising on the evidence, 
even if the evidence had discrepancies or was contradicted by evidence from 
the state.385  “This rule reflects the principle in our jurisprudence that it is the 
jury, not the judge, that weighs the evidence.”386 Judy Norman was not 
arguing for an expansion in the law of self-defense, but rather, that 
self-defense law should protect her, and the dissent agreed, working through 
the elements of self-defense and explaining why each could be met in 
Norman.387  
For the dissent, all the evidence established Judy’s actual belief that J.T. 
was going to kill her.388 In discussing the way a jury would analyze the 
reasonableness of her belief, the dissent emphasized several factors, 
                                                                                                                     
382 Id. 
383 Id. at 16. 
384 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 12 (citing State v. Gappins, 357 S.E.2d 654, 659 (N.C. 1987)); id. at 
17 (Martin, J., dissenting) (describing the “ordinary firmness” element).  
385 Id. at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Dooley, 203 S.E.2d 815 (N.C. 1974)).  
386 Id. 
387 See id. (discussing the elements of self-defense and explaining how the evidence supported the 
defendant).  
388 See id. at 17–18 (stating that testimony from the defendant and the experts supported the 
defendant’s actual belief).  
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including the escalating crisis and the eyewitness testimony that showed that 
her family shared her perceptions of threat and impossibility of escape.389 
The dissent quoted extensively from the testimony on coercive control.390 It 
quoted Dr. Tyson’s statements that he could find nothing in the record to 
contradict Judy’s perception that she could not get help and that Judy had 
begun to fear for her family and her children if she died or left.391  
Justice Martin discussed articles that relied on Walker’s theory for their 
description of a continuing state of threat and fear, but his dissent did not 
use the terminology of “syndrome” or “learned helplessness.” He 
emphasized Judy’s fear of imminent death and the impossibility of escape: 
Defendant’s intense fear, based on her belief that her husband 
intended not only to maim or deface her, as he had in the past, 
but to kill her, was evident in the testimony of witnesses who 
recounted events of the last three days of the decedent’s life. 
This testimony could have led a juror to conclude that 
defendant reasonably perceived a threat to her life as 
“imminent,” even while her husband slept. Over these three 
days, her husband’s anger was exhibited in an unprecedented 
crescendo of violence. The evidence showed defendant’s fear 
and sense of hopelessness similarly intensifying, leading to an 
unsuccessful attempt to escape through suicide and 
culminating in her belief that escape would be possible only 
through her husband’s death.392 
The dissent also emphasized Judy’s right to defend against great bodily 
harm, taking that threat as seriously as the threat of death.393  
 The testimony of eyewitnesses supported Judy’s perception that she 
could not escape; the family’s inability to resist J.T. or help her proved her 
lack of options. Captivity was relevant to the reasonableness of her 
perception of threat.394 In the dissent, “helplessness” was not a psychological 
condition. Rather, it described Judy’s awareness of her lack of resources, 
informed by her family’s inability to protect her and the failures of social 
service agencies and the law: 
In addition to the testimony of the clinical psychologist, 
defendant presented the testimony of witnesses who had 
actually seen defendant’s husband abuse her. These witnesses 
                                                                                                                     
389 See id. at 18 (noting that the testimony of the defendant’s family supported the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s actual belief); id. at 19 (“[J.T.’s] rage was such that defendant’s mother feared he 
might kill the whole family . . . .”).  
390 Id. at 17–18. But see id. at 14 (majority opinion) (finding no evidence that she had any belief he 
would kill her). 
391 Id. at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. Tyson’s testimony).  
392 Id. at 19. 
393 Id. at 20. 
394 Id. at 17–18. 
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described circumstances that caused not only defendant to 
believe escape was impossible, but that also convinced them 
of its impossibility. Defendant’s isolation and helplessness 
were evident in testimony that her family was intimidated by 
her husband into acquiescing in his torture of her. Witnesses 
also described defendant’s experience with social service 
agencies and the law, which had contributed to her sense of 
futility and abandonment through the inefficacy of their 
protection and the strength of her husband’s wrath when they 
failed. Where torture appears interminable and escape 
impossible, the belief that only the death of the oppressor can 
provide relief is reasonable in the mind of a person of ordinary 
firmness, let alone in the mind of the defendant, who, like a 
prisoner of war of some years, has been deprived of her 
humanity and is held hostage by fear.395 
 The crisis that the majority had treated as irrelevant was crucial to the 
analysis of reasonableness in the dissent: 
From this evidence of the exacerbated nature of the last three 
days of twenty years of provocation, a juror could conclude 
that defendant believed that her husband’s threats to her life 
were viable, that serious bodily harm was imminent, and that 
it was necessary to kill her husband to escape that harm. And 
from this evidence a juror could find defendant’s belief in the 
necessity to kill her husband not merely reasonable but 
compelling.396 
The dissent took a similar approach to reasonable belief about 
imminence, citing the Model Penal Code approach while emphasizing that 
“the question is not whether the threat was in fact imminent, but whether 
defendant’s belief in the impending nature of the threat, given the 
circumstances as she saw them, was reasonable in the mind of a person of 
ordinary firmness.”397 
                                                                                                                     
395 Id. at 18. 
396 Id. at 20.  
397 Id. at 19 & n.1. 
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III. JUDY NORMAN IN THE IMAGINATION OF LEGAL SCHOLARS—WHAT 
WE MISSED AND WHY WE MISSED IT 
A. Assumptions and Errors About Judy Norman, Battered Women, and 
Expert Testimony 
[The battered wife] does not even flinch during the beatings, 
as we think all other animals instinctively do to escape the pain 
caused, for example, by lighted cigarettes held against flesh. It 
is almost impossible to imagine that a human being, rather 
than a thing, could really be that passive when abused.398 
Almost all of us in the legal academy have missed some aspects of Judy 
Norman’s story, perhaps because the inventory of violence and degradation 
was clearer than the trends and larger patterns in the story. The judicial 
opinions recounted Judy’s strategies, but many readers could not grasp them. 
In the epigraph to this section, Anne Coughlin confesses a difficulty that 
reveals failure to see Judy’s desperate search for help, the combination of 
strategies, and the terror that paralyzed Judy’s family members—all of which 
separated the person Judy Norman from a passive “thing.”399 Coughlin’s 
inability “to imagine” illustrates a larger problem: intimate partner violence 
sometimes engenders fear and revulsion that make it difficult for judges, 
jurors, and readers to process the facts in these cases.400 
George Fletcher’s article focusing on Judy Norman states without 
qualification that women can kill, if necessary, to protect their “sexual 
autonomy”—in the context of his discussion, rape—but makes no mention 
of Judy Norman’s sexual autonomy.401 For Fletcher, the violation in forced 
prostitution was so different from rape as to merit no discussion.402 But why 
use the phrase “sexual autonomy” and ignore violent trafficking? 
Fletcher believes that those who perceive threat in Norman are justifying 
killing in retaliation for past wrongs, even if they will not admit it. He thinks 
the “standard maneuver in battered-wife cases” is to argue that “the actor 
feared a recurrence of the past violence, thus [shifting the focus] from past 
to future violence, from retaliation to an argument of defending against an 
                                                                                                                     
398 Coughlin, supra note 344, at 67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Norman 
(Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)) (using the cigarette burn in the Norman case as 
an example). 
399 See id. (citing Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587) (discussing Coughlin’s perception of Norman’s 
passivity). 
400 Legal scholars might read impairment into Judy Norman’s story because we are threatened by 
the idea that these awful things could happen to someone who was not impaired. 
401 George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 
553, 560 (1996). 
402 See id. at 555–56, 574 (discussing “when the impending violation is sufficiently proximate to 
trigger a legitimate response”—notably, without discussing forced prostitution). 
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imminent attack” and that “[i]n view of her prior abuse, the wife arguably 
has reason to fear renewed violence.”403 This approach ignores the escalating 
quality of threat that led Judy’s mother Laverne to arm herself and the 
continuation of threat after separation.  
Relying on Anne Coughlin’s critique of learned helplessness and 
“battered woman syndrome,” Fletcher says that “[i]f married women can 
now be held liable for their crimes . . . they can be held accountable for their 
failure to leave abusive husbands.”404 By tying criminal responsibility to 
lack of previous success at separation, Fletcher adopts the requirement that 
Victoria Nourse calls “pre-retreat.”405 Fletcher’s forthright statement is 
unusual in its candor. More commonly, “pre-retreat” appears in judicial 
opinions that rely implicitly on the idea that a woman should have removed 
herself before her husband’s violence became critical.406 As Nourse 
explains, this approach is a departure from the usual law of self-defense.407 
The Norman case seems to invite scholarly errors on facts and legal 
points,408 and those errors reveal assumptions made by the authors. For 
example, some say that Judy “retrieved” a gun.409 “Retrieve” means to 
regain possession, to get something back.410 There is no indication in the 
                                                                                                                     
403 Id. at 558. 
404 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 139 
(1995) (emphasis added); cf. Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596, 
1618 (1996) (criticizing Fletcher for referring to the “gulag” Judy called home and then treating her as 
autonomous and her actions as freely chosen: “[I]n a gulag, how is one ‘free’?”). 
405 Nourse, supra note 18, at 1284–85. 
406 Id. at 1284. 
407 Id. 
408 For example, some authors describe the issue in Norman as the admission of expert testimony. 
See Jane Campbell Moriarty, “While Dangers Gather”: The Bush Preemption Doctrine, Battered 
Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 24 (2005) 
(stating that Norman did not allow expert testimony because that testimony would have made 
“‘[h]omicidal self-help . . . a lawful solution’” (citing State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 15 
(N.C. 1989))); David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of 
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 81 (1997) (stating that “some courts remain adamantly opposed to the 
introduction of this evidence on the basis of legal doctrine” (citing Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 12–14)).  
409 Jeffrey P. Gray, Was the First Woman Hanged in North Carolina a “Battered Spouse?”, 19 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 311, 323 (1997) (describing Judy as having “retrieved a pistol” (citing Norman II, 
378 S.E.2d at 13)); see also id. at 311 n.* (noting in his biography that Gray was the assistant state 
attorney who briefed and argued the only two cases the North Carolina Supreme Court considered on 
battered woman syndrome); Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, 
Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 228–29 (2002) (“When her husband 
got drunk and fell asleep, Norman retrieved a gun from her mother’s house and shot him.” (citing Norman 
II, 378 S.E.2d at 9)); Anthony J. Sebok, Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?, 
57 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 737 (1996) (“[T]he Norman court thought that the fact that Judy Norman walked 
to her mother’s house to retrieve a gun while Mr. Norman was asleep suggests that she could have fled 
her own house . . . .” (citing Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13)); Faigman & Wright, supra note 408, at 84 
n.100 (describing that Judy “retrieved a gun from her mother’s house” (citing Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 
12–16)). 
410 See Retrieve, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (defining 
retrieve as “to get back; regain”). 
 
 2019] MISUNDERSTANDING JUDY NORMAN: THEORY AS CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE 737 
record that Judy had handled this gun before or knew it was there; according 
to the record, her purpose was first to bring the baby to her mother and then 
to get something to help with her headache.411 The term “retrieve” implies a 
suspicion that she had gone across the road with the purpose of getting the 
gun, or that she had formed a more developed decision to end his life.412 
Those concepts might affect the conclusion that she had enough time to 
reach other decisions.413 
The most important errors may be those that minimize the dangers 
facing Judy Norman. Professor Dressler has access to the Norman 
transcript—his casebook quotes Judy’s entire response to her lawyer’s 
question about why she killed her husband, including her certainty that the 
coming night at the truck stop would be worse than ever.414 Yet Dressler 
asserts that there was no crisis: “As far as we know, tomorrow was going to 
be no different than yesterday or the day after tomorrow.”415 That statement 
contradicts all the judicial opinions416 and the eyewitness who had never 
seen J.T. that angry before.417 Like the failure to consider the temporal 
implications of “nap,” the inability to see crisis is a crucial factor in the 
                                                                                                                     
411 See Transcript supra note 1, at 85 (describing Laverne Laws’s testimony that Judy visited her 
mother’s house to get medication for her headache and found the gun when Laverne directed Judy to her 
purse to get pain pills for her headache); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (describing why Norman visited 
her mother’s house). 
412 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 9, at 347 (“[A]fter returning home from the hospital, she decided 
to take matters into her own hands. Her husband had been asleep for some time; Ms. Norman walked to 
her mother's house, obtained a gun, and then returned and shot her husband three times in the back of the 
head while he slept, killing him.”).  
413 Joshua Dressler’s account condenses the chronology of June 11–12 and omits both the baby and 
her fear of waking J.T. See Joshua Dressler, Criminal Law, Moral Theory, and Feminism: Some 
Reflections on the Subject and on the Fun (and Value) of Courting Controversy, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1143, 1158–59 (2004) (mentioning that Judy Norman had four children and explaining the abuse she 
endured in the days leading up to the incident but choosing not to mention the baby and Judy’s fear of 
waking her husband). Dressler’s description implies that Judy went to her mother’s house with the 
purpose of obtaining a gun and killing her husband and, like Kaufman, describes Judy as taking matters 
“into her own hands.” Id. at 1158; Kaufman, supra note 9, at 347. 
414 JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 521 (6th 
ed. 2012). 
415 Dressler, Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra note 29, at 1489–90. 
416 See State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588, 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (reciting the 
overdose incident in which J.T. told emergency personnel that Judy “don’t [sic] deserve to live” and 
describing the “decedent’s sleep [as] but a momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror”). But see 
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 12, 15 (holding that there was no evidence proving that Judy Norman was under 
“imminent” threat of “death or great bodily harm” and arguing that a different holding could have the 
effect of “mak[ing] opportune homicide lawful as a result of mere subjective predictions of indefinite 
future assaults and circumstances”); id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (reciting Judy Norman’s intense fear 
in the days before the killing and recounting the deceased’s attempt to interfere with the first responders 
after Judy overdosed, telling them, “Let the bitch die”).  
417 Transcript, supra note 1, at 57–58 (testimony of Mark Navarra).  
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argument that no reasonable person could possibly have perceived the threat 
in this situation.418  
A similar minimization of violence and danger appeared in a study that 
tested public perceptions of appropriate punishment using two 
hypotheticals, one based on the case of New York subway shooter Bernhard 
Goetz, and the other—the authors stated—on Norman.419 In each 
hypothetical, an expert testified about a “syndrome”: “posttraumatic stress” 
or “battered-spouse.”420 In both hypotheticals, the facts were arguably less 
threatening than in the actual cases. In the male hypothetical, the facts 
evoking threat were similar to Goetz except that the hypothetical defendant 
was approached by only one teenager on a subway platform who stated, 
“give me some money, man” rather than being approached by one or two of 
a group of four teenagers who were together on the subway train.421 The 
female hypothetical bore less resemblance to the facts of Norman, and the 
                                                                                                                     
418 The failure to see crisis may also explain Professor Dressler’s interpretation of the dissent. The 
dissent concludes the argument about reasonableness by stating that “[J.T.’s] barbaric conduct . . . 
reduced the quality of the defendant’s life to such an abysmal state that . . . the jury might well have 
found that she was justified in acting in self-defense for the preservation of her tragic life.” Norman II, 
378 S.E.2d. at 21 (Martin, J., dissenting). To Professor Dressler, this statement suggests that Justice 
Martin considered J.T. to have forfeited his right to life by abusing Judy; Dressler criticizes “moral 
forfeiture” theory but does not address Justice Martin’s arguments about reasonableness, the fears shared 
by eyewitnesses, and the impossibility of escape. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 
247–48 (7th ed. 2016) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 7TH ED.].  
419 Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 
1587–88 (2010).  
William had persistently abused Julie during their ten-year marriage. This mistreatment included 
physical beatings, some of which resulted in injuries (facial cuts; broken ribs; twice a broken nose) 
requiring emergency medical treatment. Three times the police arrested William for assaulting Julie, but 
released him from custody each time after Julie declined to press charges. 
Testifying in her own defense, Julie told the jury that William had beaten her on the morning of the 
shooting after returning home from a night of hard drinking and then fallen asleep in the bedroom. Julie 
testified that she then went to her mother’s nearby home and obtained the hand gun used in the shooting. 
“I felt I had no choice except to shoot him,” she stated, “because I knew when he woke up this time he 
was going to hurt me really bad.” 
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace, a Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty 
of a major university. Based on a thorough psychiatric examination of Julie, Wallace offered his opinion 
that Julie was suffering from “battered woman syndrome.” “Like other victims of chronic domestic 
violence,” Wallace testified, “Julie believed that she was powerless to leave and that no one could or 
would help her.” “In my opinion, Julie honestly perceived that her husband would attack her if she didn’t 
kill him first; that belief was quite reasonable, given the beatings she had previously suffered, and the 
effect of those beatings on her psyche,” he concluded. 
Id. (quoting Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defense Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 25–26, 65 (2008)).  
420  Id. at 1586–87. 
421 Compare id. at 1586–88 (creating a hypothetical in which a fictitious forty-eight-year-old 
white male shoots a seventeen-year-old African American male), with People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 
43 (N.Y. 1986) (stating that four youths sat together on the subway train and that it appeared from the 
evidence before the Grand Jury that one of them approached Goetz, possibly with a second youth beside 
him, and stated, “give me five dollars”). The hypothetical also shifted location from subway car to 
subway platform, which could also affect the interpretation of threat. 
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differences were significant: it omitted the existence of children and Judy’s 
frustrated efforts at help-seeking.422 It omitted all the factors that pointed to 
lethal danger, including the abuser’s threats to kill, and it omitted forced 
prostitution—the threat Judy had identified first on the witness stand. 
One way to measure the difference between this hypothetical and the 
published opinions in Norman is to apply the respected Danger Assessment 
Scale, which asks about facts and patterns correlated with risks of 
lethality.423 The published facts in Norman yield “yes” answers to nine of 
the twenty questions in the Danger Assessment: whether physical violence 
had increased in severity or frequency; whether he was unemployed; 
whether he had avoided being arrested for domestic violence; whether he 
threatened to kill her; whether he forced unwanted sex; whether he 
controlled her daily activities; whether she had been beaten while pregnant; 
whether she believed he was capable of killing her; whether he followed her; 
                                                                                                                     
422  See Braman et al., supra note 419, at 1587–88 (presenting a hypothetical based on Judy 
Norman). 
423 During the 1980s, Jacquelyn Campbell studied patterns and risk factors in femicides—the 
deaths of battered women—and developed the Danger Assessment [DA] for use by counselors 
collaborating with the women to assess their risks and choices. See Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Nursing 
Assessment for Risk of Homicide with Battered Women, ADVANCES IN NURSING SCI., July 1986, at 36–
37 (explaining the study of risk and development of the DA); Campbell revised the DA in 2004 to create 
a list of twenty questions still used today. See Jacquelyn C. Campbell et. al., The Danger Assessment: 
Validation of a Lethality Risk Assessment Instrument for Intimate Partner Femicide, 24 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 653, 655 (2009) (reproducing revised DA questions); id. at 657–59 
(describing revision of the original questionnaire and citing three validation studies); id. at 661–63 
(describing the revision process); D. Alex Heckert & Edward W. Gondolf, Battered Women’s 
Perceptions of Risk Versus Risk Factors and Instruments in Predicting Repeat Reassault, 19 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 778, 778 (2004) (finding an earlier version of DA combined with women’s 
perceptions of risk to be among the accurate methods of prediction); id. at 778 (“Women’s perceptions 
of risk by themselves were much better predictors than [two other risk assessment tools] and not quite as 
accurate as the DAS”); Jill Theresa Messing & Jonel Thaller, The Average Predictive Validity of Intimate 
Partner Violence Risk Assessment Instruments, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1537, 1543 (2013) 
(noting high values in DA when applied to attempted femicides and severe reassaults); cf. Amanda Hitt 
& Lynn McLain, Stop the Killing: Potential Courtroom Use of a Questionnaire that Predicts the 
Likelihood that a Victim of Intimate Partner Violence Will Be Murdered by Her Partner, 24 WIS. J.L. 
GENDER & SOC’Y 277, 307 (2009) (describing research methods including interviews with close friends 
or relatives of women killed by partners who provide information of their experience and patterns in their 
relationships). Other threat assessment tools also emerged but in future studies. Among these, only the 
DA proved to be more accurate than battered women’s predictions about abuse. The DA has been 
validated repeatedly, but its application in law enforcement raises important questions. See, e.g., Hitt & 
McLain, supra, at 307 (discussing the validation of risk factors); Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, 
Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 
526 (2010) (discussing “weaknesses that undermine the DA’s effectiveness” when the DA is used in 
screening by law enforcement, including a potentially flawed belief that separation from the abuser will 
stop future violence).  
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and whether he was an alcoholic or drug addict.424 (As to alcoholism, the 
hypothetical mentions only a night of hard drinking.)425  
Using the facts in the published opinions, the weighted result on the 
Danger Assessment places Judy Norman’s risk in the highest category, 
Extreme Danger.426 The statements about threats to children—in the 
transcript but not the opinions427—would have raised the raw score but could 
not have changed the assessment of lethal risk, simply because the Danger 
Assessment scale has no higher risk category. In stark contrast, the facts 
from the female hypothetical in the Braman law review article do not 
produce a single “yes” answer to the Danger Assessment questions.428 The 
hypothetical does not reflect—and may not have produced in readers—the 
lethal danger that appears in the facts in Norman.  
The gap between hypothetical facts and Norman may or may not have 
affected the study. For the authors’ purposes, the hypothetical might stand 
on its own, but they should not have associated it with Norman. That 
association reveals a story we tell ourselves about Norman: a story that omits 
constraint and danger. That story avoids hard questions about what 
justification would mean if our sisters or our daughters faced a night at the 
truck stop under J.T. Norman’s threat of death. 
 This hypothetical illustrates the academy’s overreliance on the idea of 
a “syndrome” rather than the substantive content of expert testimony. 
Uttering the word “syndrome” cannot, in itself, transform the trial of a 
criminal defendant or the evaluation of threat by jurors. Experts do not speak 
in a vacuum. They explain intimate partner violence; they discuss patterns 
and common reactions; they analyze facts from this case or similar facts; 
                                                                                                                     
424 See supra Part IA (a history of the marriage), describing severe escalation in violence; J.T.s long 
history of unemployment; the failure of police to arrest J.T. when they were called; forced prostitution; 
extreme control of daily activities including preventing her from eating; J.T.’s violent attack during 
Judy’s pregnancy that resulted in the premature birth of the baby; the testimony of Judy and her mother 
that they feared J.T. would kill her; J.T.’s successful pursuit of Judy to the food stamp office and on 
previous occasions when she fled seeking help; and J.T.s drinking and alcoholism).    
425 See hypothetical and reference to “hard drinking,” supra note 419.  
426 See Johnson, supra note 423, at 529–30 (defining the highest risk as “Extreme Danger”). The 
published Norman facts score in the Extreme Danger category.  
427 See Transcript, supra note 1, at 83 (recounting a situation in which the children were threatened). 
428 Compare the hypothetical facts in Braman et al., supra note 419, at 1587–88 (portraying a less 
severe set of facts and threats than Judy Norman experienced), with the DA factors listed in Johnson, 
supra note 423, at 528 (enumerating DA scale). The authors of the hypothetical linked to Norman may 
have believed that describing a record of arrests and failed prosecutions for domestic violence made the 
abuser seem more dangerous—indeed, people responding to these questionnaires may have seen it that 
way. However, the lethality factor in the DA involves avoiding arrest for domestic violence entirely—
which described J.T. Norman’s experience but not the experience of the abuser in the hypothetical. See 
Johnson, supra note 423, at 529 (listing number seven on the DA scale as avoiding arrest for domestic 
violence). 
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they educate juries away from stereotypes.429 Factors predicting lethal 
danger are an important part of the substance a jury will consider in weighing 
reasonableness.  
B. A Vulgarized Version of the “Syndrome”—Evidence and Influence 
Misogyny is not the cause of this persistent confusion among legal 
scholars. Errors about the Norman case and “syndrome” testimony appear 
in the work of men and women who define themselves as feminists. 
Professor Dressler, who has written several articles rejecting any self-
defense claim for Judy Norman, has at the same time worked to find another 
theory that would help her.430  
The interesting question is why feminists and scholars who are not 
misogynists turned day into night, missed the urgent crisis while imagining 
that the threat had not grown more severe, missed the threat of sex slavery 
entirely, and reframed testimony on “coercive control” as testimony on 
“learned helplessness.”431 These misunderstandings spring in part from 
stereotypes about passivity in battered women and about expert explanation 
as defined by simplistic, vulgarized versions of Walker’s theory.  
In addition, legal research methods may have perpetuated these 
misunderstandings. Any search for the phrase “battered woman syndrome” 
in legal sources will yield results that give disproportionate weight to older 
precedent, such as cases that often cite Walker’s first book432—only one of 
many works from that first wave of social science research.  In contrast, the 
expert at Judy Norman’s trial approached Norman’s experience through a 
lens of coercive control, an approach that was valid in 1987 and even better 
                                                                                                                     
429 See, e.g., Osthoff & Maguigan, supra note 252, at 235 (explaining that social science testimony 
is not limited to a woman’s psychological makeup even though psychological reactions are sometimes 
important; experts also explain common patterns found in battering relationships, including general 
dynamics and common responses to abuse or particular dynamics in a particular case; they educate juries 
away from preexisting bias and expectations); VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at iv 
(explaining that judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys are helping juries better understand the issues 
surrounding battered women and helping to “dispel myths and stereotypes related to battered women”); 
Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases, 11 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 82 (1996) (explaining that experts have “expressed concern about the use of the term 
‘syndrome’ in connection” with battered women). 
430 See, e.g., Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 469 (discussing an 
alternate theory for acquittal that is not based on the approach he saw as mental incapacity); Dressler, 
Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra note 29, at 1491–92 (arguing for a duress 
defense to apply in cases like Norman’s). 
431 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
432 See, e.g., United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Walker’s books 
from 1979 and 1984); State v. B.H., 870 A.2d 273, 279 (N.J. 2005) (referring to Walker’s work to define 
battered woman syndrome); State v. Stewart, 719 S.E.2d 876, 884–85 (W. Va. 2011) (citing Walker’s 
work to define battered woman syndrome and noting that the syndrome has been part of West Virginia 
jurisprudence for over 30 years). 
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supported today.433 The concept of “learned helplessness” that gripped many 
professors and judges trumped the actual testimony about coercive control 
in the case. 
Anne Coughlin contradicts virtually all serious scholars by treating 
“battered woman syndrome” as a separate defense.434 Scholars who differ 
on many other points agree that the “syndrome” is not a defense but a theory 
that is part of the evidence provided by some experts.435 Indeed, Coughlin 
cites several cases and articles that explain clearly this is not a defense.436  
                                                                                                                     
433 See DUTTON ET AL., supra note 247, at 1 (describing how battered women’s advocates have 
defined intimate partner violence as a “‘pattern of coercive control’ . . . in which the batterer asserts his 
power over the victim through the use of threats, as well as actual violence”) (citing ELLEN PENCE & 
MICHAEL PAYMAR, EDUCATION GROUPS FOR MEN WHO BATTER: THE DULUTH MODEL (1993)); 
JOHNSON, supra note 234, at 7–8 (discussing “intimate terrorism” as a type of domestic violence that 
“involves the general exercise of coercive control” that is “embedded in a general pattern of power and 
control”); OKUN, supra note 217, at 86–87, 115–33 (discussing coercive control and woman abuse in a 
book published in the mid-1980s); SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 124 (“[O]ther interpretive frameworks 
to describe battering that have been proposed, such as ‘coercive control,’ do not focus exclusively on the 
woman who has been battered, but on the batterer or the relationship.”); STARK, supra note 50, at 5 
(discussing in a 2007 book coercive control as a framework for abuse); Dutton & Goodman, supra note 
247, at 743, 746 (stating that, for decades, advocates have “placed the notion of coercive control squarely 
at the center of their analysis of intimate partner violence,” exploring issues of coercive control and 
setting forth a new model of coercion in intimate partner violence). 
434 See Coughlin, supra note 344, at 6 (arguing that the “battered woman syndrome defense” is 
sexist); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 509–10, 510 n.131 
(1996) (noting that Coughlin is a scholar who believes there should be a separate battered woman 
syndrome defense); cf. Maguigan, supra note 250, at 381–82 (suggesting that criminal law does not need 
to be redefined to include battered woman syndrome as a specific self-defense claim). 
435 Many cases had already held that the “syndrome” was not a separate defense. See, e.g., Chapman 
v. State, 386 S.E.2d 129, 131 (GA 1989) (“Although evidence of the syndrome is admissible, . . . it is not 
a separate defense.”). Most scholars recognize that “battered woman syndrome” is not a separate defense. 
See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 124 (explaining that “battered woman syndrome” is not a 
separate defense and that feminists did not advocate for a separate defense); Sarah M. Buel, Effective 
Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 217, 296 (2003) (“BWS is not a defense, but rather a pattern of symptoms used to describe the effects 
of abuse on the victim.” (footnote omitted)). 
436 In these instances, Coughlin cited some point that suited her argument while ignoring other 
statements in the same sources clarifying that the “syndrome” was not a defense. See, e.g., Coughlin, 
supra note 344, at 56 n.279 (citing State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990) (“[A]dmission of 
expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome does not establish a new defense or 
justification,” but assists the trier of fact in evaluating the defendant’s honest belief in imminent danger 
of death or great bodily harm and that deadly force was “her only means of escape” (emphasis added))); 
id. at 51 n.248 (citing State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C. 1986) (emphasizing that the court was “not 
recognizing the battered woman’s syndrome as a separate defense” but addressing the related testimony 
as relevant to self-defense)); id. at 67 n.334 (citing State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988) (“[N]o 
jurisdictions have held that the existence of the battered woman syndrome in and of itself operates as a 
defense to murder.”)); id. at 56–57, nn.281, 285, 286 (citing People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 388 
n.8 (Ct. App. 1992), rev’d, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994) (“There . . . still exists a misconception by some 
lawyers and judges that there is a defense called ‘battered woman syndrome’ giving women who are 
battered some unique right simply because they are battered. That is not the law in California (or, as far 
as we can tell, anywhere else).”); id. at 28 n.138, 49 n.233 (citing Maguigan, supra note 250, without 
discussing Maguigan’s statements contradicting the idea of a separate defense).  
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But Coughlin’s position is no accident. It is the intellectual foundation 
of the central argument in her article—her analogy between “battered 
woman syndrome” and the “marital coercion” defense.437 Coughlin read 
Walker carefully and identified many points of contradiction within her 
writings, yet failed to see that—from the beginning—Walker was defending 
her terminology against feminist criticism.438 While Coughlin’s position is 
an outlier, it exemplifies a more general problem: when Walker explained 
that “learned helplessness” did not mean the woman was literally helpless, 
that part of her work did not gain traction in legal scholarship.  
George Fletcher misunderstood both the term “battered woman 
syndrome” and the expert testimony in Norman: “The jury had heard expert 
testimony about the battered women’s syndrome. Judy was allegedly a 
paradigm of women addicted to abuse.”439 “Addicted to abuse” is a gross 
mischaracterization of all contemporary experts, including Walker, whose 
work sought to rebut earlier theories of battered women’s masochism.440 It 
had nothing to do with Dr. Tyson’s testimony in Norman. 
Accurate information has been available in law reviews for decades. 
Mary Ann Dutton’s “redefinition” appeared in a 1993 law review 
symposium on domestic violence.441 “Battered woman syndrome” appears 
in the title, and the journal is available through Westlaw and Lexis—
research with conventional legal tools would have found this article 
easily.442  
Stereotypical ideas about expert evidence persisted. Even when citing 
articles by psychologists relying on Dutton and others, law professors 
sometimes failed to grasp the substance of those articles. For example, 
Joshua Dressler described a study and used a quotation about the 
pathologizing effect of testimony about battered woman syndrome: “[A] 
juror simulation study has reported that ‘the presence of expert evidence 
providing a diagnosis of [BWS], compared to a no expert control, [causes] 
                                                                                                                     
437 See Coughlin, supra note 344, at 29. Coughlin uses the term “marital coercion” to distinguish 
this class of cases from the general defense of duress and argues, “The marital coercion defense was 
available only to married women, and it had all but disappeared in this country by the mid-1970s, when, 
as is my thesis, it reemerged in the guise of the battered woman syndrome defense.” Id.  
438 See, e.g., id. at 56 (discussing Walker’s work and expert testimony); BWS 2d 2000, supra note 
225, at 11 (“[M]any advocates who worked with battered women did not like the implications of the term 
‘learned helplessness’ because they felt it suggested that battered women were helpless and passive.”). 
439 FLETCHER, supra note 404, at 135 (emphasis added). Lynne Henderson rebuts Fletcher’s 
paradigm: “She was not addicted to the violence; she was held prisoner by it—a fact relevant to a claim 
of self defense.” Henderson, supra note 404, at 1618. 
440 See BWS 2d 2000, supra note 225, at 102 (criticizing the concept of masochism in battered 
women as “inconsistent with feminism” and criticizing the persistence of the construct of masochism). 
441 Understanding Women’s Responses: A Redefinition, supra note 239, at 1195. 
442 See id. at 1191 (showing “battered woman syndrome” in the title of Dutton’s article); see also 
Meier, supra note 246, at 1314 (citing Understanding Women’s Responses: A Redefinition, supra note 
239); Stark, supra note 246, at 974 n.6 (citing Understanding Women’s Responses: A Redefinition, supra 
note 239). 
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the jurors to view the defendant as more distorted in her thinking, and less 
capable of making responsible choices, and less culpable for her actions.’”443 
But Dressler took that quote out of context. The authors had summarized a 
previous, less-sophisticated study. In contrast, their own study compared 
three categories: (1) Lenore Walker’s “syndrome” approach; (2) a “social 
agency” approach based on the work of Mary Ann Dutton and others; and 
(3) no expert at all.444 Only Walker’s “battered woman syndrome” 
framework made jurors more disposed to accept the idea of insanity in the 
battered woman.445 The “social agency” framework characteristic of Mary 
Ann Dutton’s work did not have the same effect.446 Dressler’s double-
quotation out-of-context matched his own ideas about the “syndrome” but 
missed the very point of the work he cited, which recognized and compared 
different approaches.  
In theoretical debates on self-defense, participants often built arguments 
on these misunderstandings about expert evidence. The legal question in 
Norman is not the concept of “learned helplessness” or a “syndrome” but 
the availability of a jury instruction on self-defense. If the judge had allowed 
a self-defense instruction, the Norman jury would not have been asked 
whether Judy had “learned helplessness.” The jury had already heard about 
her help-seeking efforts and the lessons she had learned. She had tried many 
times to find help or safety, including at the hospital in Chicago, hotels, and 
the homes of family members. J.T. had found her and brought her back 
brutally so many times that she had become convinced he would find her 
again. Judy would not go to a shelter because she was concerned for her 
children. Her mother believed J.T. might kill the whole family.447 J.T. told 
Judy he would kill her if she filed papers to commit him or a complaint for 
domestic abuse. The police did not help her, and she came to believe no help 
was available.448 Allowing the jury to consider self-defense would not have 
changed the evidence introduced at trial, and admitting expert testimony 
would not have reshaped the legal charge to the jury. The legal question 
would be whether a reasonable person would have perceived the threat as 
Judy saw it.  
Professor Dressler rules out imminent threat as a matter of law because 
of J.T.’s nap and then, to address the dangers Judy Norman faced without 
                                                                                                                     
443 See Dressler, Feminist or (“Feminist,”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra note 29, at 1488 
(attributing the quote to Schuller & Hastings, supra note 249, at 169). For the actual context, see Schuller 
& Hastings, supra note 249, at 169 (citing an earlier study by Norman J. Finkel et al., The Self-Defense 
Defense and Community Sentiment, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 585, 597–98 (1991)).  
444 Schuller & Hastings, supra note 249, at 171. 
445 Id. at 184. 
446 Id. 
447 Id. at 80, 82. 
448 Id. at 36. See Part IA (summarizing events in the history of the marriage) and Part IIB 
(summarizing expert testimony at trial).  
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allowing the jury to find her acts justified, proposes a new “non-syndrome” 
approach based in duress—an argument that Judy had “no-fair-opportunity” 
to find other solutions.449 But the points Dressler would cover are not really 
new; Dr. Tyson covered them thoroughly. Dressler frames the inquiry: 
Think about what a jury might have asked itself if it had been 
given the opportunity. Could Judy have avoided the situation 
by walking out the door? (Remember, we are not using 
syndrome evidence, so the battered woman’s learned 
helplessness, if it exists, is not relevant.) To answer that 
question, the jury would likely ask itself other questions: Did 
Judy Norman have children, thus making it more difficult for 
her to leave? Yes. She had four living at the time of J.T.’s 
death. What then were her options? Leave them with J.T.? 
That would be unthinkable for any loving parent. Leave with 
them? Where would she have gone? How would she have 
supported the children? What safety nets had been set up in 
her community to make such an option realistic? Moreover, 
what would have prevented J.T. from finding her and 
“punishing” her for her departure? Rather than leave, could 
she have called the police for help? She did, and they did 
nothing to protect her. And, so on.450  
Because of Dressler’s beliefs about expert testimony, he fails to see two 
crucial points: Dr. Tyson had indeed addressed those same facts, and Tyson 
had not applied Walker’s framework to those facts.451 Part IV.E infra 
explores the duress proposal and its link to ideas about experts.  
Imagine these professors as jurors with no expert to help them. They 
hear the evidence and retreat to deliberate. Probably, they could have 
avoided the error of “midnight shooting” if they had heard the facts 
themselves. But they might have told each other what they told the world 
after reading the facts: Judy retrieved a gun and took matters into her own 
                                                                                                                     
449 Dressler makes this argument repeatedly. Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, 
supra note 29, at 469; Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters, supra note 10, at 278. 
450 Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 470; cf. supra text 
accompanying notes 270–312 (quoting and discussing Dr. Tyson’s testimony about Norman’s fears for 
her family, inability to get help from agencies and authorities, and J.T.’s ability to find her). 
451 Also based on those misconceptions about experts, Dressler argues that expert (“syndrome”) 
testimony should be excluded from the determination of reasonable perception of imminent threat. See 
Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 464 (arguing that testimony on 
battered woman syndrome should be excluded because it “essentially converts the battered woman’s 
claim from the justification of self-defense to a mental incapacity defense”); see also Dressler, Feminist 
(or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra note 29, at 1486–88 (arguing that a “reasonable 
person” would not believe a sleeping man was an “instantaneous threat”); Dressler, supra note 10, at 
266–69 (arguing that evidence of “battered woman syndrome” provides reasons to excuse the act but 
cannot justify it).  
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hands because she decided to act as judge, jury, and executioner. They might 
dismiss eyewitnesses who believed as firmly as Judy did that she could not 
escape and that her life was in danger. When the professor-jurors talked 
about sleep, they might forget that on the last day of his life, J.T. had feigned 
sleep to surprise Judy by kicking her in the head when the need to control 
the car left her no way to defend herself.452 (At the time of the shooting, 
Judy’s actions were consistent with a belief that J.T. was asleep, but his 
practice of surprise attacks made the appearance of sleep less useful for 
predicting the presence or absence of a threat). Her help-seeking might 
disappear into the idea that years of abuse are a sign of passivity; the 
professors might express dismay or disbelief and wonder that any human 
being could be this passive.  
Listening to Dr. Tyson would have helped legal scholars. The label 
under which his testimony was admitted—“forensic psychology,” “battered 
woman syndrome,” or “intimate partner violence and its effects”—would 
not have determined the content of his testimony. Consistent with Mary Ann 
Dutton’s redefinition, jurors would have heard the description of violence 
and degradation and the functions of those behaviors in the dynamic between 
them, heard about Judy’s efforts and defeats in help-seeking, and heard Dr. 
Tyson say that he could not identify any options she had overlooked.453 If 
the trial happened today, the expert would also provide knowledge from 
decades of subsequent research, including findings on patterns in intimate 
partner violence. The professors would learn that “why didn’t she leave” is 
the wrong question to ask, that lethal danger often increases at separation, 
and that women like Judy Norman attempt many solutions, including 
leaving, without success. 
Law professors are analytical by training, skilled at reading arguments 
and applying theories. Most jurors will have no preconceived ideas about 
the content of expert testimony. The expert will educate jurors away from 
their own misconceptions. The task for jurors will be to work with the 
evidence presented, including the information from experts. The legal 
academy should also take that approach instead of relying on old summaries 
of expert frameworks. 
C. Locating the Helpful Points in the Debates 
Victoria Nourse proposes a powerful, simple way to cut through 
confusion about “subjective” and “objective” aspects of self-defense law: 
It is an open secret that courts adopt a self-defense standard 
that is both objective and subjective; as a doctrinal matter, 
then, there simply is no debate, except at the margins . . . . 
[P]erform a simple test. Open up a self-defense case using 
                                                                                                                     
452 Id. at 20. 
453 See supra Section II.C.2 (discussing intimate partner violence and its effects). 
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objectivity and subjectivity to describe self-defense law. Now 
black out those adjectives. You will probably be left with a 
better text and nothing will have been lost. The law can still 
speak of state of mind and conduct, it can even speak of the 
reasonable person and her perceptions, it can apply the age-old 
“appearances” test in self-defense, and announce the proper 
rules of aggression and proportionality. History makes it quite 
clear that the law of self-defense does not need the discourse 
of subjectivity for any of that.454 
I agree with and support Professor Nourse’s approach. Confusion about 
expert testimony became entangled with the “discourse of subjectivity” to 
make it difficult for the debates on Norman to reach productive conclusions. 
The debates suffered further from the idea of a “midnight shooting” and 
from the inability of scholars and judges to see the threat of forcible 
trafficking. Nonetheless, the debates on battered women and self-defense in 
which Norman has played such an important role have been extensive, and 
they include many thoughtful points.  
Legal scholars need a way to evaluate the strengths of those arguments 
without holding onto stereotypes and misconceptions. Taking a cue from 
Professor Nourse’s critique of the discourse of subjectivity, we should strike 
and replace outdated terminology before using these concepts in legal 
analysis.455 Except when discussing Lenore Walker’s work specifically, we 
should replace references to testimony on “battered woman syndrome” or 
the “cycle of violence” with testimony on “intimate partner violence.” For 
“learned helplessness,” substitute “the effects of intimate partner violence.” 
Then, evaluate the points that remain. That simple measure should help 
distinguish the core of each scholarly argument and eliminate the residual 
effects of outdated concepts. And that, in turn, should allow us to make the 
best possible use of the substantial body of literature that scholars have built 
around the Norman case. 
IV. REVISITING REASONABLENESS, IMMINENCE, AND JUSTIFICATION 
A. Interrogating Sleep—Context vs. “A Matter of Law”456 
Sleep happens in a context. The word “sleep” describes a condition that 
varies with different times, circumstances, and sleepers. A person might 
sleep for a minute or a full night and might sleep lightly or deeply.  
                                                                                                                     
454 Nourse, supra note 18, at 1295–96 (footnotes omitted). 
455 This proposal adapts Nourse’s suggestion that we eliminate the often-misleading adjectives 
“subjective” and “objective” and instead focus on the substance of self-defense requirements. Id. 
456 State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (“The State contends 
that since decedent was asleep at the time of the shooting, defendant’s belief in the necessity to kill 
decedent was, as a matter of law, unreasonable.”). 
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If it should matter to self-defense that there is more than one kind of 
sleep, then how should it matter? The debates on Norman include many 
arguments on the nature of the imminence requirement, how it should be 
interpreted, and whether it should be covered in the evaluation of necessity 
for the use of deadly force.457 But the literature on self-defense has not 
grappled much with the variations in sleep. 
Some scholars assume that sleep should create a per se rule against 
reasonable self-defense,458 even though courts divide on this question.459 
Paul Robinson answers the idea that the attack must be happening 
immediately by giving the example of an attacker who kidnaps and confines 
his target and announces his intention to kill one week later.460 Robinson 
argues that the law must permit the prisoner to kill the attacker and escape 
one morning before the week has passed:  
The proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat but the 
immediacy of the response necessary in defense. If a 
threatened harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the 
intended victim waits until the last moment, the principle of 
self-defense must permit him to act earlier—as early as is 
required to defend himself effectively.461 
The kidnapping example recognizes both the exceptional danger and the 
continuing threat in that crime. Many states include kidnapping as one of the 
grounds for use of deadly force in self-defense.462 A similar example would 
                                                                                                                     
457 See, e.g., Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 458, 467 (arguing 
that some degree of imminence is required to justify killing); Kaufman, supra note 9, at 369 (concluding 
that the imminence requirement is a “crucial, independent restriction on the individual right to resort to 
violence against others, especially deadly violence”). 
458 See, e.g., id. at 458, 467 (arguing that a battered woman is not justified in killing her sleeping 
abuser because the abuser may change his behavior). 
459 Some courts have allowed a self-defense instruction when the defendant killed a sleeping abuser. 
See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 823 (Mich. App. 1992)  (“Defendant admits shooting the 
victim while he slept, but claims she acted in self-defense following forty-eight hours of abuse and death 
threats and years of battery.”); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Minn. 1989) (describing facts in 
which a battered defendant killed her husband while he was asleep); id. at 797 (“The court has determined 
not to preclude, as a matter of law, the defense or theory of self-defense.”); People v. Emick, 481 
N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (N.Y. App. 1982) (defendant shot while her boyfriend was asleep); id. at 560 (quoting 
self-defense instruction given at trial); id. at 562–63 (reversing her conviction because of the admission 
of evidence “extremely prejudicial to her defense of justification” and because the self-defense 
instruction had incorrectly included a duty to retreat). Other courts have ruled out self-defense when the 
defendant killed a sleeping abuser. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 589 (Kan. 1988) (“[T]he 
giving of the self-defense instruction was erroneous. Under such circumstances, a battered woman cannot 
reasonably fear imminent life-threatening danger from her sleeping spouse.”). 
460 ROBINSON, supra note 21, at § 131I(1). 
461 Id. 
462 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (Westlaw through Act 2018-579); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
627:4(I(c) (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(2)(B) (West 2007) (authorizing the use of deadly 
force to stop a kidnapping). For an extended discussion of kidnapping and battered women, see Gregory 
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involve a hijacker who takes cold medicine and falls asleep while guarding 
captive passengers. Assuming other exit was unavailable, most scholars 
would find justification if passengers killed the hijacker when he dozed off.  
Questions about imminence can arise outside the crime of kidnapping. 
Imagine a man who controls his wife by setting the alarm system so the 
doors and windows beep when they open. He wakes whenever the system 
beeps. He ran track in high school—he can always catch her before she 
reaches a nearby house. If she finds a gun under the bed, must she try running 
before she can use it even though he will catch her? Perhaps a sufficiently 
dangerous threat will make it unnecessary for him to run quickly. He might 
say, “You are free to leave any time, but when you go through that door, it 
will beep, and I will kill your child in the other room.” Even if she is not 
chained physically, a reasonable person could believe that she cannot simply 
leave—even while he sleeps.  
In a house in Cleveland, a man named Ariel Castro kept three women 
chained and confined for years and raped them.463 Rape justifies the use of 
deadly force in self-defense in almost every state,464 but Castro’s victims 
were prisoners, chained, without weapons. If Castro fell asleep after one of 
those rapes and a knife fell out of his pocket, would sleep have ruled out, as 
a matter of law, the woman’s need to act immediately? 
Dressler argues for a per se rule against a lethal attack during sleep 
because a living abuser might change his mind.465 But every time Ariel 
Castro slept, it was possible that in the morning he would change his mind 
about committing more rapes. Would that possibility make the act of killing 
Castro while he slept into what Fletcher saw in Norman466—unlawful 
vengeance for past rapes instead of self-defense against the next rape? 
The legal questions here must be: What threat would a reasonable 
woman in her circumstances perceive? And would that reasonable woman 
in her circumstances find it necessary to act immediately before her abuser 
could wake up and begin again? 
                                                                                                                     
A. Diamond, Note, To Have but Not to Hold: Can “Resistance Against Kidnapping” Justify Lethal Self-
Defense Against Incapacitated Batterers?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 729, 732 (2002) and the sources gathered 
therein. 
463 For articles reporting on this event, see Trip Gabriel et al., Cleveland Man Charged with Rape 
and Kidnapping, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/us/cleveland-
kidnapping.html?pagewanted=1; Caroline Porter, Kidnapper Castro Gets Life Without Parole, Plus 
1,000 Years, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323681904578641924168692486 (last updated Aug. 
1, 2013, 7:21 PM). 
464 See Don B. Kates, Jr. & Nancy Jean Engberg, Deadly Force Self-Defense Against Rape, 15 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 873, 881 (1982) (discussing the “long standing recognition of the right to resist rape with 
deadly force”). 
465 Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 467. 
466 Cf. Fletcher, supra note 401, at 558 (“Those who defend the use of violence rarely admit that 
their purpose is retaliation for a past wrong.”). 
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In the late 1990s, the Cadena sex trafficking ring forced between twenty-
five and forty young women into prostitution in Florida.467 A woman 
recruited girls in Mexico with the promise of jobs in the United States. 
Instead, they found themselves trapped in brothels, beaten, and forced to 
have sex with up to twenty-five or thirty men per day, six days a week.468 
“Armed pimps were omnipresent,”469 and guards accompanied women who 
left for errands.470 The women were transported to different houses every 
two weeks.471 During the transit between brothels, they had a few moments 
without supervision to use public restrooms, but escape was impossible.472 
The girls could not run because they feared threats they found credible: harm 
to their families, brutal beatings, and death.473 It is worth noting that Judy 
Norman also believed her husband’s threats of harm to her family, brutal 
beatings, and death. 
Some clients tried to help by offering to facilitate escapes, and some 
called police, but lookouts with cell phones warned the traffickers before 
police arrived.474 When one girl found a phone in the closet and called 9-1-
1 several times, neither the dispatchers nor the police who came to the house 
spoke Spanish. The police left.475  
 What rights to use force would those young women have in their own 
defense? If an armed guard in that brothel fell asleep where a woman could 
steal his gun and efforts to escape might wake him, would the law demand 
that she wait until he woke up and began another attack to justify deadly 
force? Would the law of self-defense demand that she try calling the police 
again before using deadly force, even though several previous calls had 
brought no help? Put another way, would a reasonable person in her position 
                                                                                                                     
467 FLA. STATE UNIV., CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FLORIDA RESPONDS TO 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING 37–38 (2003), https://cahr.fsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/thereport.pdf 
(hereinafter FLORIDA RESPONDS TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING). This report explains how the Cadena ring 
entrapped women: 
[T]he traffickers controlled them by a variety of means. Beatings, rapes, and death 
threats were the crudest forms of discipline utilized by their captors. Equally effective 
however, were psychological forms of coercion: ignorance of where they were, 
inability to speak English, an acute and constant sense of isolation, and threats that 
their families in Mexico would be killed were they to try to escape from the traffickers. 
One woman was trafficked along with her sister, and the Cadenas saw to it that the 
girls were always held in separate locations, each knowing that the other would suffer 
consequences if she tried to escape.  
Id. at 42. 
468 Id. at 39–41. 
469 Id. at 44. 
470 Id. at 43. 
471 Id. at 44. 
472 Id. at 43. 
473 Id. at 42. 
474 See  FLORIDA RESPONDS TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 467, at 45, 47. 
475 Id. at. 48. 
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believe that police might help this time, and therefore, she must try calling 
again before using deadly force to escape?  
In situations like the Cadena brothels or the Cleveland house, the right 
to resist with deadly force if necessary should not depend on the particular 
requirements for kidnapping in each state. In a state that required removing 
the victim from one place to another, a right to self-defense against 
kidnapping might not arise until after the women were moved between 
brothels. That right, if it exists, must spring from the nature of the harm of 
violent sexual trafficking—a different crime than rape, but a crime that 
subjects a woman to repeated sexual violation, coerced by threat of death or 
violently enforced. For a full discussion of sex trafficking and self-defense, 
scholars will need to discuss many issues—the topic is complex. The next 
section of this Article will focus on questions of timing, threat, and self-
defense in trafficking. This section looks at sexual slavery with its ongoing 
confinement and coercion to ask specifically about sleep—should sleep rule 
out imminent threat?  
Law faces a choice here. If these women would not be justified in using 
deadly force to escape because an armed guard is sleeping, then the 
requirement for instantaneous threat during sleep is more dangerous than a 
duty to retreat that would be limited by the woman’s safety.476 On the other 
hand, if these women were not required to wait until the guards woke up and 
the attacks began again, then sleep itself must not be the factor upon which 
justification turns. 
Either imminence is always a contextual evaluation—temporal urgency 
of threat in these circumstances—or the essence of the imminence 
requirement must lie in necessity, not in some particular amount of time on 
the clock. Either way, sleep should not create a per se rule. The idea of 
“learned helplessness” interferes with the ability to evaluate threat in each 
particular set of facts. Judy Norman should have been able to ask the jury 
whether a reasonable person in her circumstances could have believed that 
she had to act immediately, even though he was asleep.  
B. Timing, Sex, and Death—Temporal Urgency and the Threat of Sexual 
Slavery 
George Fletcher takes for granted that Judy Norman could have used 
deadly force to defend against the harm of rape (given imminent threat and 
                                                                                                                     
476 Cf. Nourse, supra note 18, at 1285 (“[T]here may be a problem with applying an implied ‘pre-
retreat’ rule in battered woman cases if American law does not apply that rule to the man in the dangerous 
bar or neighborhood. To ask of battered women that they leave—in whatever doctrinal guise (imminence, 
retreat, threat, etc.)—raises serious questions about whether the law of self-defense treats battered women 
less favorably than others.”). 
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necessity).477 That right is available in almost all states. It is worth noting, 
however, that some states, including North Carolina, limit rape to forced 
vaginal penetration.478  
In North Carolina, the state supreme court had already stated that the 
harm of forcible sodomy could also justify the use of deadly force in 
self-defense.479 But J.T. was not committing forcible sodomy on Judy as that 
term is generally understood. He was using force to compel her to sell oral 
sex to strangers against her will. There are few cases addressing forcible 
sodomy in North Carolina and none that address this question, so it is 
difficult to determine whether North Carolina could have treated J.T. as an 
attacker based on a form of accomplice liability. 
Most states do not include trafficking among the enumerated crimes that 
justify deadly force in self-defense, but some frequently enumerated crimes 
might address Judy Norman’s situation.480 Transporting her to the truck stop 
depended on violence and, perhaps, on her fear that resistance could be 
fatal.481 In most states, deadly force can be used against kidnapping,482 and 
J.T.’s violent movement of Judy from place to place might have qualified. 
In North Carolina, as in most states, kidnapping depends on the purpose for 
which the person is held and moved.483  
On the other hand, most cases of kidnapping wives or intimate partners 
involve estrangement or separation.484 Because the Norman court did not 
                                                                                                                     
477 See Fletcher supra note 401, at 560 and accompanying text (“No legal system in the Western 
world would expect a woman to endure a rape if her only means of defense required that she risk the 
death of her aggressor.”). 
478 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.21(a) (2017) (“A person is guilty of first-degree forcible rape if 
the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person by force and against the will of the other 
person . . . .”). The Model Penal Code also makes deadly force available to defend against rape and 
defines rape as vaginal, oral, or anal intercourse. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04 (2)(b), 213(2), 213.1(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
479 State v. Hunter, 286 S.E.2d 535, 540 (N.C. 1982). 
480 Human Trafficking Enactments 2005–2012, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http:// 
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/human-trafficking-laws-in-the-states-updated-
nov.aspx (last updated Dec. 31, 2012) (providing an overview of state human trafficking laws). 
481  State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
482 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(a), (a)(3) (LexisNexis 2016) (“A person may use deadly 
physical force . . . if the person reasonably believes that another person is . . . [c]ommitting or about to 
commit a kidnapping in any degree . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(2), (2)(c) (2003) (“Deadly 
physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes . . . [t]he other person is committing or 
reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping . . . .”); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108(2), (2)(A)(2) 
(2017) (“A person is justified in using deadly force upon another person . . . [c]ommitting or about to 
commit a kidnapping . . . .”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a), (a)(2), (a)(2)(B) (West 2017) (“A person 
is justified in using deadly force against another . . . to prevent the other’s imminent commission of 
aggravated kidnapping . . . .”). 
483 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39(a)(1)–(6) (2006) (listing purpose elements of the crime of 
kidnapping). 
484 Diamond, supra note 462, at 754 (reporting that the author had found only one case that involved 
a battered woman confined at home by a batterer with whom she cohabits “rather than being abducted in 
public by husbands or boyfriends from whom they have separated or want to separate”). 
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treat the rapid escalation of violence and abuse as intensifying the threat to 
Judy, they would probably have found it difficult to distinguish her case 
from a more ordinary situation in which a husband took his wife’s arm 
forcefully and marched her out to the car—even if that ordinary case could 
have been charged as battery or false imprisonment. A few weeks after Judy 
shot J.T., North Carolina enacted a law making “felonious restraint” a lesser-
included offense of kidnapping.485 The application of that law would have 
been obvious, though the courts would still have had to consider whether 
deadly force was available to defend against the lesser included offense.  
Let us assume for this discussion that defending oneself against the 
transportation, violence, and unwilling commercial sex acts involved in 
forcible trafficking can, under appropriate circumstances and necessity, 
justify the use of deadly force in resistance. It is not surprising that, in the 
mid-1980s, attorneys and courts did not treat this as the basis for Judy’s 
defense. The term “sexual slavery” had been coined only recently; the issue 
had not yet drawn the advocacy, activism, and scholarly energy that had by 
then been invested in work on intimate partner violence.486 Forced 
prostitution looked more like a particularly awful form of abuse than a 
separate crime generating its own rights to self-defense.487 
In the decades that followed, only a handful of law review articles 
treated forced prostitution seriously in analyzing Judy Norman’s use of 
defensive force.488 So far, none have addressed the relationship between the 
particular threat of violent trafficking and the temporal urgency of the 
threat—her need to act immediately.  Although the question of deadly 
defensive force in prostitution and trafficking also raises questions about 
autonomy, choice, and captivity, the discussion that follows here focuses on 
                                                                                                                     
485 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.3 (1994). 
486 See BARRY, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that when the author “began to write Female Sexual 
Slavery in the mid-1970s, the subject had been . . . effectively buried” and to “study female ‘sexual 
slavery,’ [she] could only start with the slender file of material [she] had developed over the previous ten 
years”). 
487 See id. at 6, 9–11 (discussing assumptions and findings regarding forced prostitution). 
488 See, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, The Values and Costs of Imminence, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 10, at 419 (treating the forced prostitution of Judy Norman as repeated rape 
that did justify the use of deadly force and therefore distinguishing Norman from the general discussion 
of the imminence requirement); Angel, supra note 10, at 76 (“Is not forced prostitution, known as rape, 
grave bodily harm? . . . She correctly perceived increased violence leading to grave bodily harm and 
possible death because J.T.'s abuse was more frequent and worse than ever.”); Mahoney, supra note 10, 
at 91 n.449 (alteration in original) (“Forced prostitution—essentially, third-party rape—must by the terms 
of the discussion [in the majority opinion] have been considered something other than ‘great bodily 
harm.’ Or, perhaps, since she had experienced this particular bodily harm for many years, it no longer 
amounted to ‘great’ harm.”); Shana Wallace, Comment, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law 
and Battered Women’s Right to Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1780 (2004) (“[T]here was no 
question about the magnitude of harm she would face when her husband awoke. Forced prostitution, 
rape, severe beatings, and possible death were what she was promised[—]all forms of harm well within 
the traditional protections of self-defense law.”). 
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the timing of threat and defense in a pattern of violent, recurrent, interrelated 
criminal acts.  
When does the trafficking event begin, and at which points would self-
defense be justified? On the witness stand, Judy said that she shot J.T. 
because when he woke up, the same thing would begin again, and that night 
at the truck stop, his brutality and the experience of forced prostitution would 
be worse than it had ever been.489 The harmful event would take hours, and 
during those hours she would be under violent control in the car and at the 
truck stop.490 Was the right to use deadly force equally applicable at all 
points? If not, what would distinguish the crucial points or permissible 
moments for the use of deadly force? Put another way, in a search for a legal 
standard to clarify when victims of forced prostitution may or may not use 
deadly force, how should law choose which events mark the line across 
which that force becomes permissible? 
Common sense indicates that Judy must be able to resist initial 
transportation to the truck stop. But the law should not limit Judy’s options 
based on the possibility that while they drove, J.T. might change his mind 
about the destination.491 The fact that she had endured previous trafficking 
events should not affect her right to resist this one, especially when she had 
reasonable grounds to believe this time would be worse. 
If the urgency of using deadly force depends in part on the unavailability 
of legal protection, then it should matter that Judy would have had difficulty 
seeking help from police against violent trafficking. She probably feared 
confessing to illegal sex acts for which she had previously been arrested 
while J.T. evaded criminal responsibility.492 While Judy and J.T. were in 
Chicago, the North Carolina legislature had made it a crime to hold a person 
in involuntary servitude and to kidnap a person for the purposes of 
involuntary servitude, but that legislation focused on labor and arose from 
an effort to protect farm workers.493 Twenty years passed before North 
Carolina expanded its laws to cover sex trafficking victims, criminalizing 
                                                                                                                     
489 Transcript, supra note 1, at 142. 
490 State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
491 But cf. Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 467 (arguing that a 
sleeping abuser who plans to kill might experience a change in behavior or mindset). 
492 Id. at 36, 136. 
493 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 771 (defining the crime of involuntary servitude and amending the 
kidnapping statute to reflect the new statutory definition of involuntary servitude); see also Kelle Barrick 
et al., Labor Trafficking Victimization Among Farmworkers in North Carolina: Role of Demographic 
Characteristics and Acculturation, 2 INT’L J. RURAL CRIMINOLOGY 225, 234–35 (2014) (stating that 
about twenty-five percent of migrant workers experience trafficking in North Carolina); Charlotte Gail 
Blake, North Carolina's New Involuntary Servitude Statute: Inadequate Relief for Enslaved Migrant 
Laborers, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1186, 1186 (1984) (explaining that the legislature enacted the involuntary 
servitude bill in response to cases in which defendants were found to have violated the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act and the Thirteenth Amendment by enslaving agricultural workers). 
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human trafficking and sexual servitude and including both crimes in the 
kidnapping statute.494  
Until 2011, self-defense was a judicially created common law doctrine 
in North Carolina.495 Therefore, on one hand, the absence of express 
coverage in the kidnapping law did not rule out self-defense against violent 
trafficking. After 2011, when the legislature enacted a self-defense law, the 
new statute preserved existing common law rules.496 If judges had seen the 
harm of sexual slavery at the time of the Norman case, they could have 
considered whether the harm was comparable to forcible sodomy and 
whether courts should allow similar use of defensive force. On the other 
hand, even if judges perceived the harm of sexual slavery, they might have 
discounted the gravity of a harm committed many times or had trouble 
seeing the escalating threat that made Judy Norman turn to deadly force.497 
Future legal scholarship can help by exploring the complex issues in self-
defense against the brutal recurring criminal acts and particular harms 
involved in the forcible trafficking.  
C. Reasonable Belief and Eyewitnesses 
I looked at my dad’s head. I seen the blood . . .  and I ran out 
of the room and hollered that he killed her. I kept on hollering, 
‘He killed her.’498 
These witnesses described circumstances that caused not only 
[the] defendant to believe escape was impossible, but that also 
convinced them of its impossibility. Defendant’s isolation and 
helplessness were evident in testimony that her family was 
                                                                                                                     
494 See Act of July 27, 2006, No. 2006-247, § 20(c) 2006 N.C. Laws 1084 (rewriting the offense of 
kidnapping to include “[t]rafficking another person with the intent that the other person be held in 
involuntary servitude or sexual servitude” and “[s]ubjecting or maintaining such other person for sexual 
servitude”). The federal government also took action against sex trafficking. In 2000, Congress made it 
safer for trafficking victims from other countries to testify against those who exploited them. Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1533–
34 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of Title 8 of the United States Code) (creating a new 
nonimmigrant visa classification to strengthen the ability of law enforcement to prosecute cases of human 
trafficking). 
495 See, e.g., State v. Rawlings, 762 S.E.2d 909, 913 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that North 
Carolina recognized the common law right to self-defense prior to the statute).  
496 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.2 (West 2011).  
497 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 10, at 91 (criticizing the majority opinion because “[f]orced 
prostitution—essentially, third-party rape—must by the terms of the discussion have been considered 
something other than ‘great bodily harm.’ Or, perhaps, since she had experienced this particular bodily 
harm for many years, it no longer amounted to ‘great harm.”); Angel, supra note 10, at 87 (arguing that 
the majority either forgot or ignored that severe beatings and forced prostitution constitute grievous 
bodily harm); People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 20 (Cal. 1996) (quoting the prosecutor’s argument that 
because the abuser had threatened to kill her many times, this time could not be taken seriously). 
498 Transcript, supra note 1, at 61 (emphasis added).  
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intimidated by her husband into acquiescing in his torture of 
her.499 
People around Judy thought J.T. was going to kill her.500 Judy believed 
his death threats.501 When she attempted suicide, J.T. tried to block 
intervention and then increased his threats of mayhem and death.502 The 
family found his lethal threats so credible that Laverne armed herself. Phyllis 
showed her belief in the imminent deadly threat to her mother when she 
reacted to the sight of her dying father by shouting repeatedly that he had 
killed her mother. J.T.’s threats to kill might have seemed routine because 
he repeated them so frequently but the witnesses around Judy took those 
lethal threats seriously.503 Justice Martin’s dissent emphasized the 
conviction of those around Judy that she could not escape and could not find 
help.504 Judy believed it, and the people around her believed it. The family 
believed they could not help her and stood by, “intimidated by her husband 
into acquiescing in his torture of her.”505 In some cases, intimate partner 
violence takes place in secret; in other cases, family, friends, or others see 
incidents of violence. J.T. may have liked having witnesses to his 
performances of violent power and control. “[H]e did it a lot when other[s] 
. . . [were] around; he was showing off . . . .”506  
Eyewitness belief presents an important issue in self-defense. When 
evidence is available that a defendant’s actual fear of a threat was shared by 
eyewitnesses, that shared belief speaks to the very essence of reasonableness 
in self-defense—the question of whether others familiar with her 
circumstances would share her perception. Similarly, when witnesses share 
a perception that escape is impossible, the jury should be allowed to consider 
that evidence when weighing imminence and necessity.507 The dissent relied 
on that approach in its conclusion: “If the evidence in support of self-defense 
is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of a rational juror 
                                                                                                                     
499 Norman II, 378 S.E.2d 8, 18 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
500 See Angel, supra note 10, at 70–71 (discussing witness testimony that addressed the abuse and 
Judy’s mother’s belief that  J.T. would kill Judy). 
501 Supra text accompanying note 189 (quoting Judy that she believed J.T.’s threat to kill her). 
502 Transcript, supra note 1, at 36–37; Mahoney, supra note 10, at 92 (“[T]he day before he died, 
her husband had essentially attempted her murder: rather than fulfilling his duty to save her life when 
she attempted suicide, he had done all he could to cause her to die and prevent others from saving her.”); 
Angel, supra note 10, at 70–71. 
503 Angel, supra note 10, at 71.  
504 See State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 18 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting 
that witnesses were convinced Judy could not escape and that witness accounts described Judy’s 
interactions with social service agencies and the law that convinced Judy she could not find help). 
505 Id. at 269-70. 
506 See supra text accompanying note 90 (quoting testimony of Mark Navarra). 
507 In his dissent, Justice Martin cited the belief of witnesses that Judy could not escape the family’s 
inability to defend her against torture and the testimony of witnesses about Judy’s fear that J.T. would 
kill her. Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 17–19 (Martin, J., dissenting).  
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whether the state has proved an intentional killing without justification or 
excuse, self-defense must be submitted to the jury. This is such a case.”508 
Indeed, Norman had so many eyewitnesses that we must remember not to 
create a standard that would demand a similar abundance of eyewitness 
evidence to reach the jury. 
If courts ignore that shared perception of threat, judges can create a 
different moral problem by disqualifying or disregarding the perceptions of 
the closest witnesses. Even though Laverne was still struggling to help, 
intimate terrorism had persuaded the family that Judy could not escape. Her 
help-seeking continued to fail. A juror might find that the witnesses had 
evaluated the situation correctly. These witnesses’ perceptions of danger 
cannot be treated as relevant only to “subjective” belief—that approach 
would move away from the core principle that gives the determination of 
reasonableness to the jury.  
If courts fail to treat shared terror as relevant to the “objective” prong of 
self-defense, they will create a new moral hazard in which the most lethal 
batterers could convince more people of lethal danger without adding to the 
evidence in favor of reasonable self-defense. The fact that witnesses shared 
Judy’s belief would not automatically validate her perception as reasonable, 
but their belief must be relevant to whether the jury must evaluate 
reasonableness. Scholarly debates suffered from the idea of impaired 
perception in battered women. The debates on Norman should have 
recognized the importance of the discussion of eyewitness perception in the 
dissent.  
D. Was it Possible to Help Judy Norman? 
Was help more available than Judy and her family believed? What kind 
of intervention or assistance would have made Judy Norman safe? An 
example from a rural area in the early 1990s illustrates some elements of a 
successful intervention. Kathy Strahm, a young prosecutor in rural Brown 
County, Indiana, met Martha Boroughs, a defendant charged with writing a 
bad check who sought a continuance to allow her to repay the money.509 
Martha Boroughs said that her husband John Boroughs had written the 
check, but begged Strahm to allow her to pay it off anyway; she feared her 
husband. The next week, a state police detective told Strahm that Martha 
was in “real trouble” because John had begun choking her into 
unconsciousness and might kill her soon. Together, the detective and the 
prosecutor arranged for John to begin serving a jail sentence on traffic 
charges in another county. Then they offered Martha an opportunity to press 
                                                                                                                     
508 Id. at 21. 
509 This account of Martha Boroughs’s experience is based on an interview with Kathy Strahm 
reported in Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in 
THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59, 83–84 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk 
eds., 1994). 
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charges. After John had been in jail for more than a month, Martha felt safe 
enough to reveal a story of grotesque violence in a marriage that lasted only 
two years. Repeatedly, John had beaten and raped her; he had kicked, 
confined, and choked her. The battering caused an abscess in the bone that 
scarred her face. John tortured her with electric shocks, and during his calls 
from jail, Martha recorded his threats to apply electrical shocks to her eyes 
when he returned. 
Martha Boroughs had made complaints to police, but that record looked 
like complaints filed by many women—separate incident reports, each on a 
recent episode of abuse. She had not pursued prosecution. John always 
eventually got out of jail. He had threatened that if she left, he would punish 
her and force her to return by killing her children and her father, one after 
another, and she believed him.  
The state brought fifty-two criminal charges against John Boroughs, 
including five counts of attempted murder, eight counts of battery, fourteen 
counts of intimidation, and several counts of rape and deviate sexual 
conduct. Every incident of violence became part of the pattern of controlling 
and abusive behavior. The judge split the case into several separate trials 
covering different time periods. In the first trial, the jury convicted John 
Boroughs and the judge sentenced him to eighty-five years; the appellate 
court affirmed his conviction. Strahm concluded that serious concern for 
Martha’s safety had been crucial to successful prosecution.510 
Such an intervention might have helped Judy Norman, but that 
intervention required a knowledge of households and relationships that 
exists in very few communities, then or now. Saving Martha Boroughs 
brought together a young prosecutor and a veteran detective who paid 
attention to details and people. Is this a story of alert law enforcement, or is 
it a fairy-tale ending possible only in a small community under ideal 
conditions?511 What would it take to institutionalize this kind of support and 
to enable domestic violence victims to rely on it? 
Many years later, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, D.C. 
developed a Victim-Informed Prosecution program to serve victim-
witnesses who had the most severe histories of violence: “A special team, 
including criminal prosecutors, civil lawyers, and victim advocates provides 
intensive and fully coordinated legal, social, and safety services for these 
women. Team members receive extensive training and meet bimonthly to 
engage in detailed planning and strategy sessions that uniquely meet each 
                                                                                                                     
510 Id. at 83–85. 
511 In 1990, Brown County had a population of about 14,000 people. IND. BUS. RESEARCH CTR. AT 
THE IND. SCH. OF BUS., 1990 Census of Population and Housing, STATSINDIANA, 
http://www.stats.indiana.edu/c90/counties/brown_prof.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).  
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victim’s needs.”512 Perhaps multiple team members, specializing in fully 
coordinated services, could have protected Judy Norman with her 
nontraditional household. But Victim-Informed Prosecution was a pilot 
program.513 It could not have served everyone in need, and it is not clear 
whether any victim could rely on finding such extensive help. When family 
networks and local police did not protect her, Judy Norman had no 
comparable resources to which to turn. 
E. Context and Imminence, Justification and Excuse 
Imminence is a contextual evaluation. It must matter to temporal 
urgency whether the person threatened is mobile or chained in place; it must 
matter whether an attacker appears capable of moving quickly or slowly. 
The legal evaluation of threat is based on both what the defendant actually 
perceived and what a reasonable person in her situation would have 
perceived.514 Scholars err when they treat the perception of threat in 
battering as if arguing for imminence in Norman necessarily involves 
making reasonableness more “subjective.”515 The claim that no reasonable 
person could possibly see imminent threat in a sleeping man depends on 
unspoken premises that death is the only relevant threat, escape is possible, 
and sleep will last for a while. 
Professor Dressler has written extensively in this field, rejecting justified 
self-defense for Judy Norman. He argues that no reasonable person could 
see imminent threat in J.T. Norman as he slept. “Indeed, if Judy Norman did 
believe, because of BWS, that her sleeping husband represented an 
instantaneous threat, . . . [i]t should suggest that there was something wrong 
with Judy Norman’s psychological connection to reality.”516 He sees expert 
evidence as incompatible with the reasonableness standard because 
reasonableness cannot be judged “from the perspective of someone who, by 
definition, is experiencing a set of symptoms that renders her state of mind 
abnormal[.]”517   
                                                                                                                     
512 See Goodman et al., supra note 56, at 331 (citation omitted) (proposing that these programs may 
help address the needs of women for whom social support networks do not diminish the recurrence of 
abuse). 
513 See Lauren Bennett Cattaneo et al., The Victim-Informed Prosecution Project: A 
Quasi-Experimental Test of a Collaborative Model for Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 15(10) 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1227, 1228 (2009) (evaluating whether the program increased the sense of 
voice for women who participated). 
514 See Nourse, supra note 18, at 1295–96 (“[C]ourts adopt a self-defense standard that is both 
objective and subjective.”). 
515 See id. at 1239, 1277–78; Mahoney, supra note 218, text accompanying notes 324-44 
(recounting a long history of majority and minority trends in self-defense standards that are later 
categorized as “subjective” and “objective”). 
516 Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 464 (asserting that lack of 
connection to reality “is an argument of excuse, not justification by self defense.”). 
517 Id.  
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Dressler seeks a defense for Judy Norman consistent with perceived 
lack-of-threat in the facts. He argues for the adoption of an excuse defense 
based in duress rather than justified self-defense in cases like Norman.518 His 
reasoning illustrates the interaction of ideas about the “syndrome” with 
arguments about substantive law.519 Treating the subject of expert evidence 
as “intimate partner violence and its effects” and replacing “learned 
helplessness” with “the effects of intimate partner violence” can change 
these debates. 
There are two kinds of errors built into the argument as Dressler 
constructs it. There are underlying factual mistakes involving time and the 
nature of the threat: a nap or a “midnight shooting”; the threat of death or 
the threat of violent, forcible sex trafficking. But the argument also rests on 
mistaken ideas about “syndrome” evidence. Even if Dressler reconsidered 
the time of day and trafficking, some of his objections to a self-defense 
instruction rest on his concepts of “battered woman syndrome” and “learned 
helplessness.” 
His argument against justification was built on the idea that expert 
evidence on intimate partner violence necessarily describes pathology and 
also on the idea that a pathologizing account or an account of impairment is 
inconsistent with a finding of reasonableness.520 The first of these linked 
concepts misunderstands expert evidence on intimate partner violence, but 
the second misunderstands reasonableness itself. For example, if Judy 
Norman had been intoxicated, impairment would be relevant but would not 
rule out self-defense if a sober person would have perceived the same threat. 
The vulgar version of “learned helplessness” influences this  treatment of 
impairment, especially when applied to the prior conclusion that reasonable 
perception of imminent threat is impossible in the Norman facts.521 There is 
some circular reasoning here: expert testimony seems to support or justify a 
threat perception that—if honestly held—would necessarily show impaired 
perception; therefore, support for the perception of imminence must rest on 
treating impaired perception as reasonable. This reasoning led Dressler to 
reject justified self-defense and turn to duress.  
                                                                                                                     
518 See Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters, supra note 10, at 278 (“As 
it turns out, the no-fair-opportunity claim suggested here looks a great deal like the rationale for the 
existing defence of duress.”). 
519 Id. at 276–77 (criticizing “syndrome-type” evidence as potentially demeaning to an accused, and 
promoting “no-fair-opportunity” excuses as providing a “potential syndrome-free zone” where an 
accused can show that she is not blameworthy because she “acted as an ordinary individual might have 
behaved in similar circumstances”). 
520 See, e.g., id. at 268–69 (“The conceptual—and even practical—effect of BWS evidence is to 
pathologize the Judy Normans of the world. . . . Even if [BWS] evidence [supports] a . . . belief that the 
sleeping abuser is an imminent threat . . . there is no basis for claiming that such a belief is reasonable . . 
. .”). 
521 Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 463. 
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Professor Dressler understands that imminence is contextual. He 
approves the Model Penal Code approach that “asks whether the necessity 
to use the defensive force is immediately at hand.”522 Invoking Norman, 
Dressler offers an illustration of the difference between the Model Penal 
Code and common law: 
For example, suppose that Judy Norman had been in her 
kitchen making dinner when J.T. entered the kitchen and said 
to her, “This is it, bitch. Today you die. I am going to the 
bedroom, getting my gun, and killing you here and now.” He 
then turns toward the bedroom, and Judy takes this moment 
with his back turned to lethally stab him in the back with a 
large kitchen knife . . . . Judy would very likely win in a Model 
Penal Code jurisdiction: The use of force was “immediately 
necessary . . . on the present occasion.” If she waited for J.T. 
to return with the gun, to be sure that he meant business, she 
would have been helpless.523 
His view of context and imminence has evolved or been clarified over 
time. In an exchange with Professor Holly Maguigan at Fordham in 2011, 
Dressler found sufficient evidence to send self-defense to the jury in some 
hypotheticals that involved a sleeping abuser: one in which the abuser had a 
baby in the bed and said he would shoot the baby as soon as he woke up, 
and one in which the abuser had a weapon and said he would shoot the 
woman as soon as he woke up.524 He went even further with a hypothetical 
in which the man had made no explicit threat and had previously attacked 
without killing her.525 Although Dressler noted those facts were weaker, he 
would allow a self-defense instruction if the woman testified that she could 
tell circumstances had changed, and that the abuser was going to kill her 
when he woke up.526 He would trust the jury to evaluate the timing of sleep 
and danger to determine the reasonableness of deadly force.527 “The longer 
                                                                                                                     
522 Id. at 468 n.27 (emphasis omitted). 
523 Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2016)). I agree with this discussion 
of the Model Penal Code standard and its application to the kitchen hypothetical. 
524 Dressler & Maguigan, supra note 11, at 13–14. 
525 See id. at 14–15 (“I knew, I could tell from the look in his eye, I knew. He had never done this 
before. I knew that when he woke up he was going to blow me away.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
526 Id. 
527 Id. at 14–15. This approach represents some shift in Dressler’s position from previous work in 
which he used the term “nonconfrontational” broadly and opposed justified self-defense in 
“nonconfrontational” homicides. See Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 
457 (grouping together as nonconfrontational situations in which abusers are sleeping, watching 
television, and eating dinner); Dressler, Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra 
note 29, at 1485 (grouping together as nonconfrontational situations in which abusers are sleeping or 
watching television). 
 
 762 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:3 
the period of time during the night between when she did it and when he was 
going to wake up, and whether or not she should have really believed his 
threat, given everything we know about them, etc., etc., I would let the jury 
make that determination.”528 
 Professor Dressler’s 2011 position moves toward a time-frame that 
might allow a self-defense instruction in Norman if his analysis recognized 
the difference between the nap and “midnight”529 and addressed self-defense 
against violent sexual slavery. He did not choose any bright line for the 
length of sleep that a jury could evaluate. But if the Model Penal Code allows 
the jury to consider self-defense in his kitchen hypothetical,530 it should 
allow that instruction in Norman. J.T. might awaken from his nap in less 
time than would be required to get a gun from another room in Dressler’s 
hypothetical. The uncertain time involved in leaving the kitchen and 
returning with a gun undermines the moral argument against allowing any 
time lapse because an abuser might have a change of heart.531 Uncertainty 
does not answer the question of reasonableness: the timing of a nap is more 
difficult to estimate than a walk to and from another room. Nonetheless, if a 
reasonable juror could find that in the kitchen Judy had a right to stab J.T. in 
the back, then a nap should not make jury consideration unavailable as a 
matter of law. 
Most scholars writing on imminence and justification have not yet 
addressed Judy’s statement that she could not endure more trafficking with 
increased violence.532 Recognizing that looming threat would not ensure a 
                                                                                                                     
528 Dressler & Maguigan, supra note 11, at 14 (emphasis added). Dressler also said that it would be 
a “different situation” if there were a specific statement of intent, for example, “when I wake up I’m 
going to kill you.” Id. Of course, the imminent trafficking in Norman was so well-established that the 
judicial opinions and scholars treated it as a fact, not a threat. However, consistent with almost all 
scholarly discussion, the hypothetical facts posed to Dressler and Maguigan in the Fordham exchange 
included only the threat of death, not a threat of trafficking.  
529 Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abuser, supra note 29, at 468 n.27. 
530 See hypothetical in text accompanying note 523, supra. 
531 A change of heart remains a possibility in the kitchen hypothetical. J.T. might get to the other 
room and reach for the gun but, seeing a family Bible nearby, be overcome by awareness that murder is 
wrong and divorce is a better option. (Religion did appear briefly in the Norman record when Mark 
Navarra testified about an exchange between Judy and her niece about going to church. Transcript, supra 
note 1, at 51–52. Or, J.T. might trip and break his leg on the way, creating a period of disability in which 
Judy could organize the family to reach safety—or his heart might soften. Dressler concedes that a 
reasonable person would not be required to rely on a possible change in the threat. See Dressler, Battered 
Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 468 n.27 (“The common law, if strictly followed, would 
probably suggest that she acted prematurely . . . . But, Judy would very likely win in a Model Penal Code 
Jurisdiction . . . . If she waited for J.T. to return with the gun, to be sure that he meant business, she would 
have been helpless.”). That should also be true of J.T. Norman’s nap. 
532 Dressler’s casebook quotes her full statement from the transcript about this fear, see DRESSLER 
& GARVEY, supra note 414, at 521, but that fear is not part of Dressler’s analysis of threat. This omission 
is similar to George Fletcher’s unqualified statement that Judy could kill to defend her sexual autonomy 
and his simultaneous lack of discussion of the threat of violent trafficking that Judy described from the 
stand. Fletcher, supra note 405. 
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jury finding that deadly force was reasonable. The crucial point is that the 
invisibility of trafficking in the legal imagination has been a silent basis for 
arguments that reject self-defense in Norman. This issue of resistance to 
violent trafficking invites scholarly debate to address its ramifications.533 
At Fordham, Dressler explained that his objection to self-defense in 
Norman depended on his ideas about the “syndrome”: “My criticism of that 
case . . . is the infusion of the Battered Woman Syndrome evidence as the 
way to prove imminence . . . .”534 That statement might change if he 
reconsidered expert evidence as testimony on intimate partner violence and 
its effects. It would also be necessary to reevaluate the relationship of expert 
evidence to the jury instruction. A tactical decision to call or not call an 
expert cannot trigger a per se rule against relevance to a self-defense 
instruction—expert evidence is part of all the evidence in a case. The legal 
question involves the burden on the state to disprove self-defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt: once the defendant has introduced evidence toward self-
defense, might even one juror conclude that the prosecution had failed to 
prove that a reasonable person in Judy’s position would not find it necessary 
to act immediately while J.T. slept? Understanding intimate partner violence 
and its effects (or a close reading of Dr. Tyson’s testimony on coercive 
control) should answer Dressler’s concern that “syndrome” evidence would 
use impairment to prove reasonableness in the perception of imminence.  
The argument for an excuse defense based in duress seeks to avoid 
“learned helplessness” while framing an explanation for the reasons Judy 
had not separated from J.T.535 (Here, substituting “the effects of intimate 
partner violence” for “learned helplessness” should address his concerns.) 
Dressler’s proposal builds on earlier suggestions that duress claims are 
appropriate when a defendant has had “no-fair-opportunity”536 take other 
actions.537  
The duress proposal has serious problems. As others have pointed out 
and Professor Dressler has recognized, J.T. did not compel Judy to kill him 
in a way similar to the legal concept of duress.538 In some domestic violence 
                                                                                                                     
533 Dressler & Maguigan, supra note 11, at 1, 15. 
534 Id. at 15. 
535 See Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 470 (asserting that 
“battered woman’s learned helplessness . . . is not relevant” and proposing alternative reasons Judy did 
not separate from J.T). 
536 See id. at 469 (discussing situations in which a defendant has no fair opportunity). 
537 UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 7TH ED., supra note 418, at 245; see also Rosen, supra note 
358, at 22, 24 (discussing excuse and the lack of fair opportunity in battered women’s self-defense cases, 
citing Joshua Dressler’s earlier discussion of no-fair-opportunity). 
538 See Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 470 n.31 (discussing 
duress and the Model Penal Code § 2.09); Krause, supra note 32, at 567–68 (comparing Dressler’s 
approach to the Model Penal Code’s duress defense). See also Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-
Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV.11, 
22 (1986) (discussing excuse when the circumstances allow “no fair opportunity to choose whether to 
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cases, the facts sound in both self-defense and duress—for example, if an 
abuser puts a gun in the middle of the table and says, “Kill me or I will kill 
you.”539 But basic self-defense inquiries about threat, reasonableness, and 
initial aggressor can address those facts without turning to the law of duress.  
The criminal defense of duress—the claim that someone acted because 
another person made a threat that a reasonable person could not withstand—
speaks to Judy’s circumstances but does not address the reasons she gave for 
killing J.T.540 J.T. compelled Judy to live in a way that allowed no escape, 
but he did not make her kill him. He held her there through pain, deprivation, 
and credible threats including death; duress forced her to commit 
prostitution. He was going to commit acts worse than the terrible things he 
had already done to her. She was trying to avoid trafficking more violent 
than ever, and she was trying not to die. Duress does not capture that 
struggle.  
The duress proposal falls short in several ways. It does not eliminate 
questions about reasonableness, since both approaches require that a “person 
of reasonable firmness”541 would have responded the same way. Applying 
duress to homicide would abandon one of its bright-line rules.542 And duress 
creates a slope at least as slippery as self-defense. Duress would not solve 
concerns about jury nullification—a jury that cannot bear to convict can use 
whichever theory the instructions offer. If it is appropriate to change the 
duress rule itself, the arguments for and against such a change should not 
rest on the Norman case.  
Dressler’s criticism of self-defense in Norman does not address the 
question jurors must answer. Placing the imminence of a threat in context 
does not mean asking jurors whether J.T. was a bad man. It asks the jury to 
look closely at what Judy feared in the context she faced. J.T. created 
circumstances in which the family believed Judy was going to die while 
simultaneously ensuring that, if she did not take the steps for which he had 
threatened instant death, no one could predict the exact moment when death 
would come. Brutal trafficking loomed. Judy saw no way to escape, neither 
did her family, and Dr. Tyson saw nothing in the record to contradict her 
                                                                                                                     
commit the harm,” citing several sources including Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A 
Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 421, 444–50 (1982)).  
539 Cf. R v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, 857 (Can.) (recounting the defendant’s statement that 
her boyfriend pulled her out of the closet where she was hiding from him, hit her repeatedly, then handed 
her a gun; she considered killing herself but did not; then she shot him after he told her “something to 
the effect of ‘either you kill me or I’ll kill you’” and turned around.). 
540 See Duress, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining duress and providing 
examples).  
541 Krause, supra note 32, at 567. 
542 Id. at 568 (“Few jurisdictions have followed the MPC . . . and the defense cannot be invoked for 
homicides.”). 
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belief that help was unavailable.543 The reasonable evaluation of imminent 
threat should consider both escalating danger and J.T.’s strategic 
destabilization and defeat of all other methods of coping with those threats. 
Persistent ideas about “learned helplessness” shape Professor Dressler’s 
discussion of duress and excuse. Even though Dressler acknowledged in the 
Fordham exchange that testimony on “battering and its effects” might be 
relevant to the question of reasonableness,544 his subsequent work has not 
been not consistent on this point.545 Although that discussion receded from 
opposition to a self-defense instruction in all cases involving sleeping 
abusers, “syndrome” misconceptions still interact with the analysis of self-
defense doctrine. 
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
Judy Norman lived in the same area of North Carolina until she died in 
2007 after an extended illness. Her online obituary noted that she had lived 
in both Chicago and North Carolina, and that she had worked at Cone 
Mills.546 Three of her children survived her, as did her sister and her 
mother.547 She probably did not know that her losing appeal became an 
iconic case that generated decades of debates in criminal law. 
In the end, what should legal scholars learn from the Norman case? We 
could start with humility. When it seems to us that social scientists and 
courts have been foolish, contradictory, and trapped within outdated puzzles, 
legal scholars should check to see whether there is anything we have missed. 
(That lesson, of course, applies broadly—the mistakes about Norman 
become an example of the cost of failing to take that approach.) Here, much 
of the scholarly debate missed evidence in the published opinions and vast 
                                                                                                                     
543 State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 18 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. 
Tyson’s testimony at trial: “Mrs. Norman didn't leave because she believed, fully believed that escape 
was totally impossible . . . . [S]he believed the law could not protect her; no one could protect her, and I 
must admit, looking over the records, that there was nothing done that would contradict that belief”). 
544 Dressler & Maguigan, supra note 11, at 16–17. Responding to Maguigan’s description of a 
different framework on “battering and its effects,” Dressler acknowledged that his earlier opinion that 
expert evidence was relevant to subjective belief was based on “the old Lenore Walker-type testimony” 
and seemed to reconsider relevance to reasonableness, stating: “[T]he crux of it will be whether or not it 
is relevant to the objective portion of the standard, whether it was a reasonable belief. And, as you say, 
it depends on the facts and it depends on exactly what the nature of the testimony is.” 
545 See UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 7TH ED., supra note 418, at 245–47 (discussing whether 
“a battering victim who kills in nonconfrontational circumstances” should be able to claim self-defense); 
id. at 246 n.147 (explaining why the “syndrome” label should be avoided); JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 243–44 (6th ed. 2012) (treating “battering and its effects” only as a 
label designed to avoid the word syndrome, continuing to equate expert testimony with Walker’s theories, 
and arguing against the relevance of syndrome testimony to reasonableness in cases involving sleeping 
abusers). 
546 Harrelson Funeral and Cremation Services, Judy Norman, http://hosting-
9639.tributes.com/obituary/show/Judy-Norman-95106577 (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
547 Id. (noting that her surviving family also included brothers, another sister, seven grandchildren 
and two great-grandchildren). 
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changes in the world of social science that had already entered legal cases 
and law reviews.  
We should reckon with the threats women describe. Judy Norman 
testified to both her fear of death and her inability to face a night of violent 
trafficking worse than she had ever known. The failure of scholars to reckon 
with that second threat was an unforced error that has warped our debates.  
More broadly, we must remember that struggle is relevant and important 
to understanding oppression, whether or not that struggle succeeds. It is a 
mistake to treat defeat as if it meant failure to try. It is a mistake to define a 
woman’s traits by the defeat of her efforts. When Judy Norman leaves her 
husband repeatedly and is caught again and again, when she calls for help 
repeatedly and cannot find it, when she decides against strategies that he 
says and the witnesses around her believe would mean instant death—those 
desperate circumstances should not turn into a narrative about passivity. 
Recognizing those struggles would discourage the tendency to misread 
expert testimony as an explanation for passivity.  
Finally, Norman is only one of many examples of the misunderstandings 
that the concepts of “syndrome” and “learned helplessness” have brought to 
legal scholarship. Moving away from these outdated and misunderstood 
constructs is vital for legal work on intimate partner violence, not only for 
work on the Norman case. Making that change will allow us to see more 
clearly the real dangers women face from violent intimate partners, the 
efforts these women make, the interventions they need, and the respect with 
which we should treat their capacity for resistance, survival, and change. 
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APPENDIX: MODEL OF COERCION IN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (MARY 
ANN DUTTON & LISA A. GOODMAN)
SOURCE: Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner 
Violence: Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 746 fig.1 (2005). 
